Friend or Foe? Regional Perspectives on Israel

Phil Gordon - This panel is looking at what the Arab states think of Israel… There is almost a consensus today that there’s a new strategic alignment between Israel and Arab states, but what does it mean? What does Israel have to do to turn the quiet cooperation into overt cooperation? And to what degree can such cooperation lead to peace with Palestinians? Netanyahu has said he’s come to think the path to peace with Palestinians passes through the Arab world (in contrast to previous periods when he believed the path to peace with the Arab states passed through the Palestinians).

Abdullah Swalha - Many Sunni Arab states no longer view Israel as an enemy, in light of changes in geostrategic conditions of the region, Israel and Arab states find themselves aligned, especially in light of Iranian threat. But if you dig deeper, you will still find three controversial and important facts: 1. This rapprochement is secret, because Arab states still don’t want public normalization, an approach for which people of the region are the biggest losers; 2. The interaction has mostly been between governments but there has been no civil society engagement, people-to-people connections, and without letting people know about partnerships between Israel and Sunni states we will lose support of the people and won’t manage to break barriers; and 3. Common threats are not strong enough to build the alliance, we need to build a network of mutual interests. Making Iran the only component of the alliance isn’t enough because suppose the Iranian regime collapses – then what happens to the Israeli-Sunni Arab alliance?

Gilles Kepel - Common wisdom is that Iran and its proxies are everybody’s foes and that Arabs can reconcile with Israel to an extent even if peoples aren’t behind such reconciliation, but the picture is more complicated. The Sunni world is very fractured, for example; it’s easier to put Israelis and Palestinians into the same room than it is to put Qataris and Saudis in a room together. When we think about the future, are we sure that Israel and Iran will forever have diverging interests? There are problems between the governments as such, but will the government of the Islamic republic be able to sustain its policies? If we look at the Syrian landscape, for example, it looks like the Iranian empire has reached the Mediterranean – the second time since Darius the Great – but will it be able to continue? I wonder to what extent the Iranian empire is overstretched, especially with tremendous problems at home, an economy that is not going well, etc. This isn’t to disregard the threats the Iranian regime poses, but rather to acknowledge that the expansion of Iran is a challenge to Iranian regime at home. And regarding the fracture in the Sunni world, where does Turkey stand? We’ve seen that Turkey has aligned itself with Qatar and supporters of the Muslim Brothers, in opposition to counter-revolutionaries in Egypt, UAE, Saudi – but are the latter really allies of Israel? It’s unclear. Look at Libya, where an ostensibly secular leader (Heftar) has aligned himself with Salafists, who repeatedly espouse anti-Western ideas. One final note: we don’t really have a mediator anymore, because we don’t know where the U.S. is.

Zalmay Khalilzad - In terms of the region, the most important thing I’d note is the reform effort underway in Saudi Arabia, which itself includes the positive view toward Israel emerging. Whether the reforms will succeed is a huge question mark, with huge implications. Already there is some grumbling in Saudi Arabia that Israel isn’t tough enough in dealing with Hezbollah, which Saudis would like to see. The second issue of great importance is Iran, which has played its cards extremely well in the competition with Saudi Arabia. You can’t really speak of capitals in the Arab world making decisions today without speaking of Iran today. I believe Iran is seeking to reshape Iraq, to turn the Popular Mobilization Forces (the militias) into another Hezbollah. Whether it will succeed remains to be seen, and much will depend on whether we can make it costly for Iran to pursue its policies in the region. I think Iran is determined to build a corridor, perhaps even more than one, across Iraq and Syria. The other key player whose future is uncertain is Turkey – where is Turkey going? The state of its relations with the West is in serious trouble, while relations with Iran and Russia are improving. I call Turkey a “swing state,” insofar as whichever direction it goes will have huge implications on the region.

Thomas Friedman  - We need to look at these questions from 30,000 feet, i.e., from a global perspective. For fifty years after WWII it was a great time to be a weak state; bigger states could subsidize you and help you rebuild in the event you suffered through war (think of Syria losing to Israel three times…).  But this arrangement ended with the end of the Cold War. Today no superpower wants to deal with weak states because all they get is the bill.  Climate change, digital globalization, and technology doubling its powers every 24 months – these three are now converging into a storm, and weak states are simply getting clobbered. So the new geopolitical divide is between the world of order and the world of disorder; the Mediterranean is a dividing line, and the states disintegrating first are those with “straight lines” for borders, because they were the most artificial. I completely disagree with Netanyahu’s calculation about peace with Palestinians passing through the Arab states. Take Saudi Arabia, which is experiencing major strains; why would Saudi get in bed with the “yehud?” Such an alliance would also be a gift to Iran. Finally, elite encounters between intelligence officials may be one thing, but sentiments deeper in Arab society are another. I’d encourage Israelis to re-read the history of the May 17 peace agreement with Lebanon, blown up within a year because it wasn’t grounded in the cultures of the region. We’re seeing the end of the ISIS story and the beginning of a conflict between Israel and Shiite enemies on its northern front. For Israel to deter Iran and Hezbollah, it must reinforce the message it sent in 2006 – “You will not out-crazy us.” But to do this, Israel will need European (even if only tacit) support, and it won’t get that if it spurns the Palestinians.

Discussion

Phil Gordon - What would it take to make the private relationship (ie., the secret) a public one? Part of the challenge is that Israel has every reason to want the relationship public, while the Arab world has every reason to want to keep it private. What would the Israeli government have to do to bring the relationship out of the shadows?

Abdullah Swalha - The emerging trend in the region is one which sees things differently, one which believes the Israeli-Arab conflict isn’t the only cause of instability in the region, and that we should separate the matter of a relationship with Israel from the Israeli-Palestinian context. Take, for example, [Egyptian President Abd al-Fatah al-] Sisi’s hosting of [U.S. Vice President Mike] Pence two weeks ago, despite the Jerusalem announcement leading the Palestinians to cut off ties with the U.S., or Jordan and Israel resolving the embassy crisis in Amman despite the reactions to the Jerusalem announcement.

Phil Gordon  - Ok, so what would it take to get the other countries (i.e., not Egypt and Jordan) to bring the relationship out of the shadows?

Gilles Kepel  - It has become commonplace to hear that the 2-state solution is dead, but if so, what comes next? The question whether peace with Arabs comes through peace with Palestinians presumes we can’t have both – but in fact, we should be pursuing both at the same time. I also think we’re not paying enough attention to the youth of the region.

Phil Gordon  - The Saudis and others will say that if Israel agrees to the Arab Peace Initiative [of 2002], they’re ready to make peace with Israel. Is there something to this?

Thomas Friedman - I’m dubious because the Saudis have refused to update the offer since 2002. And things have changed dramatically since then. For one thing, Tehran is on the border of Tel Aviv today because it turned out a big chunk of the Sunni Arab world was “soft tissue.” My criticism of Netanyahu isn’t, “why don’t you get out of the West Bank tomorrow?” What I find completely missing from the leadership, and from Netanyahu specifically, is any creativity on the peace process. Given Israel’s strategic dilemma, and the desire to maintain a Jewish and democratic state, what are the creative ways we can pursue to maintain the possibility of peace? You don’t need the API to advance your regional agenda if you show people you’re creatively trying to pursue peace.

Zalmay Khalilzad  - There’s no question that among the Saudis’ priorities, building a normalized relationship with Israel doesn’t rank very high. There’s a convergence of interests between Saudi Arabia and Israel over Iran, yes, but unless the Saudis see that an agreement with Israel would help them on both the Iran front and in the arena of their domestic reforms, it’s unlikely an agreement would be made public.

Thomas Friedman - When the Iran deal was signed, I gave President Obama an “I” for “incomplete” because he was betting that if you could keep Iran away from a bomb for fifteen years, social conditions within Iran would change in such a way that would fundamentally change or constrain the regime. I’d be careful giving Obama an “F” today, given the protests we’ve seen recently in Iran. This is the moment for a really great American geo-strategist.

Gilles Kepel - We haven’t tackled the issue of Russia. Much has changed in our assessment of who is a “friend” and “foe.” Netanyahu has visited Russia seven times. What kind of game is Russia willing and able to play in the regime, vis-à-vis Iran, vis-à-vis Israel, and so on? It appears that Israel has an intimate relationship with Russia, which gives Israel a significant edge over, say, the U.S., which doesn’t have such a close relationship with Russia.

Phil Gordon  - Can Europe play a key role in the peace process and in the region more generally?

Gilles Kepel - Having been with President Macron on his recent plane ride to Riyadh, to try to get Saudi Arbia out of its self-inflicted mess (with Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri), I can say there definitely is a role for actors other than the U.S. and Russia.

Abdullah Swalha - I would conclude by asking the Arab states, who among you is ready to hand over the Golan to Iran today?