On Nasrallah’s lengthy interview of January 26:

The speech needs to be seen in context – first of all, after 10 weeks of silence on Nasrallah’s part. It comes after Hezbollah was in Lebanon for 5 years and lost 2000 fighters; during a complex internal Lebanese reality, where there is no government; the country is under Iranian sponsorship, and the sanctions on Iran hurt Hezbollah badly. Over the last 2 years, critical Hezbollah plans have been exposed and thwarted: the plan to capture parts of the Galilee, by way of the tunnels; the precision missiles project; and the plan to open a new front against Israel on the Golan Heights. The element that rules in Lebanon is the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

There is now a chance to return Lebanon to the Lebanese; to demand that the UN enforce resolution 1701; and to engage the Arab countries in countering Hezbollah as the dominant element in Lebanon.

The Campaign between Wars:

The IDF has had the opportunity to operate on 4 fronts without reaching an all-out confrontation. Iran took advantage of the non-war state to try to assume hegemony in Syria. As to reconstruction in Gaza, this has been a time for Arab states to recognize and demonstrate that the fight against the Islamic State and al-Qaeda is more urgent that the Palestinian issue. Israel had the opportunity to cooperate with neighboring states; to enjoy operational freedom of action; and to undermine Iranian entrenchment in Syria.

The Policy of Ambiguity:

The policy was correct and is still correct. When I mentioned activity in the NY Times interview, I was referring to national security activity on all fronts, not necessarily in Syria. The Israeli public sees what the IDF does in Gaza and the West Bank. It is important that it knows that there is also much activity up north.

500 Rockets from Gaza in One Day in November:

The event needs to be seen in the context of an IDF operation that was exposed. Overall there has been quiet in the south, which justified the restraint. The decision not to escalate in Gaza was taken unanimously by the cabinet, and was a correct decision. The distinction must be made between an isolated incident and a system-wide incident that could spread and escalate.

Elor Azaria:

The incident was a severe one – it was a transgression of the law and of the IDF spirit. The attempt to portray him as a hero is very serious.

Report of Maj. Gen. (ret.) Brick on IDF Readiness:

The IDF has what to improve, and important gaps to close. But the IDF’s level of preparedness and readiness is very high.

Civil-Military Relations:

Relations with a Minister of Defense are not personal. There are very important checks and balances in the system. Over my 4 years as Chief of Staff, the government authorized very sound policies: against collective punishment; against use of excessive force in Gaza; the multi-year budget and planning program; the campaign against Iran in the north; and the campaign against the precision missiles project in Lebanon.