On October 8, 2018, INSS held a conference to present a strategic framework for the Israeli-Palestinian arena. The plan was formulated at INSS to improve Israel's strategic situation in this arena and halt the drift toward a one-state situation. The plan, which aims to preserve Israel's existence as a Jewish, democratic, secure, and moral state, was drawn up by INSS researchers, former senior officials in public service, diplomats, and security personnel, as well as key figures involved in the negotiating process.

Amos Yadlin, INSS Director

Israel currently has no strategy for dealing with the Palestinian threat, which is a threat to Israel's DNA as a Jewish and democratic state. The right speaks about the status quo, but in practice conducts a process that is leading us to a single state.

For 30 years, the struggle has been between two paradigms that are divorced from reality: "two states now" versus "one state tomorrow." Experience indicates that a permanent overall agreement in the framework of a two-state solution is not possible in the near future, while a one-state solution jeopardizes Israel's future as a Zionist country. Therefore, INSS and its partners propose a third paradigm. The core of this paradigm is an immediate arrest of the dangerous drift toward a single state on the one hand, and an end to the waiting for the Palestinians to agree to peace. This paradigm rests on instituting measures that shape a situation that will serve Israeli interests. The aim is to safeguard Israel's existence as a Jewish, democratic, secure, and just state.

These measures include underscoring anew Israel's willingness to sign a general peace agreement; in the absence of an agreement, re-dividing the territory of Judea and Samaria in order to create a contiguous Palestinian space on 65% of the territory, while delineating areas under Israeli control, including the major settlement blocs and areas of strategic interest; freezing construction in Jewish communities east of the security fence; preserving Israel's operational freedom of action in the entire area; completion of construction of the security fence; and launching a comprehensive economic plan for reconstruction and development of the Palestinian territory.

In contrast to the disengagement from the Gaza Strip, security will be left completely in Israel's hands. Not all of the territory will be evacuated, no Jewish communities will be dismantled, and there will be no withdrawal to the Green Line. The process will be coordinated and controlled.

This plan enables Israel to take proactive action to improve its future situation. Israel will be willing to conduct negotiations with the Palestinians at any time. If they do not cooperate, Israel will act independently, while maintaining its security and obtaining backing from the international community and the Arab world.

Udi Dekel, INSS Managing Director

  • The objective

The underlying objective of the plan is a Jewish, democratic, secure, and moral State of Israel in recognized borders with international legitimacy, based on a solid Jewish majority.

We may feel that we are in a status quo situation, but in fact, the current trend is drifting toward a one-state situation. The significance of this situation is described at length in the published framework. The problem is that this drift threatens the ideal of the state we want to achieve, and that facts are established that create a trap from which it will be difficult to escape. We want to generate movement toward an escape from the trap.

  • Examination of alternatives

In working on the plan, we did not begin with a predetermined result. We considered 12 possible alternatives in light of a series of future scenarios and criteria. We found three elements that recurred in all of the non-two-state alternatives: 1) Much more difficult decisions were required in comparison with the "two states for two peoples" alternative; 2) The implementation process is much more difficult; 3) Long-term security stability cannot be guaranteed. The conclusion is that the sole alternative that survives different scenarios is the two-state alternative.

  • The problem

Agreement with the Palestinians cannot be achieved at present. Every previous attempt to achieve a permanent agreement was prevented by an unbridgeable difference on core issues. The other paths attempted in the past failed: 1) An interim settlement – rejected by the Palestinians out of fear that the temporary will become permanent; 2) A regional settlement – There is no willingness to act without progress between Israel and the Palestinians; 3) A state in temporary borders – rejected by the Palestinians; 4) Unilateral disengagement – the territory is abandoned to terrorism. We want to move beyond all this.

  • The opportunity

At present, Israel has maximum strategic opportunities, including: a friendly American administration; flexibility in the Arab world; a lowering of Palestinian prestige – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer the main conflict in the Middle East; most of the public in Israel supports separation – despite a slight decline, the majority is still in favor; the international community is struggling to preserve the two-state option, and there is realization that the entire conflict cannot be solved in one effort and acceptance that stages are necessary; Israel is strong and resilient.

  • The idea

The plan combines elements from different political alternatives: 1) Interim arrangements that build an infrastructure for a two-state solution in the long term in coordination with the Palestinians, if possible; 2) Independent steps if the other routes are blocked in order to demonstrate the seriousness of Israel's intentions and deprive the Palestinians of a veto on progress towards the goal; 3) A regional element – guarantees and securities as an accompanying measure. The plan creates a modular route that facilitates progress towards the target, while moving between the various elements.

The guiding principles are: 1) This is not a solution; it is a way of creating conditions for the future; 2) This is the move to take an Israeli initiative and clarify intentions, in contrast to recent years, in which we merely responded – to effect a change in the existing drift and create an infrastructure for separation; 3) Defined territorial-security interests – we define them for ourselves; 4) An effort to attain agreement and coordination with the Palestinians, but with the understanding that progress can also be made independently; 5) Coordination with the US; 6) A positive Arab environment as a tailwind; 7) Assets are not handed over – rather, we are released from the demographic and moral burden.

The framework fits very well with the Trump administration's plan. If/when it is made public, it will be clear that there are similar elements to the plan proposed here.

  • The framework
  • Defining and reorganizing the territory of Judea and Samaria – 65% of the territory as a basis for a Palestinian state
  • Continued operational freedom of action in the entire territory
  • Completion of the security fence – the separation demarcation
  • Reducing Israeli control over the Palestinians and friction between the populations
  • Strengthening Palestinian infrastructure, governance, and economy
  • Distinctions between settlement blocs (which we want as part of the State of Israel in the future), where there will be continued construction; and isolated Jewish communities, where there will be a construction freeze aimed at demonstrating Israel's seriousness and refraining from establishing facts on the ground
  • There is no evacuation of Jewish communities at this stage. We are not engaging in this or other core issues, such as refugees – these will be dealt with only as part of a permanent settlement.

Organization of territory in Judea and Samaria:

  • Creating a uniform Palestinian area in Areas A and B – constituting 40% of the West Bank and 95% of the Palestinian population – these will be transferred to the Palestinians for their management and administration.
  • Reserving an additional 25% of Area C for Palestinian infrastructure development and economic projects. These are territories that can be given completely to the Palestinians in the future with no evacuation of Jewish communities. International parties have proposed a mechanism of an international bank to manage these projects in order to make sure that the money reaches its destination.
  • Creating a transportation system that will make territorial contiguity possible, reduce friction, and remove barriers to economic development.
  • Distinguishing between settlement blocs, where there will be continued construction – and isolated Jewish communities, where construction will be frozen. No annexation measures will be taken, because these will take the Palestinians out of the picture.
  • Anchoring security interests – there will be no Palestinian security or civilian control in the Jordan Valley, traffic arteries, or strategic sites.

A security solution:

An entire section of the published framework describes a complete security solution, including maintaining independent capabilities, such as operational freedom of action in the field, restrictions on the capabilities of the Palestinian security agencies, and so forth; cooperation with the agencies of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Egypt, Jordan, and others; and integrating the economic-civilian aspect, such as work in Israel and freedom of movement in Areas A and B.

The situation of the PA:

We conducted part of this work with a Palestinian group (which cooperated until the transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem). We considered three PA situations: functional, hostile, and disintegrated. We prefer a hostile PA to a disintegrated PA.

We will try to do everything in order to cooperate with the PA. We want to strengthen its political elements and prevent a takeover of its area by Hamas and other negative groups. In addition, if there is willingness to negotiate, we are immediately willing to return to the table.

The Palestinian economy:

There is a section in the framework concerning the Palestinian economy. At this stage, we have an interest in aiding the Palestinian economy. In the short term, we will support and advise, with the long term goal being Palestinian economic independence (without dependence on Israel).

The plan discusses an international aid program for the Palestinian economy, to be implemented through an international bank for development of the PA (under Quartet management). This is a multi-stage and gradual plan that includes: in the near future – individual projects that will reap relatively quick results (for example technological ventures, establishment of business zones); in the medium term – projects for strengthening the economy's function and generating capital, promoting existing international projects, and strengthening infrastructure (for example construction of industrial parks and upgrading agricultural technology; in the long term – depending on progress in the previous stages – accelerating ventures on a large scale (for example an independent tax collection system and reform in the educational system and higher education)

The regional element:

The regional route is not a substitute for the bilateral route and cannot exist without it. The Arab countries will not allow Israel to bypass the Palestinians. They want us to make progress, and then they will be willing to give their share, primarily in Palestinian aid.

The essential elements from the Arab countries' perspective are a credible Israeli commitment to a two-state solution; a positive attitude towards the Arab initiative; and concrete progress in a dialogue with the Palestinians.

Other challenges – Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip:

Jerusalem – The plan addresses possible action on the issue of Jerusalem if there is progress according to what is proposed. The Gaza Strip was considered separately, and recommendations for policy were formulated. This is a problem separate from the framework, and we support the policy of isolation and division.

These two issues are not a condition for progress in the plan.

  • The benefit for Israel

Usually, when we talk about what we are going to give, it is immediately asked what we will get from the Palestinians. We want to focus on how we profit from the plan:

Preserving a Jewish and democratic state: preserving the best options for us in the future; eliminating the Palestinian veto; reducing friction and control of another people; international legitimacy for Israel; promoting cooperation with the Arab world; promoting a regional and international effort for reconstruction in the Gaza Strip; preserving the status quo in the Holy Basin.

Even if we are thwarted at each stage of implementation of the plan, the situation will be better for us than what is happening today.

MK Naftali Bennett, Minister of Education and Diaspora Affairs

The plan is the same thing in a different guise – two states, a Palestinian state.

We are also shaping our fate today in accordance with the right's policy, without concessions or doing damage to ourselves.

The goal of establishing a Palestinian state is a mistake and divorced from the geopolitical reality in the region.

The INSS plan means suffocating the Jewish communities outside the settlement blocs. Freezing construction means that there is no future in these communities – kindergartens will not be built there and they will not be developed. Eli, Ofra, and Kiryat Arba will die. This is the position of the Zionist left – it is legitimate, but this is the position. I am opposed to it. There is a built-in assumption that in the end, we will abandon the civilian Jewish communities outside the settlement blocs. In the long term, security cannot exist without a civilian presence. If, God forbid, we remove these communities, we will see terrorist attacks in central Israel. The people living in the Jewish communities are a living group in the field. That is why the IDF is there and feels safe to move. If there is no life in the field, we will leave there in the end, and there is no security there. The Gaza Strip is an example – everyone agrees that we do not want to enter the Gaza Strip.

As for international legitimacy, past experience following such measures shows that they are forgotten shortly afterwards (for example, the evacuation of Gush Katif). Israel's international status is improving now without concessions. Giving things away does not necessarily gain respect. It is clear that the Palestinians will say that the idea of 65% of the territory is unacceptable to them, and if that is the case, no country in the world will bestow legitimacy upon this.

I agree on one point, with one difference – living conditions and territorial contiguity. I oppose giving up territory, but I am in favor of contiguity of movement and full freedom of movement throughout Judea and Samaria, without roadblocks. This is unrelated to sovereignty. Transportation contiguity without continuous sovereignty is possible.

Finally, there are two approaches since Oslo: 1) Cutting off contact – they are there and we are here, but if they shoot at us, we respond in full force. Past experience (in Lebanon, for example) shows that if we cut off contact, the hostile forces in the field become stronger. If we have to respond or fight, we will meet much stronger forces. 2) Continuous contact – Judea and Samaria is the only place where it can be said that Hamas and the enemy are under control (despite the terrible events that occur). The plan is an elegant way of leading us to two states (or three, including the Gaza Strip), with incendiary balloons and no hope. The alternative is our approach – it is not perfect, but there is hope in it. The situation is not perfect, but playing with it will bring about a catastrophe. I insist that we give the Arabs no more territory and do not establish a Palestinian state here.

MK Yair Lapid, Chairman of Yesh Atid

Today, the government has no idea regarding the Palestinian issue. They have taken it off the table. The most explosive problem is not being addressed. The government is passing the problem on to our children, who will face 7-10 million Palestinians.

I accept word for word what is written in the framework about the price that Israelis are paying for the existing situation and the risks of drifting into a single state.

As for the substance of the plan, it means abandoning a political initiative. The measures in it are unilateral, without taking advantage of an opportunity to reach a settlement at the regional level. The problem is not each measure in itself – the steps involved are important Israeli interests, for example the distinction between settlement blocs and isolated Jewish communities, but there is no political framework. This amounts to telling the public that there will be no political settlement.

The main lesson from the disengagement is that unilateral measures will not help. The question is whether there is anyone on the other side who shares the logic behind the measures.

Each of the measures is a bargaining chip. It is better for us to retain as many assets as possible and not give everything to the Palestinians already.

Weaknesses of the plan:

  • The moderate Arab countries will not cooperate with technical measures that do not mention reaching a settlement.
  • The Gaza Strip – The problem is what this plan does not say about it. This is a separate entity with different goals. The solution for it does not pass through Abu Mazen.
  • Jerusalem – I oppose any idea that includes the division of Jerusalem. The proposed metropolitan East Jerusalem is a euphemism for dividing the city. What should be discussed is how to reach a political settlement that does not include Jerusalem or the right of return.
  • The plan endorses the Palestinians' approach – Israel makes concessions and they can wait, and do not have to do anything. In the Middle East, when you give something for free, it is perceived as weakness.
  • The measures in the plan do not converge. Each measure has a different time for implementing it, every measure has a price, and every measure will be affected by any change in the situation (such as a terrorist attack or a claim at The Hague). The attempt to generate constructive ambiguity is what lay behind the Oslo spoilers. The proposal is a tactical one that enables the leadership to evade political measures instead of confronting them.
  • The plan rightly argues that we now enjoy an opportunity in the US and with the Arab world. I argued against both the plan and the government – historic opportunities are for a limited time frame – we do not have time to wait for construction of industrial projects in Area C.
  • What is missing in the framework is that it does not treat the Palestinians as a responsible party. The middle-of-the-road way requires the Palestinians to take responsibility for their lives and fate.

I support a regional summit at which a non-final agreement is reached that does not include Jerusalem or the right of return. Achieving an overall settlement of the kind previously proposed is hopeless. We should strive toward a political plan that deals with solvable problems – a plan that recognizes that if we are destined to manage a conflict, it is best to manage it against an entity that is a state. This is something that the world is able to accept. In the framework of a regional settlement, none of the steps will be assets that were previously thrown away; they will be included in the settlement.

MK Tzipi Livni, Head of the Opposition

The plan contains both a vision for the future and current steps that should be taken. Both are necessary.

Our national view involves a state that is Jewish, democratic, secure, and willing also to adopt what is "moral." This means separation from the Palestinians and two states for two peoples. At present, however, this cannot be achieved, so it is necessary to examine alternatives paths, without changing our goal.

We cannot be hostages of the other party's desires to reach or not reach a settlement with us. The Arabs did not accept Israel when it was established either, but in contrast to today's Jewish leadership, the leadership at the time chose a Jewish state. Some in the current administration prefer Israel to retain all of the land, even at the price of a Jewish state.

I am now willing to take tactical measures because there is no real status quo. The government is instituting measures daily so that in the future, we will be unable to separate from the Palestinians when we want to do so. The group doing this is a minority in both the country and the government. They are not there for security, but so that we will be unable to return the least bit of the entire land of Israel. When we choose the entire land of Israel, we are saying goodbye to democracy.

The Palestinians are now within us. I want to make them our neighbors. Construction of the security fence should be completed, as proposed in the plan. The right wants to prevent its construction and continue managing the conflict while we are one inside the other.

One important element in the plan is the basic realization that full security cannot be achieved through purely military means. Military and political measures must be combined. Israel's concept of security is not that we should be within every place from where there is a threat, just as we are not going to conquer Iran.

Similarly, peace with the Arabs without the Palestinians will not happen. I am saying this from my personal knowledge. When we make peace with the Palestinians, we will stop thinking that we have given and given, because at that moment, we are receiving something – normalization with the entire Arab world.

As for the PA, we should be grateful every day for Oslo and the existence of the PA. Two million Palestinians are not our responsibility. The same is true of two million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip because of the disengagement.

One more isolated Jewish settlement does not give security, and will prevent peace. These are slogans. The same is true of a settlement without Jerusalem. Things that were achieved in the past in negotiations that I conducted – agreement to a demilitarized country, Bush's letter to Sharon, which establishes that there is no right of return – were not achieved by my saying what would not be, but because I proposed a solution.

In contrast to what Lapid said, the important part of the plan is that it does not present independent measures as a substitute for a permanent solution. The vision we want to achieve is presented, and it is recognized that if it cannot be achieved now, actions should be taken that are good for us and support the path leading to it. We should certainly not put obstacles on this path.

Summary - Amos Yadlin

The framework is neither right nor left – it is an Israeli plan.

The Minister of Education regards himself as a Zionist, but he is leading the way to a post-Zionist state. He also regards himself as a Jew, but he is leading the way to a country that contravenes Jewish morality.

Our goal is not a Palestinian state. If that is a byproduct within parameters that Israel can live with, it will not be a problem. The goal of the plan, however, is to shape a Jewish state – the Israeli state.

This is not Disengagement 2. Let me make it clear – disengagement from the Gaza Strip is not a failure; it is a strategic success that was implemented incompetently. In the Gaza Strip, despite everything that is happening, one Israeli soldier and 200 Palestinians were killed in the past year. More Israelis were killed in Judea and Samaria than in the Gaza Strip. There is a border in the Gaza Strip on which the entire people, left and right, is united. Why not do the same in Judea and Samaria?

As I said, the disengagement was poorly implemented. Our plan is therefore exactly the opposite of the disengagement from the Gaza Strip: it preserves security and keeps the IDF on the scene; it upgrades the infrastructure and the economy in the West Bank; it does not cause a rift among the people by removing Jewish communities; and it does not return 100% of the territory to the Palestinians. We are cutting off contact with the civilian population and giving up control over another people, not over security questions. Where security is concerned, we have learned the lesson, and we will not repeat the mistake in the Gaza Strip.

Lapid talks about a regional summit. This is part of the plan. It must be with the Palestinians – will they accept Lapid's conditions? He is giving the Palestinians a veto. We are proposing taking the veto away from them.

The elements of the proposed plan are the only way of leading Israel to where it should go.