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In an unusual statement, the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates recently compared the Iranian occupation of the three Gulf islands it claims – Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb – to “the Israeli occupation of Arab land.” Both the highly irregular statement and the sensitive analogy dramatize the concern in the Gulf that Iran, under the aegis of its nuclear program, seeks to dominate not only the region’s agenda but also Arab territory. The foreign minister’s statement prompted an immediate Iranian response in the form of an explicit warning to the UAE to refrain from similar statements in the future. In an attempt to send a message of deterrence and at the same time underscore a principle common to the two states, a spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry stressed that it was inappropriate to serve “Zionist interests.” The UAE minister, however, was unmoved, and a few days later repeated the demand that Iran end the occupation of the Arab islands. In a meeting with Abu Mazen in Ramallah he charged that Iran’s conduct “represents an obstacle to improving its relations with the Arab world.”[1]

The minister’s statements should be seen in light of reports that Iran has tightened the siege of UAE residents on Abu Musa (the only inhabited island of the three) and is denying them supplies, access to medical attention, and communication with the mainland. The minister complained that Iran was preventing UAE residents from contacting their family members on the island: “Hundreds of families are under an occupation…which is indecent and illegitimate.”[2] Perhaps of greatest concern to the minister were reports of development work undertaken by Iran on 27 oil drilling installations located near the three islands. He also accused the Arab media of not paying sufficient attention to the issue and stressed the Arab world’s seeming helplessness in resolving the problem.

The three islands claimed by Iran and the UAE are of particular strategic importance, because of their location near the Straits of Hormuz, international shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf, and important oil fields in the region. Control of the island, for example, would allow Iran in a crisis to obstruct free shipping in the Gulf with greater ease and block the Straits of Hormuz.

Before the Federation’s independence, Abu Musa was under the control of the Sharjah Emirate while the Tunb Islands belonged to the Ras al-Khaimah Emirate. On November 30, 1971, one day before the withdrawal of British troops from the Gulf, Iran took control of the islands by force and demonstrated the Gulf states' vulnerability to threats from their neighbors and how much they need external support – formerly from Great Britain, then from the United States – to guarantee their national security. The states later arrived at an agreement about joint administration of Abu Musa, which Iran has systematically violated.

Over the years, Iran continued to take unilateral steps in the Gulf. In April 1992 it opposed the entrance of foreigners to Abu Musa and forced UAE citizens who wanted to visit the island to obtain Iranian visas. Iran subsequently built a landing strip on the island and enlarged its military force stationed there. There were even reports that Iran placed artillery, aerial defense systems, and surface-to-sea missiles on the islands and dismissed the guard force that was stationed on Abu Musa as part of the agreement. Iran continued to tighten its control and in August 2008, ignoring all protests, opened several ministries on the island. In response, Abu Dhabi declared that Iran had violated the joint sovereignty agreement and forwarded an official complaint to the UN Security Council. For its part, Iran has opposed international mediation on the issue and demanded a bilateral solution on the basis of the 1971 agreement. However, in practice it has evaded every attempt to resolve the issue. Iran contends that the issue is more a “misunderstanding” on the part of the UAE than an actual “conflict,” and moreover, Iran has historical and legal rights to the islands.

It is in the best interests of both states to contain the crisis. Iran does not want to draw any more attention to itself in light of the international pressure it already faces, while the UAE, although trying to raise the issue on the Arab and international agendas, is aware of the limitations of its power, and in any case prefers to separate this conflict from other issues on the bilateral agenda.

Generally speaking, Iran’s posture to the Arab Gulf states is free of overt confrontations and tends for the most part to be characterized by friendly rhetoric, at least outwardly. Iran understands that along with more aggressive efforts to seize control it must also demonstrate good neighborliness in order to earn the sympathy and support of the Gulf states. For their part, the Gulf states see the difficulties of the international community in stopping Iran on its way to nuclear capability and are therefore interested in avoiding angering their increasingly powerful neighbor. Thus, they continue to separate the issue from other, primarily economic, issues. Dubai, for example, has established itself as a central trade hub (legal and illegal) for Iran and is home to many Iranians. Beyond the economic consideration of maintaining connections with Iran, it may be that the Emirates view the maintenance of open trade relations as a kind of insurance policy against a future Iranian attack.

Against this background, the current confrontation has assumed particular significance. Statements by both sides are taking the crisis, usually relegated to the sidelines, to new heights. The UAE’s senior diplomatic representative in Tehran was reprimanded at the Iranian foreign ministry for his “unconsidered and irresponsible” statements,[3] and the vice chairman of the Foreign Relations and Defense Committee of the Iranian Majlis claimed that the statement by the UAE foreign minister “was made on behalf of hypocritical elements dedicated to serving Israeli interests.”[4] MEMRI’s website also reported on the Iranian intention of embarking on a campaign to restore the entire Arab UAE (the Jalfawa Region in Persian) to its sovereignty in response to the Emirates’ claim of sovereignty over the islands. It was further reported that the Iranian Majlis is working to downgrade the relations between the states and that a threat appeared on a website (of questionable reliability) that Iran would use military force against the UAE unless it withdraws its demands.[5]

The UAE also understands the limits of support from fellow Arab states. While over the years its claim to the islands was supported by the Arab League and even the UN General Assembly, the core of the support was rhetorical, and no practical steps were ever taken on its behalf. In this sense, current UAE criticism is aimed not only at Iran but also at the Arab states, reminding them that they should oppose any conquest of Arab territory, not just by Israel.

How and to what extent these developments in the Gulf will make the Arab Gulf states, including the UAE, change the dual nature of their foreign policy – passive opposition to Iran with maintenance of good neighborly relations – in order to avoid a direct confrontation remains to be seen. The Gulf states are justifiably worried that Iran’s drive to influence the agenda in the Gulf – as illustrated by its gradual but systematic defiant moves over the years to strengthen its control over the islands – is liable in the future to be translated into growing efforts to dictate the agenda in the Gulf and expand its sphere of influence (including through territorial expansion) in the name of exporting the revolution. This concern would be all the more urgent if Iran attains military nuclear capability.

[1] Arab News and a-Sharq al-Awsat, April 26, 2010.

[2] Khaleej Times, April 21, 2010.

[3] Arab News, April 28, 2010.

[4] Press TV, April 26, 2010.

[5] MEMRI, May 3, 2010.