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Qatar’s readiness to use its immense economicpower for political purposes, coupled with the weakness of several regional actorsin the wake of the “Arab Spring,” has put the emirate’s foreign policy in thespotlight. Indeed, Qatar became a key country in the Middle East in recentyears, wielding significant influence far beyond its borders. All this islikely to change. While American defense support has given Qatar a sense ofsecurity and empowered its diplomatic activism (Qatar is host to both the USCentral Command Forward Headquarters and the Combined Air Operations Center,America’s largest air force base in the Middle East), the emirate’s power is notunlimited. Many are unhappy with Qatar’s “adventurous” foreign policy and regionalactivism, not to mention its opportunism.

Several internal and external developments arelikely to have a negative impact on Qatar’s standing. Last June, in an unusual step,Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thanihanded the leadership over to his 33 year-old son, Prince Tamim, who therebybecame the youngest head of state in the Arab world. There are indications thatthe new emir will seek to gradually focus more on internal affairs and development projects in preparation for the 2022 football World Cup atthe expense of the extravagant foreign policy of the recent past, which hasaroused criticism at home. Behind closed doors, some in the emirate have urgedthat the immense wealth be used to develop “roads in Doha, not Lebanon.”

In foreign policy,some of the emirate’s gambles were unsuccessful. Before the outbreak of theSyrian civil war, Qatar was close to the Syrian regime. Once the civil war began,however, believing that regime’s days were numbered, the al-Thani family turnedits back on the minority Alawite regime and its allies, Hizbollah and Iran, andbegan supporting the opposition. Qatar’s support for the extremists among therebels in Syria (as previously in Libya) sparked criticism and damaged Qatar’srelations with the US, which fears the consequences of strengthening thesefactions. Qatar has since reduced its involvement in the crisis and its supportfor the rebels in general, while Saudi Arabia, its large neighbor on the west,has become their principal supporter (for example, Ahmad Jarba, who is close toSaudi Arabia, recently replaced Mustafa Sabbagh, who is close to Qatar, as presidentof the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces).

The emirate hasbeen subject to international criticism, following the exposure of conditionsfor foreign workers (mainly Nepalese and Indians) in development work for theWorld Cup – 600 foreign workers die each year in the emirate. The possibilitythat the World Cup will be rescheduled for the winter because of the difficultconditions in the summer in the Gulf could also harm Qatar’s prestige, as Doha feelsthat the World Cup should take place as planned, on the original dates. On adifferent international front, Qatar offered its “good offices” in negotiationsbetween the US and the Taliban. These negotiations have stalled, due in part tothe closure of the Taliban offices in Doha a few months ago, which has hurtQatar’s prestige and its potential ability to assist in such efforts in thefuture.

With the rise ofpolitical Islam, Qatar, to the dismay of its Arab Gulf neighbors, tried to ridethe Islamic wave by becoming close to its most prominent representative, theEgypt of Mohamed Morsi, awarding it some $8 billion in loans and grants. Yet formany years relations between Qatar and Egypt were strained – Egyptian PresidentHusni Mubarak once asked “Why should I pay attention to a country with the populationof a small Cairo hotel?” – and the one-year honeymoon between Qatar and Egyptduring the brief Muslim Brotherhood era ended. When Morsi fell, Qatar lost botha principal ally and considerable influence in Cairo and the region. In anattempt to resuscitate its relations with Egypt, at least to some extent, Qatarhas tried, so far without success, to portray itself after the militarytakeover in Egypt as having always supported the “Egyptian people,” rather thanany particular regime.

The new Egyptianregime was not impressed by this posture; it froze LNG supply talks with theemirate, closed down the local branch of al-Jazeera and arrested journalists employedby the network, rejected Qatar’s request to increase the frequency of flightsbetween Cairo and Doha, and even in protest returned a $2 billion grant fromQatar awarded to the previous regime and deposited in Egypt’s central bank – anindication of the depth of the tension and the strained relations. In lateSeptember 2013 the Egyptian government even issued an arrest warrant againstSheikh Yusuf Qardawi, an Egyptian theologian living in Qatar who is identifiedwith the Muslim Brotherhood, on charges of incitement that led to the killingof Egyptian policemen. Al-Jazeera has lost some of its influence in sizableparts of the Arab world following its coverage of the events in Egypt, whichreflected a critical attitude toward the military regime.

Qatar had someinfluence in Jerusalem, with which it maintained open relations for years – a kindof de facto normalization. Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in late2008-early 2009, however, and Qatar’s relations with elements such as Iran andHamas (to which the previous emir gave a $400 million check on awell-publicized visit that “breached” the Israeli blockade on the Gaza Strip),caused a break in relations between Qatar and Israel. Qatar was proud ofthese relations, which helped distinguish it in the Arab world, and Qatar doesnot conceal its willingness to enjoy open relations with Israel, on conditionthat “Jerusalem proves that it is serious about the peace process,” a lowerthreshold for relations than those stated elsewhere in the Arab world.

As a small country, Qatar must identifyprocesses and trends and keep ahead of its larger neighbors in order to promoteits particular agenda, which is driven by pure survival interests. It cannot beruled out, however, that the small emirate has reached the limits of its power andis now facing opposition to its regional policies. It will have to adjust itsregional policy, especially toward Egypt, if it wants to retain its influencein the Arab world. As long as the regime in Egypt is not yet entirely stable,it will find it difficult to completely dispense with aid from Qatar. If andwhen the situation in Egypt stabilizes, however, and there is no change inrelations between Cairo and Doha, the Egyptian military regime will prefer doingwithout Muslim Brotherhood-supporting Qatar, and settle for the generous aid readilyoffered by Qatar’s oil-rich neighbors: Saudi Arabia, theUnited Arab Emirates, and Kuwait.

Until the uprisingin Syria began, Qatar’s foreign policy was all about keeping as many doors openas possible. Relations were maintained with all elements in the Middle East asan insurance policy, in part as protection against radical forces in theregion. This demonstration of an independent policy, which was in inverseproportion to Qatar’s geographic size, resulted from its drive to enhance itsregional importance and protect its vast natural resources. However, theemirate, home to some 300,000 citizens (in addition to over one million foreignworkers), has exceeded its natural boundaries in acting as a major leagueplayer in recent years. Given its financial power, it will be hard to ignore itin the long term. Nonetheless, the (temporary?) weakness of political Islam inthe region may prompt Qatar to focus more on domestic affairs, exercise a morecautious policy, and wait patiently for auspicious political opportunities. Indeed,Tamim’s first official trip abroad was to Saudi Arabia, possible evidence ofhis attempt to ease the tension with Riyadh and perhaps even adopt a moremoderate foreign policy.