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Home Publications Chapters A Nuclear Deal with Iran and the Perils of Sanctions Relief
A Nuclear Deal with Iran and the Perils of Sanctions Relief
in The Interim Deal on the Iranian Nuclear Program: Toward a Comprehensive Solution?, eds. Emily B. Landau and Anat Kurz, Memorandum No. 142, Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, September 2014

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