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At the end of the Interim Leadership Forum in Cairo, attended by Palestinian Authority head Mahmoud Abbas, Islamic Jihad head Ramadan Shalah, and Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, Mashal stated that Fatah and Hamas should turn over a new leaf and recognize the errors of the past. He also declared that Hamas intends to adopt the strategy of popular resistance that was used in the past year in various Arab countries.

These comments have raised hopes that the desired change has occurred and that Hamas is seeking to alter its historical path, i.e., cease engaging in terror (in its terms, the strategy of armed struggle) and wage its struggle through non-violent means. This declaration comes in the wake of previous statements by Mashal on Hamas support for the idea of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with its capital in East Jerusalem. It appears to contradict the absolute negation of Israel’s right to exist alongside a Palestinian state. In other interviews, however, Mashal has made contrary statements, similar to those recently made by Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, in favor of the Palestinians' right to fight the occupation through armed struggle because “armed resistance is the strategic choice for liberating Palestinian land from the sea to the river.”

A basic change in Hamas' political approach and strategy of struggle, which for many years was identified with a worldview that trumpeted the recourse to extreme violence against Israeli citizens, would have dramatic significance. Therefore, it is important to examine carefully all of Khaled Mashal’s statements, understand the context in which they were made, examine the range of opinions in Hamas on the issue of armed struggle, and assess the ability of the various actors to influence the movement’s conduct in the future.

Mashal’s comments were made in Cairo at the conclusion of another round of reconciliation talks between the two leaders of the main Palestinian movements, with Egyptian mediation. In fact, his comments repeat provisions of the agreement he reached with Abbas in the previous round of reconciliation talks in November. Already then, the main concession by Mashal to allow the reconciliation process to continue was acceptance of the PLO's basic political platform. The primary components of this platform are a general ceasefire with Israel; popular resistance through non-violent means as the main means of resistance to the occupation and the settlements; negotiations on establishing a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital; and Abbas’ conditions for renewing negotiations, that is, Israeli recognition of the 1967 borders and a freeze on settlements. This agreement was intended to aid Abu Mazen in his efforts to achieve broad international legitimacy for a future Palestinian unity government and blunt Israel's ability to deny the legitimacy of a government that includes representatives of organizations that negate Israel's right to exist. Therefore, what is new now is not the content of the statements, but Mashal’s willingness to make them publicly and uphold his agreements with Abbas, even though he is aware of the possible dissent within his organization. Mashal has justified the approach of the popular struggle with the example of Arab spring, whereby a mass popular protest paved the way to achieve political goals.

Mashal’s comments were made in Cairo under the auspices of the current post-Mubarak Egyptian regime. The gains by the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliamentary elections portend well for Egypt’s future support for Hamas. The Egyptians, patrons of the reconciliation agreement, placed the full weight of their influence on both Hamas and Fatah in order to formulate an agreement that would aid in settling the issues in dispute between the parties. These were, first and foremost, holding parliamentary and presidential elections in the first half of 2012, and strengthening the PLO as a representative Palestinian institution that includes all factions. The Egyptians hope that these moves will make it possible to restart political negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel, leading to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

At the same time, Mashal’s insistence on the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to continue the armed struggle against the occupation leaves a broad opening for justifying acts of terror in the future if, in his opinion, it is necessary. These statements were of course also intended to mollify his internal rivals, mainly among the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which opposes the reconciliation process with Fatah that he is advancing. This Hamas leadership, and especially the leadership in Gaza, perceives itself as a central element in the movement’s decision making process that should not be ignored. This is particularly true since the elections in 2006 and since Hamas wrested control from the Palestinian Authority in Gaza in 2007 (although even among the internal leadership there is no unanimity of opinion, and there are disputes among senior members of the military leadership and senior members of the political arm). They also fear that as the government in control of the Gaza Strip, their interests will be harmed by the reconciliation process. Several months ago, Mashal was severely criticized by one of the prominent members of the Gaza leadership, Mahmoud a-Zahar, who attacked him for what he saw as unilateral decision making on the issue of reconciliation and a failure to receive approval from the movement’s shura council in Gaza.

Likewise, it remains to be seen how this declared policy will influence the military leadership in Gaza headed by Ahmed Jabari, which to a certain extent conducts an autonomous policy concerning the movement’s military actions. While the military arm is preserving the ceasefire in the sense that it avoids initiating shooting at Israel and fires only in response to Israeli actions. It continues to plan the kidnapping of Israelis in the wake of the deal in which Gilad Shalit was released, and take advantage of the anarchy in the Sinai, and most of all, is not sufficiently determined to prevent actions by other organizations against Israel.

The contradictory statements by prominent Hamas figures highlight the continuing indecisiveness in the movement, which about five years ago went from being an extra-governmental resistance movement to a central player in the Palestinian political establishment, and even has control over a portion of the Palestinian people. Hamas’ aspiration to lead the Palestinian people while earning national and international legitimacy through victory in democratic elections was apparently the basis of Mashal’s declaration. It is possible that he has even adopted the thinking common among Palestinians that widespread popular resistance has the power not only to embarrass Israel and strengthen the process of Israel’s delegitimization in various places and institutions around the world, but also to force Israel to hasten to enter into a continuous political process that will promote the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders.

In Israel, some see Mashal’s statements as an opening for a basic change in Hamas’ positions toward participation in a political process with Israel that will bring about recognition of Israel, or at least a basic modus vivendi. Others, however, see these steps as solely tactical and serving a temporary political function, and do not believe that they constitute a paradigm shift, which – in their opinion – in any case could not occur with Hamas. It is difficult to decide this dispute, because a deep change of this nature does not take place overnight and is the result of a process that includes many tactical decisions. Presumably even the Hamas members spearheading the process do not know where it is going. How the process develops also depends to a large extent on the decisions and actions of other actors, not least among them, Israel.

Israel has an interest in attempting to influence the process, and as such, Mashal’s statements can serve as a lever for developing a dialogue between Hamas and Israel that initially does not have to be direct. In fact, it is possible that at this stage, it would be better if it were not direct. Such a dialogue could begin to take place through actions (such as additional responsiveness to the needs of Gaza’s residents) and declarations by leaders.