Moderator: Dr. Yoel Guzansky
Amb. Gerald Feierstein | Dr. Dore Gold | Amb. Dr. Martin Indyk
This panel explored prospects for Israel-Gulf relations, the current state of U.S.-Saudi relations, and the future likely involvement of China in the Gulf.
Yoel Guzansky: The Arab Gulf states now largely define the Arab agenda, due to the weakening of the traditional Arab political centers. The Gulf presents Israel with a variety of threats, including nuclear proliferation, and political instability. But it also presents Israel with several opportunities – including fight against common threats. The monarchies are confronting several challenges, from the need to rewrite the social contracts, to the uncertainty about the future of US regional policy and Iran’s nuclear program. Will Saudi Arabia join the nuclear club if Iran attains nuclear capability? Can the monarchs cope with challenges to the political order should instability emerge? What lies ahead for Israel-Gulf relations?
We are witnessing a gradual emergence of closer relations between Israel and some GCC states, coupled with cautious measures of normalization. Did 'the elephant' (i.e. the Palestinian issue) left the room? Can SA be relied upon to play a leading role in the peace process?
Martin Indyk (MI): From an American perspective, notwithstanding the huge differences between policies pursued by President Obama and those pursued by President Trump, there is a basic continuity in the “retrenchment” of the US in the Middle East and its pivot to Asia. It’s a pivot that is driven not by personality but by strategic calculation, after fifteen years of engagement with boots on the ground in the Middle East. There is also a sense that with the natural gas revolution in the US, in which America is now an exporter of energy and no longer dependent on the Gulf, there is a downgrading of the Middle East as a strategic priority for the U.S. The first strategic priority is dealing with the rise of China and the return of geopolitics. Secondary to that is Russia in the European theater. The Middle East no longer has a vital importance to the U.S. But America maintains key interests in the region, namely the security and stability of its allies, including Israel. As the American burden shifts, so too does the burden of maintaining the security and stability of our allies shift to powers in the region. But there’s a problem with this formula because Israel is naturally constrained by the complication of the Palestinian issue. The other problem is that the traditional Arab powers in the region – Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and so on – are not able to play an effective role. So that leaves Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states. Saudi Arabia is uniquely incapable of playing that role. In order to get the regional powers to cooperate with one another, there will need to be progress on the Palestinian front.
In 2014, former defense Minister, Lieberman, revealed that Israel had secret talks to establish full diplomatic ties with several Gulf countries "within a year or eighteen months". Was it wishful thinking?
Dore Gold (DG): Israel and many Sunni states have common interests, that much is clear. To the west, the common threat is terrorism. To the east, the common threat is Iran. In 2015, as Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I visited an important Arab state and met with my counterpart there. As I recounted our interests, going down the list, he grinned and noted that his interests were our interests. In the West there’s a desire for a public expression of that identity of interests. But frankly, we’re doing very well working quietly. In the Gulf, a public expression would be extremely useful because it would signal to the Iranians that they’re not having a veto power in the Israel-Gulf relationship. The special interests between Israel and the Gulf states began very early. The critical question is: how overt does the relationship need to be.
Some argue that the Khashoggi case poses a bigger challenge to Riyadh than 9/11! Back then the al-Saud were united and mobilized to preserve their interests. Nowadays, they are far from being unified. Maybe we should stop talking about family rule?
Gerald Feierstein (GF): The Khashoggi murder was the exemplar of a broader tendency in the Gulf, following on the Arab Spring, toward a more authoritarian approach in the interest of countering perceived threats. For MbS, the most important challenge is to establish his own credibility as a successor to King Salman. His behavior domestically reflects a push to solidify his control in the family and also more broadly in the society. Some of the things he has done, for example, the idea of Vision 2030, have been positive. But on the other hand, we’ve seen the tendency toward a more authoritarian regime, seen for example in the Ritz Carlton incident, Khashoggi, the arrest of many civil society activists, including women’s rights advocates. So the question is: is this a Chinese type of development model moving forward? Will it succeed? The economic picture is mixed, but it’s still early in the game. Will there be an Arab Spring in the Gulf states?
Internal dynamics grow more delicate the closer we get to Saudi succession. For the first time the crown is to be passed to a grandson of Ibn Saud, but MBS has yet to stabilize and fully consolidate his rule. Shouldn't we prepare contingency plans in the event instability occurs?
DG: Saudi Arabia’s interactions with Israel are different than the threats coming out of Syria, for example, so while contingency planning is always advisable, doing so publicly is not a good idea. MbS is in charge of the National Guard and the army, unlike previously when the relevant ministries were under the control of different brothers. So we don’t know what the probability is of considerable instability at the top.
Finally we have an American ambassador in Riyadh. Amb. Abizaid may be the right man, but he came at the worst time. Yemen war and Khashoggi renewed a debate about the value of the alliance. Will realpolitik prevail again?
MI: Saudi Arabia is a lynchpin for the overall U.S. approach to the region. What MbS is hugely consequential for the region. So if he succeeds in his reformist approach, it will change Saudi Arabia but it will also have a profound ripple effect around the Sunni Arab world because of Saudi Arabia’s leadership therein. But if he fails, it will be hugely consequential in the opposite direction. There is little evidence that MbS has learned anything from the international reaction to the murder of Khashoggi. So there is cause for concern, and the ability of outside players to influence him seems to be nonexistent.
America and the kingdom have changed dramatically since Roosevelt met King Abdul Aziz. Today, the world's largest oil producer is the US, not Saudi Arabia. Is Riyadh becoming more of a liability than an asset for the U.S.?
GF: It’s well over two years that the US hasn’t had an ambassador in Riyadh. It’s critically important for the US to have someone on the ground to broaden out the engagement beyond Jared Kushner and the King. This is a difficult moment in U.S.-Saudi relations. The challenges to that relationship will grow, not shrink, over the course of this year. The Democratic majority in Congress now has made clear they intend to examine the nature of the relationship, so it’s very possible we will see unpleasant hearings on the Hill in the coming months.
DG: The whole relationship can’t be reduced to oil. The critical factor has been Iran, which has been busy trying to extend its influence across the region for years, including in Bahrain but also within Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. There are Hezbollah branches operating in the Eastern Province. If the US decides to remove its carriers from the Gulf, it would have huge implications.
Washington is negotiating a "123 deal" with Riyadh, but the Saudis want the same thing Iran got – the right to enrich uranium. Last week the WP reviled, what appears to be, a secret, Chinese, ballistic missiles factory near Riyadh. Can Riyadh be trusted with nuclear capability?
MI: The American view continues to be that nuclear proliferation in the Middle East would be very bad for US interests. So we need to be deeply concerned about it, and in a sense the Saudis have a point when they argue that they deserve a nuclear deal as the Iranians obtained. There is no reason for the Saudis to have uranium enrichment. The fact that they have Chinese-provided ballistic missile capability underscores that the Saudis will always pursue their own interests, and if they can’t get it from the US, they will go elsewhere. It’s no secret that they’ve had a longstanding relationship with Pakistan. So the assumption is that should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia would go to Pakistan and purchase comparable technology.
MI: The relations between the oil producers in the Gulf and China are bound to grow because the former are major sources of energy imports for the latter, and this is only compounded by the fact that the American market is shrinking. The Chinese are very happy to engage economically with the Gulf Arab states, but they remain very reluctant to build a military capacity to intervene in the Gulf and they show no interest in developing one. I expect over time a greater Chinese interest in moving into the Gulf militarily to protect their interests in the free flow of oil.
GF: The only two military facilities of China outside the mainland are in Pakistan and Djibouti. But the Chinese will be expanding, particularly as their economic interests grow. And I think we’re going to see it much faster than people anticipate.
DG: We need to broaden our view and monitor what is happening in Africa, where there is a determined Chinese effort to expand across the continent. We also need to look at developments in East Africa and see how they are linked to the Gulf – and how they ultimately impact Israel.
Breaking News – Bin Salman is in Jerusalem! (Praying in al-Aqsa): What conditions are to be met for bin-Salman to come to Jerusalem?
MI: Ultimately King Salman is calling the shots on the issue of Jerusalem, not MbS. So if the son showed up to pray in Jerusalem, it would be because the King gave him permission. And the only way the King would grant such permission is if the US and Israel committed to establishing an independent Palestinian state more or less on the 1967 lines with a capital for the Palestinians in East Jerusalem.
DG: In Israel, we sometimes overstate our importance among the various Arab players. But what influences Saudi leaders is not so much Jerusalem but their role as custodians of the holy mosques in the Hijaz. It’s difficult to imagine MbS coming to Jerusalem. On the other hand, Anwar Eshki, former head of military intelligence, came to lead prayers in the al-Aqsa mosque recently.
GF: To the extent that there is a Saudi popular opinion about relations with Israel, about 40-50% approve of a formal relationship with Israel following an agreement with the Palestinians that would establish an independent Palestinian state. So that reflects the conditions under which any Saudi King would be able to visit Jerusalem. Until then, it’s unlikely the Saudi leadership would run the risk of alienating a large segment of Saudi society.