Publications
Intelligence and National Security, 16/3, Autumn 2001, pp. 1-26.
The inadequacy of Israeli military intelligence support for COIN operations against the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon is attributable to weaknesses in respect of strategic culture and perceptual capacity, characterized by (1) reliance on 'regime targeting': "at its heart lies the belief that the removal of key individuals from an insurgent organization will induce neuralgic atrophy, leading to structural implosion in all or part of an insurgent organization" (pp5-6) (2) a concomitant failure to develop a 'hearts and minds' strategy (3) errors of focus on the part of intelligence planners, who have tended to rely on worst-case assessments (4) organizational divisions which have exacerbated Israeli failure to cultivate human intelligence (humint) resources, in marked contrast to the Hezbollah opposition, and a consequence over-reliance on technical means of intelligence-gathering.
Keywords: IDF; Security establishment - Intelligence; Lebanon – Israeli context; Humint Israel; Lebanon; HezbollahThe opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.