Inside Iran: Prospects for Change in the Islamic Republic's Nuclear Policy?
Roundtable Summary of Heinrich Böll Foundation-INSS joint event on March 5, 2012
This roundtable discussion focused on the impact of international pressure (including sanctions, sabotage, explosions, etc.) on Iran's nuclear policy and the stability of the regime. Current developments within Iran were reviewed, and the possible effects of these developments on the P5+1 negotiations with Iran were discussed. Finally, current attitudes of the US and Europe as well as their potential and desired policies were discussed.
The recent parliamentary elections (early March 2012) served as the starting point for analyzing
developments in Iran. Khamenei affirmed his power and is now running "a one man show."
Following those elections, Iran has become more centralized: Khamenei has marginalized
Ahmadinejad as well as centrist revolutionary figures. This is part of a larger power struggle
between the Revolutionary Guards factions that support Ahmadinejad and those that support
Khamenei.
Moreover, Khamenei is revising the role of the parliament. During the elections, only factions
fully in support of Khamenei were allowed to run. Some speculate that Khamenei will choose a
less dynamic figure to be the next speaker of parliament, as the current speaker is too dominant.
Lastly, Khamenei might dissolve the presidency, in order to do away with two competing centers
of power. On top of the above mentioned institutional changes, some claimed that since 2009 the
Iranian population became more passive and less interested in politics.
Some suggested that Khamenei is losing track of what happens inside Iran. He surrounds himself
with a small group (about 20) of members of the Revolutionary Guards, who serve as the top
echelon of Iran's decision makers and have little understanding of foreign affairs. Moreover,
Khamenei doesn't let the opposition have its voice heard. This situation not only engenders poor
decision making, which was criticized and described as careless and not fitting any logical
pattern, but it also undermines the stability of the regime.
The issue of regime stability served as one of the main points of contention within the
roundtable. Some view the regime as unstable due to the above mentioned institutional changes
and the effects of international pressure (elaborated on further below).
On the other hand, it was argued that Khamenei can survive criticism. The absence of major
unrest in Iran has a few explanations. First, the regime enjoys huge support from a committed 2
minority, mainly the elite that is united to preserve the system. Second, economic policies
are being supported, though it is not clear by whom and for how long. Third, the oppression is
much more sophisticated than in other countries in the Middle East: the regime knows quite well
how to manipulate and stamp out the opposition. Fourth, the population is nationalistic and fears
the unknown. They may oppose the regime, but they are even more afraid of a possible
revolution. In addition, the regime has become reconciled to young people living more freely
(hosting parties, listening to Western music, traveling abroad) as long as they do not become
involved in politics.
In this regard, the situation in Iran was compared to the upheavals in Arab world, namely, should
we expect an "Iranian Spring"? Most speakers thought that a comparison between Iran and Egypt
is unwarranted. The conditions prevailing in Egypt – including the population's will to test the
allegiance of the military and civil society development (through NGOs) that brought young
revolutionaries to the streets – are nonexistent in Iran. Moreover, the Iranian opposition is
outside the country and thus has relatively little effect on the inside. Lastly, in Egypt, the military
supported Egypt rather than Mubarak personally. In Iran, the Revolutionary Guards support the
leader. Though the sanctions are having an effect, they have yet to make the population turn
against the regime en masse.
However, this opinion was not shared by all. Some claimed that in Egypt the military made deals
(removing Mubarak) to protect the economy. Thus, if Iranian economic interests are threatened,
it may turn elements in the Revolutionary Guards against Khamenei.
This review of the internal situation served as the backdrop for assessing possible future
developments, as well as analyzing the views and policies of the international community. Can
the sanctions topple the regime and/or change its nuclear policy? Of course, the basic premise is
that the more the regime feels threatened as a result of international pressure, the more likely it is
to change its policy.
Most speakers opposed direct efforts aimed at regime change (as opposed to a welcome side
effect of pressure to change Iran's nuclear policy). However, the degree of objection was not
uniform. Some argued that both Israel and the US have failed before trying to change regimes.
Others more mildly suggested focusing on policy change rather than regime change, while
keeping regime change in mind (also as a means of pressure).
The supporters of regime change offered an outreach program: talking directly to the population,
combining a message of human rights, and care and respect for the Iranian population. Others
argued that actively pursuing regime change is impossible. According to them an outreach
program should have been conducted in 2009. Today, they argue, the situation is more difficult
because the population has no access to the internet and it blames the West rather than the
regime for the sanctions. It should be noticed that some suggested the possibility of negotiating
directly with relevant factions of the Revolutionary Guards, thus bypassing Khamenei. Such a
policy might be more realistic than trying to remove the Revolutionary Guards altogether. 3
Two main conflicting schools of thought regarding Iran's susceptibility to international
pressure were discussed. Even without necessarily subscribing to the point of view of the current
regime's instability, some argued that Iran is susceptible to pressure despite its totalitarian
regime. The sanctions on Iran were imposed gradually and became harsh only recently.
Moreover, sanctions take effect only gradually and cumulatively.
According to some reports, Iranians question Khamenei's policy. Many do not find Iran's nuclear
policy (and the consequent sanctions) in the best interests of the nation. As a result, the current
regime is losing support. Moreover, Khamenei controls through the business infrastructure at the
hands of Revolutionary Guards factions. Thus, his entourage is close to him for financial
reasons. Without economic backing the regime is expected to collapse in a year or two. The fear
of such a collapse can be highly instrumental in changing the nuclear policy.
Moreover, Iranian history proves that major events pressuring the regime can bring about change
in policy. For example, Khomeini stopped the Iran-Iraq War; more recently, in 2003, when the
US invaded Iraq it was decided to suspend the enrichment program. In fact, based on past
experience, when the regime has faced substantial pressure it has tended to respond without a
clear strategy and at times even erratic behavior.
Furthermore, the situation in the Middle East has left Iran more isolated than before, and thus it
has to rely more heavily than before on Russia and China. Finally, the sanctions on the Iranian
bank caused severe damage to the economic sector, and especially to Khamenei's close circles.
With no cash flow, the regime and its economy have been left isolated from other countries and
less capable of conducting business. Thus, we might be at a turning point.
At the same time, some arguments against the utility of international pressure were also raised.
First and foremost, the Iranian leadership believes that any policy change that is imposed from
the outside is a grave mistake and an insult. Moreover, Iran does not believe it will be attacked,
either by Israel or by the US. Furthermore, the Revolutionary Guards are quite indifferent to an
attack. In fact, if an attack occurs, it might play into their hands, providing them with a
justification to impose martial law. Finally, after such substantial costs, being so close to its goal,
it will not easily give in. In 2006, when the program was at the beginning, there was chance for it
to be terminated, but now it is too late.
International perspectives as well as alternatives for action were discussed. Some claimed that no
clear red lines (beyond which a military action will take place) should be (or can be) drawn, and
current sanctions should be given time to work. Specifically, Europe will have a hard time
agreeing that the time for sanctions is over and that military action is required. In Europe, states,
leaders, and populations fear an Israeli attack against Iran more than they fear Iran obtaining
nuclear weapons. Moreover, some fear that the more that pressure is placed on Iran, the more it
will increase its efforts, resulting in escalation. Instead of pressure, they believe Iran should be
shown a way out, by creating a win-win situation. 4
Others criticized this logic. Iran's ambition to develop nuclear capabilities seems strong in
any situation (whether pressured or not); moreover, pressure has caused Iran to take a step back
rather than to redouble its efforts. Should Iran become nuclear, European states and populations
should be afraid for their own security and their life, while if Israel were to attack Iran, life in
Europe would continue as before. It should be noted that various opinions could be heard within
Europe. The European point of view has shifted, and many today support increasing the pressure
on Iran and even going beyond a policy of containment.
It was suggested that the West is totally dependent on the negotiating process to prevent Iran
from achieving its goal, whereas Iran is not at all interested in a negotiated settlement that will
mean giving up its goal of a military nuclear capability, and is only using negotiations to buy
time. Time is playing against the international community. Iran is rushing ahead with its program
in spite of the sanctions. Therefore severe pressure in needed to change Iran's calculations.
Moreover, some red lines are in order. Iran should understand that the West is exhausting all
tracks of non-military pressure. If all else fails, military action will be used.
Some stressed that President Obama did not put forth his definition of what constitutes a nuclear
Iran, nor which red lines Iran should not cross, lest it be met with military attack. That is the
major divergence between Israel and the United States. If Obama were to frame precise
guidelines and red lines, it would both reassure Israel and deter Iran.
Others argued that no clear time barriers should be set as a part of possible red lines. However,
giving the sanctions time to work while maintaining a credible threat of military action is
desirable.
Another debate revolved around the issue of possible compromise with Iran. Some argued that it
is unrealistic to impose a 5 percent enrichment limit on Iran. However, some compromise that
will enable Iran to possess a civilian nuclear project is desirable. Others opposed any deal with
Tehran. After all, Iran had previously cheated on its intentions and lost international trust.
The roundtable concluded with the posing of a few key questions: Do we have time for pressure
to work? What are the red lines, if any? And what should be done if pressure fails?