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August 21, 2010 marked the official inauguration in Bushehr of Iran’s first nuclear power plant, which was built by Russia. It seems that this event finally put an end to the drawn-out ordeal, which in recent years has been used as leverage for international pressure on Iran and has been riddled with question marks. The plant's inauguration was marked by a celebratory ceremony attended by Iran’s vice president and head of its atomic energy organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, and the head of Russia’s atomic agency (ROSATOM), Sergei Kiriyenko. The operation of loading the 163 nuclear fuel rods from Russia began in advance of the ceremony, thereby launching the preparatory stage for the plant’s start-up, which is slated to take place in late September 2010.

The establishment of power reactors in Bushehr to generate electricity was begun already under the shah, apparently part of a grand plan that included the option to produce nuclear weapons. The reactors were supposed to be erected by a number of foreign companies; the first pair of reactors were under construction by the German company KWU at the fall of the shah’s regime. The first reactor, begun in 1974, was 85 percent complete at the time of the revolution, but construction stopped entirely. Iraq bombed the reactors’ center a number of times during the war with Iran. At the end of the war, the German company refused to continue construction and Iran was forced to find another country that would be willing to continue the project.

Iran saw the continuation of the development as a prestigious goal, though on the face of it there was no economic justification for the erection of power reactors in Iran, due to the abundance of oil to generate electricity as well as the massive investment required. In 1995, Russia signed contracts with Iran agreeing to complete the construction of the first two reactors by installing Russian-type VVER-1000 reactors in the original buildings that had survived from the shah era. These are large reactors, as any smaller reactors would not be economically worthwhile in light of today’s technology. It was clear, though, that fundamental changes to the buildings would be necessary since the Russian reactors were too big for the German infrastructure. The first contract with a company called Atomstroiexport was for the sum of $800 million. Upon operation, the reactor is estimated to produce 915 megawatts of electricity. As in every non-standard project, the erection of the reactor took much longer than expected and cost considerably more than the original estimate. After lengthy deliberations, Iran signed a contract with Russia for the supply of nuclear fuel to the reactor, whereby Iran must return the irradiated fuel to Russia. The purpose of this contract is to ensure Iran a supply of fuel, which it does not (yet) have the capability to produce on its own, and to ensure that the said fuel will not be used to produce plutonium on Iranian soil. Russia began supplying the fuel to Iran in December 2007. The loading of the fuel into the reactor, begun on August 21, 2010, followed charges from the West that the reactor might be used for military purposes.

The Bushehr reactor is a PWR type, or Pressurized Water Reactor, which uses approximately 4 percent enriched uranium fuel. After being irradiated in the reactor, the fuel can indeed produce plutonium, but under normal operation this material would not be of adequate quality to be used in a nuclear weapon. Even if it was decided that plutonium should be produced from the fuel, this task would require a large scale reprocessing facility, as well as additional processing facilities.

If Iran were entirely credible, there would be little concern, as the fuel would be used for the sole purpose of operating the reactor and then be exported from Iran, with no way to use it to produce plutonium. However, it is possible under certain conditions to operate the reactor in such a way that the plutonium created by the fuel would be of military grade and thus be suitable for nuclear weapons. Another option is that the Iranians would begin to produce the fuel for the reactor on their own. In this case, other than their obligations to the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran will have no external obligations for the supply of the nuclear fuel. Yet in any event, there are at least a number of years until Iran can begin to produce plutonium, even from the Russian fuel if the relevant agreements are not honored.

As it appears today, the route of developing nuclear weapons runs through uranium enrichment facilities and enriching uranium to a military level. At the same time, Iran is erecting a smaller reactor whose main purpose, or so it seems, is to produce military-grade plutonium. Only in the event that these routes will no longer be an option will Iran possibly resort to using the Bushehr reactor as a source of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Stopping the Bushehr reactor’s operation today will not change the military nuclear project’s timetable even by one day.

Russia’s declaration of its intentions to begin loading nuclear fuel into the nuclear power reactors on August 21 was accompanied by a series of Russian, American, and Iranian statements. Russia publicized a number of statements justifying its decision, claiming that not only does the plant not strengthen Iran’s nuclear plans, it actually aids in halting them by demonstrating that Iran has no need to produce its own enriched uranium. Russia emphasized that the plant will operate under the IAEA verification systems and that the international community, i.e., the “sextet” in general and the United States specifically, do not oppose its operation in practice. In addition, thousands of Russian experts are at the site and will guide the plant’s operation in its early stages.

In the United States, a few statements were made (by the White House and the State Department) claiming the Bushehr plant is not part of a military nuclear program. Rather, the plant proves that Iran has no need for enriched uranium and thus continued uranium enrichment would necessarily be intended for military purposes. Some outside the administration expressed opposing views, identified the plant as a component within a larger military nuclear plan, and called for an immediate attack on it.

For its part, Iran hurried to announce it had no intention of stopping its nuclear plans and was preparing for twenty similar reactors in the future (a ludicrous claim even to the Russians). Vice President Ali Salehi also took the opportunity to announce the establishment of an additional power station, the third in number, which will begin in 2011. The Iranian propaganda, however, was somewhat muted on the opening day.

The Russian decision to launch the nuclear power plant in Bushehr at this time was not a given. Russia recently withdrew its steady support of Iran, including defense of its nuclear plans in light of international pressure, and endorsed international sanctions; indeed, it seemed that in light of the sanctions Russia would continue to drag its feet in loading the Bushehr plant (and there is no lack of “technical” excuses to do so). There is also the understanding between Russia and the United States on the Iranian issue as part of the "reset” program for cooperation in the international arena, as well as Russia’s pained response to the “Tehran Agreement” (the Iranian-Turkish-Brazilian agreement to transfer the enriched uranium out of Iran). Since then, Russian-Iranian tension has been high, accompanied by the Iran’s fiery rhetoric, and Russia has labored with the “sextet” to annul the Tehran agreement.

Two conditions had to exist for the Russians to decide to begin the operation of the Bushehr plant specifically at the present time.

a.       An agreement, or at least a quiet understanding, with the United States. Otherwise, from Russia’s standpoint, we are looking at a violation of the sanctions policy as well as a breach in the Russian-American cooperation developed under the “reset” program, which is a valuable program for Russia.

b.       An arrangement, or at least an understanding, with the Iranians. Otherwise, why would Russia give such a valuable gift as the operation of a nuclear reactor amid a policy of sanctions against them? There can only be one reason for this surprising explanation: the return of the Russian-Iranian mutual understanding and an attainment of some sort of arrangement regarding Iranian uranium, this time in Russia’s favor.

In recent years Russia continued its two-faced game in relation to Iran in general and to its nuclear program in particular. The recent reversal was Russia’s support of the United States on the issue of sanctions against Iran in exchange for vital American concessions to Russia. Now it seems that Russia is signaling to Iran its intentions to support it at the same time. The open question that remains is this: Is Russia returning to its two-faced policy and in doing so, attaining an upgraded international status? Or are we looking at a coordinated process, only at whose end will we be notified about Iran’s ultimate direction.