Eldad Shavit, a senior researcher on the United States:
In the coming days, Trump will need to decide between a quick “closing of the file” and continued escalation that would impose a rolling campaign. He will want to present a clear and concise achievement, and the elimination of the leader could provide him with a victory image. His position will be influenced by the extent of the damage to Iran’s capabilities, Tehran’s response (a price for Americans/allies), the position of Congress, and MAGA pressure against entanglement.
Three scenarios: a quick exit with an ultimatum; expanding strikes until a change in behavior/regime; or a return to negotiations from a position of strength. The United States also perceives Israeli involvement as a catalyst and operational coordination, but critics view it as a factor that “dragged” Washington in.
Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher and head of the Gulf Program:
The Gulf states have so far attempted to remain as much as possible outside the conflict because they will pay a price and are uncertain about the American objective—whether Trump would go all the way to overthrow the Iranian regime. Even now, they remain unsure about this outcome.
Increased Iranian fire into their territory, even beyond “American” targets, will force the Gulf states to abandon their images of neutrality. At the same time, it will also leave them with limited response options and dilemmas.
Orna Mizrahi, a senior researcher and head of the Lebanon Program:
The combined attack, which included a preemptive strike against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, creates a fateful dilemma for the organization. Its avoidance so far of joining its patron, Iran, reflects the depth of its weakness and the intensity of the pressures being exerted on it: Israeli military activity and diplomatic pressure, mainly from the United States, channeled through the Lebanese leadership, which, along with broad segments of the public, demands that the organization not involve Lebanon. The organization’s leadership, currently deliberating its next steps, has refrained from addressing the developments publicly, issuing only a statement of support for Iran through its media department. In light of this, the assessment is that Hezbollah will continue to avoid initiating a move against Israel, although such a possibility cannot be completely ruled out.
Carmit Valensi, a senior researcher and head of the Syria Program:
Syria is not directly involved, but in practice, it serves as a space for interception and transit for Israeli and American aircraft, as was the case in the previous operation “Rising Lion” against Iran. It can be assessed that there is now clearer coordination and agreement with Israel and the United States allowing operations from Syrian airspace.
For President al-Sharaa, this is an opportunity to clarify his value to the Sunni-regional axis (hence the expression of support for the Gulf states and condemnation of the Iranian strikes); to justify American support for him—and possibly also to send a signal to Israel regarding the potential for cooperation between the countries.
In Syrian cities, there were celebrations upon hearing the news of the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, who is perceived as being responsible for the killing and suffering of Syrians during the country’s civil war. This is a symbolically charged moment associated with Syria’s liberation both from Assad and from the Iranian axis.
Ofir Winter, a senior researcher and head of the Jordan Program:
On the first day of the war, Jordan found itself between a rock and a hard place: Dozens of interceptions fell in its territory, some of missiles launched at the Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Force Base, without casualties. In addition to condemning Iran, Amman has emphasized that it is not a party to the fighting and that the interceptions were intended to protect its sovereignty and the security of its citizens, rather than to serve Israeli or American interests. At the same time, there is skepticism in Jordan that the war will topple the Iranian regime, given Tehran’s determination to hold onto its power and the lack of a clear strategy beyond relying on the Iranian people. Instead, Jordan’s concerns are focused mainly on the economic and security costs for the kingdom and the region.
Rémi Daniel, head of the Europe Program:
The Europeans once again find themselves watching from the sidelines in an event over which they have no control. European leaders condemned the ayatollah regime, but there are differences in wording reflecting their level of closeness to Washington. Britain’s prime minister stated that Royal Air Force planes are operating in Middle Eastern skies, and this morning, the British secretary of state for defense announced that two Iranian missiles aimed at British bases in Cyprus were identified, positioning the United Kingdom increasingly on the front line. The expansion of the war to the Gulf states, important partners of most European countries and a vital energy source for the continent, raises European sensitivity to developments. European security services are preparing to disrupt Iranian attempts to carry out retaliatory actions on European soil.
Galia Lindenstrauss, a senior researcher:
Turkey, which supported a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, views the recent developments negatively and accuses Israel of dragging the United States into an attack on Iran. Although Erdoğan is careful to avoid verbally attacking Trump, Turkish frustration is evident.
A discourse is emerging in Turkey similar to that heard following Operation Rising Lion, suggesting that after Israel significantly harms Iran, it will move to the next target: Turkey. Voices are again claiming that Turkey needs its own nuclear weapon, and that, in any case, it is good that it is accelerating its medium- and long-range missile program.
Galia Lavi, researcher and deputy director of the Israel–China Policy Center:
The current war poses a challenge to Chinese foreign policy. The United States, its rival, attacked its “comprehensive strategic partner” (Iran), which in response attacked several other “comprehensive strategic partners” (including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which are economically more important to China than Iran).
In addition, regime change in Tehran is still not guaranteed, and therefore Beijing must exercise diplomatic caution. The result—a statement against the American–Israeli attack and a general condemnation of harming Iranian sovereignty and the sovereignty of “other states in the region,” without specifying the attacker. This time as well, China is not expected to assist Iran beyond mild rhetoric and some support at the UN.
Eldad Shavit, a senior researcher on the United States:
In the coming days, Trump will need to decide between a quick “closing of the file” and continued escalation that would impose a rolling campaign. He will want to present a clear and concise achievement, and the elimination of the leader could provide him with a victory image. His position will be influenced by the extent of the damage to Iran’s capabilities, Tehran’s response (a price for Americans/allies), the position of Congress, and MAGA pressure against entanglement.
Three scenarios: a quick exit with an ultimatum; expanding strikes until a change in behavior/regime; or a return to negotiations from a position of strength. The United States also perceives Israeli involvement as a catalyst and operational coordination, but critics view it as a factor that “dragged” Washington in.
Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher and head of the Gulf Program:
The Gulf states have so far attempted to remain as much as possible outside the conflict because they will pay a price and are uncertain about the American objective—whether Trump would go all the way to overthrow the Iranian regime. Even now, they remain unsure about this outcome.
Increased Iranian fire into their territory, even beyond “American” targets, will force the Gulf states to abandon their images of neutrality. At the same time, it will also leave them with limited response options and dilemmas.
Orna Mizrahi, a senior researcher and head of the Lebanon Program:
The combined attack, which included a preemptive strike against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, creates a fateful dilemma for the organization. Its avoidance so far of joining its patron, Iran, reflects the depth of its weakness and the intensity of the pressures being exerted on it: Israeli military activity and diplomatic pressure, mainly from the United States, channeled through the Lebanese leadership, which, along with broad segments of the public, demands that the organization not involve Lebanon. The organization’s leadership, currently deliberating its next steps, has refrained from addressing the developments publicly, issuing only a statement of support for Iran through its media department. In light of this, the assessment is that Hezbollah will continue to avoid initiating a move against Israel, although such a possibility cannot be completely ruled out.
Carmit Valensi, a senior researcher and head of the Syria Program:
Syria is not directly involved, but in practice, it serves as a space for interception and transit for Israeli and American aircraft, as was the case in the previous operation “Rising Lion” against Iran. It can be assessed that there is now clearer coordination and agreement with Israel and the United States allowing operations from Syrian airspace.
For President al-Sharaa, this is an opportunity to clarify his value to the Sunni-regional axis (hence the expression of support for the Gulf states and condemnation of the Iranian strikes); to justify American support for him—and possibly also to send a signal to Israel regarding the potential for cooperation between the countries.
In Syrian cities, there were celebrations upon hearing the news of the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, who is perceived as being responsible for the killing and suffering of Syrians during the country’s civil war. This is a symbolically charged moment associated with Syria’s liberation both from Assad and from the Iranian axis.
Ofir Winter, a senior researcher and head of the Jordan Program:
On the first day of the war, Jordan found itself between a rock and a hard place: Dozens of interceptions fell in its territory, some of missiles launched at the Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Force Base, without casualties. In addition to condemning Iran, Amman has emphasized that it is not a party to the fighting and that the interceptions were intended to protect its sovereignty and the security of its citizens, rather than to serve Israeli or American interests. At the same time, there is skepticism in Jordan that the war will topple the Iranian regime, given Tehran’s determination to hold onto its power and the lack of a clear strategy beyond relying on the Iranian people. Instead, Jordan’s concerns are focused mainly on the economic and security costs for the kingdom and the region.
Rémi Daniel, head of the Europe Program:
The Europeans once again find themselves watching from the sidelines in an event over which they have no control. European leaders condemned the ayatollah regime, but there are differences in wording reflecting their level of closeness to Washington. Britain’s prime minister stated that Royal Air Force planes are operating in Middle Eastern skies, and this morning, the British secretary of state for defense announced that two Iranian missiles aimed at British bases in Cyprus were identified, positioning the United Kingdom increasingly on the front line. The expansion of the war to the Gulf states, important partners of most European countries and a vital energy source for the continent, raises European sensitivity to developments. European security services are preparing to disrupt Iranian attempts to carry out retaliatory actions on European soil.
Galia Lindenstrauss, a senior researcher:
Turkey, which supported a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, views the recent developments negatively and accuses Israel of dragging the United States into an attack on Iran. Although Erdoğan is careful to avoid verbally attacking Trump, Turkish frustration is evident.
A discourse is emerging in Turkey similar to that heard following Operation Rising Lion, suggesting that after Israel significantly harms Iran, it will move to the next target: Turkey. Voices are again claiming that Turkey needs its own nuclear weapon, and that, in any case, it is good that it is accelerating its medium- and long-range missile program.
Galia Lavi, researcher and deputy director of the Israel–China Policy Center:
The current war poses a challenge to Chinese foreign policy. The United States, its rival, attacked its “comprehensive strategic partner” (Iran), which in response attacked several other “comprehensive strategic partners” (including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which are economically more important to China than Iran).
In addition, regime change in Tehran is still not guaranteed, and therefore Beijing must exercise diplomatic caution. The result—a statement against the American–Israeli attack and a general condemnation of harming Iranian sovereignty and the sovereignty of “other states in the region,” without specifying the attacker. This time as well, China is not expected to assist Iran beyond mild rhetoric and some support at the UN.