Orna Mizrahi

Following the IDF’s campaign in Lebanon, amid severe damage to the Shiite axis as well as internal and external pressures, Hezbollah is weaker than ever—and Israel should take steps to seize the opportunities this situation presents

The map highlights the five IDF outposts located north of the Blue Line and marks areas where ceasefire violations have been recorded. Additionally, it documents Israeli strikes in Lebanon and Hezbollah attacks on Israel during the Swords of Iron War, including Operation Northern Arrows. The map is continuously updated as accurately as possible, based on open-source intelligence assessments and media reports.

Lebanon is entering a new era following the election of its president, which ended a prolonged political vacuum, along with the heavy blow Hezbollah suffered in the war. What are the implications of these changes in the Land of the Cedars, and how do they impact Israel?

Severe economic damage and criticism of Hezbollah: A look inside the land of the cedars against the backdrop of the war with Israel

The Israeli concern about further Qatari involvement in the region is clear, but Doha’s effort to deepen its influence in Lebanon may actually hold an opportunity for Jerusalem.

2022 marked 40 years since Hezbollah’s establishment and 30 years since Nasrallah became the leader of the organization. Over the years Hezbollah has developed from a classic terrorist organization into a multifaceted and multi-identity organization that is a military force with conventional capabilities and the spearhead of the Shiite “axis of resistance.” Throughout these years, and especially since the Second Lebanon War (2006), the organization has gained military strength but refrained from exercising its offensive capabilities against Israel; its activity is driven by the goal of maintaining and consolidating its balance of deterrence with Israel, in the interest of avoiding deterioration into another full-scale war. This article examines the elements that have shaped the “deterrence equation” between Hezbollah and Israel, which combines kinetic military activity and cognitive warfare, its gradual development over the course of the 40 years of conflict, and the nature of the current balance of deterrence; this is the background to assess how Israel might best deal with the challenge posed by the organization. The article contends that the balance of deterrence is rooted in Hezbollah’s origins and evolution and constitutes a central component of the organization’s current strategy. However, given Nasrallah’s tendency to take risks and the changing regional reality, this does not guarantee the prevention of a future large-scale conflict between the organization and the IDF, which could develop into a multi-arena war.