Orna Mizrahi

The Lebanese Army is the weak link on the path to realizing the vision of Lebanon’s new leadership, which seeks to repair and rehabilitate the state. A central aspect of implementing this vision is the collection of all weapons held by the militias, primarily Hezbollah, and their transfer to the Lebanese Army. This goal aligns with Israel’s interest in seeing Lebanon become a sovereign and functioning state, with a responsible central authority, whom Israel can address, that holds a monopoly on weapons through a strong army representing all elements loyal to the state. Hence, Israel and Lebanon share a common interest in strengthening the Lebanese Army so that it can implement government decisions while taking advantage of the growing weakness of both Hezbollah and Iran after the end of Operation Roaring Lion. The significant gap between the vision of Lebanon’s leadership, as reflected in its decisions against Hezbollah thus far, and its inability to realize that vision constitutes a challenge for Israel. This document presents the failures in the functioning of the Lebanese Army and concludes with recommendations for Israeli policy considering the current campaign, even though this document was written during the war and there is no certainty as to how it will end. Its importance also stems from the need to prepare for the international conference in Paris, which will focus on strengthening the Lebanese Army and whose date has been postponed until early April.  

What is the current state of affairs in the Land of the Cedars, one year after Hezbollah’s defeat in the intense campaign against Israel, and what risks and opportunities does this present for Jerusalem?

A Year After Nasrallah’s Elimination: Where Does Hezbollah Stand, and What Are the Implications for Israel?

This article examines the unprecedented transformation in the proxy network of the Ayatollah regime across various arenas, and analyzes its implications for Israel and the United States

This policy paper proposes a strategy to translate the IDF’s achievements in the war against Hezbollah—along with the disintegration of the Shiite axis, the collapse of the Assad regime, and the consequences of the war between Israel and Iran—into a new security reality along the border with Lebanon, and to foster better relations with Lebanon’s new leadership. The strategy combines ongoing military action to weaken Hezbollah and prevent its recovery with political and economic measures designed to diminish the organization while simultaneously strengthening Lebanon’s pro-Western leadership. This approach differs from the one recently presented to Lebanon by the US administration, as it considers the constraints of Lebanon’s weak leadership and the necessity of bolstering it in light of the challenge of disarming Hezbollah. It outlines a more realistic timetable and offers Israel greater flexibility, thereby increasing the chances of success—even if progress is slow and gradual—toward establishing a new security reality and improving bilateral relations.