This panel discussion, moderated by Washington Post columnist David Ignatius and featuring Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin, The Hon. Michèle Flournoy, Dr. Avner Golov, and Amb. Emanuele Giaufret, addressed President Trump’s first year in office and reviewed possible policy directions on the part of the American administration in the coming year. Topics included the U.S. embrace of Israel’s positions regarding the peace process with the Palestinians, measures to counter Iran’s influence, and the lessons to be drawn from developments on the Korean Peninsula.
David Ignatius - We will spend this session talking about Trump, his impact after his first year in office and what we can expect in his second year. I’ve never seen a year like the one we just lived through, and I’ve covered foreign affairs for 35 years. The disruption of Trump’s presidency has perhaps been good for Israel, but not good for other traditional allies of the U.S.
I want to begin by asking each of our panelists of what Trump has meant for the particular areas they focus on. Michele, I’ve described Trump as the “Great Disruptor.” Based on what we’ve seen so far, and what we might expect, where does the US stand? Has the disruption left us stronger? Weaker?
Michèle Flournoy - Being a disruptor is part of what got Trump elected. But a question that’s still on my mind is, what’s driving the disruption? Beyond slogans like America First, it’s not clear. Part of the impulse might be to dismantle what President Obama built. But it’s not clear what the positive vision is, yet. This applies to our policy with China, with Russia, and so on. In some ways, it’s not surprising that his background is in real estate deals – very transactional, very bilateral. He does not think geostrategically, he thinks transactionally. There isn’t much coherence or cohesion. You’ve even seen this at the conference, where several administration officials have made reasonable, measured policy statements – but they don’t reflect the actions of the administration. Instead, the US isn’t showing up and adversaries are testing limits to see where the US stands. There’s always some confusion at the beginning of an administration, but after a year we should be seeing more coherence.
Emanuele Giaufret - For the first time since the end of WWII, we have a US president who does not see European integration as an asset or a source of stability. There have been unintended, even positive, consequences of this; Europeans have turned to each other more than before, and there’s more of a sense of unity among some European countries. We haven’t seen countries following the example of Brexit, for example. So there may be a new sense of purpose, a new unifying factor. We see a new impetus in taking more responsibility for defense, too. Still, we shouldn’t forget how deep the EU-US relationship remains, both from a security standpoint and in terms of values. Our economies are very integrated, together we’re producing half of the world’s wealth, and a significant number of jobs rely on the transatlantic relationship.
Amos Yadlin - Yes, Trump is unconventional. But for the Middle East, disruptive at this point is not necessarily negative, and may even be positive in the long term. He hasn’t killed the peace process, which has been frozen since 2014 and which needed a shock to wake up the two sides. What he did on Jerusalem, besides recognizing the obvious, was to tell the Palestinians, “it’s time to wake up.” Kerry had told them Israel was doomed, so to Abbas, waiting things out made sense. But Trump came along and told the Palestinians, actually time may be on Israel’s side after all. The celebration on the Israeli right about Trump’s election quickly diminished because it was understood that the US would come asking Israel to make serious concessions. The two sides are more likely to shift their positions precisely because Trump is unpredictable. There was a report in Israel’s Channel 2 News a few weeks ago that Bibi understand that Trump’s “ultimate deal” is the best Israel will get, even if his right-wing government won’t like it. Israel has a huge window of opportunity now, insofar as Trump is putting forth parameters that Israel can live with in the context of a two-state solution. America is not diverting so quickly from its traditional position on the peace process. But in terms of Iran, which is arguably more important, Trump is accepting Israel’s position. We at INSS recommended that Trump not walk away from the JCPOA because by doing so, he would serve Iran. However, he understood that Iran should be contained on the non-nuclear activities not addressed in the JCPOA. This will be his test in the second year. Will he follow his words with action?
DI - I want to ask Avner about the North Korea issue. As a security analyst, can you address the Asian issues.
Avner Golov - In 2017 the Trump administration was busy dismantling many multi-lateral frameworks that are relevant to East Asian stability and political dynamics. In 2018 the challenge will be to build the bilateral mechanism that could replace the multi-lateral one it dismantled, for example through trade agreements with Japan and South Korea. The question is not so much whether he will walk the walk but whether he’ll walk alone. America First means the US won’t let North Korea get nuclear weapons which could threaten the US homeland. In North Korea’s recent offer to coordinate with South Korea is an effort to drive a wedge between the US and South Korea. If you push the North Koreans too much, you could push them to test new missiles. And we’re talking about a matter of months in which those missiles could reach the US. This is the time to push North Korea into the hands of China, in hopes the latter could compel North Korea to pull back.
DI - To Michele, do you think the notion of a limited strike to get Kim Jong Un’s attention, has merit?
MF - The problem is, from a purely military perspective, it’s not going to be effective. This isn’t Iran, where there was a single facility that was the primary concern. This is a country with mobile missiles hidden in caves, and so on. The other problem is that in this scenario, if North Korea is the nose to punch, South Korea is the hostage. So the risk is that if we push North Korea, he will hit our friend. In an environment of no communication, you have too much room for misperception and it’s a very high-risk proposition.
AY - It’s all a matter of good intelligence. If the US has good intel, its military can destroy anything. But I’d note the similarities between the two cases [of North Korea and Iran]. North Korea first signed an agreement twenty-five years ago, and through two administrations – one republican, one democrat – it violated that agreement. We’re only two years into an agreement with Iran, but I don’t want to be in the same situation with Iran as we’re now with North Korea. Iran is building a mechanism to the north of Israel in order to threaten and deter it, much as North Korea is doing toward South Korea.
MF - I think the real lesson is not that we should now go to war in North Korea, but that we should take this as a lesson of what happens when we wait too long in seeking to constrain a nuclear program. But I also want to say that if war on the Korean peninsula were to break out, that would be a recipe for complete and total US distraction and you won’t see the US show up in this region to address problems we’ve been discussing for the past two days.
EG - There’s a key difference between North Korea and Iran, from Europe’s standpoint, because Europe wasn’t involved in the North Korea issue, but it was central to the Iran agreement. The JCPOA is not based on trust, quite the contrary. The effort is to preserve it, but there are other issues regarding the presence of Iran in the region, ballistic missiles, and so on. These issues need to be tackled, but outside the scope of the JCPOA.
DI - Should we expect that Europe will be prepared to discuss limits on Iran’s ballistic missile program?
EG - We remain open to discussing various options. We have our own views on how to move forward.
DI - Avner, please discuss the contradictions we’ve seen in President Trump’s policy, especially concerning China.
AG - I often tell my American friends, China is far from replacing you as the global superpower. Yes, you’ll be challenged, with repercussions in the Middle East. But to return to the North Korea-Iran issue, I would note that the Iran deal is not so strong. In the short term, yes, it achieves something. But in the medium to long term, it creates very problematic conditions for the region, for Europe and for the world. So we allies need to talk about that medium and long term. There’s another lesson from the North Korea example: you can’t separate the nuclear issue from the missile issue. We shouldn’t focus on the long-range missiles. If we’re going to stop the Iranian missile program, we need to do it comprehensively.
MF - The new defense strategy and the new national security strategy just released by the US were products of the experts. From a defense perspective, the notion is to shift from the wars of the last fifteen years to new challenges in a way we maintain our qualitative edge. I would be amazed if that had any governing impact on the President, because it’s not his worldview. He hasn’t even accepted the notion that Russia meddled in the US elections.
DI - How is Europe seeing Russia these days?
EG - Russia’s involvement in Ukraine is a very serious issue for us, and we have sanctions on Russia as a result. But we talk to Russia on other issues, such as the Palestinian question and other diplomatic issues. We would support a firm approach from the US on the issue of Ukraine and on protecting our internal democratic processes.
DI - To Amos, what do you think of US strategy in Syria? Is there one? Is it sensible?
AY - The one with a strategy is Putin. He played a very weak card in a wonderful way. Russia basically achieved all its objectives in Syria: they’re on the global stage, they demonstrated they are loyal to their allies, they have a base in the Mediterranean, they try out their new weapons, they saved Assad, and they helped to destroy ISIS. So Russia gained in the Middle East. However, I don’t believe Russia is an enemy of Israel, or of the US. The real enemy is Iran.
DI - To Michele, what did you think of the Tillerson speech and the policy it outlined?
MF - I would definitely support our continued presence to support our allies on the ground and prevent the [Iranian] land bridge from taking full shape, but the truth is, the train has left the station. The decisions the US could have made to have a fundamentally different leverage in Syria passed in 2012 and 2013. Now the question is, how do we safeguard our interests now that Russia and Iran are in the driver’s seat, given that those countries’ interests are very different? We don’t have a lot of cards to play at this stage, and I’m not sure we can reverse that with 2,000 soldiers.
DI - What strikes me is that I’ve heard from each of the panelists some positive comments about President Trump’s strategy in the Middle East. I wonder, is there a more consistent and coherent set of policies emerging? I’m confident H.R. McMaster will be reading INSS reports as they contemplate such policies.