The al-Sisi–Erdoğan summit in Cairo on February 4 marked a significant milestone in the rapprochement that has been developing in recent years between Egypt and Turkey—countries that until the past decade were considered regional rivals. The two leaders exchanged gestures of friendship: The Egyptian president welcomed his Turkish counterpart at the airport, accompanied by his wife, and called him “Egypt’s most honored guest.” In return, the Turkish president presented his Egyptian host with a red electric car manufactured in his country, valued at about $50,000.
The accelerated normalization process between the two states is based on a range of shared interests. These include increasing bilateral trade from $9 billion to $15 billion; exporting liquefied gas from Egypt to Turkey; expanding military cooperation around joint naval exercises; signing arms deals for the export of Turkish air defense systems; and establishing a Turkish plant for producing artillery ammunition in Egypt. These steps help reduce the two countries’ dependence on Western weaponry and build on previous agreements for the joint production of drones and unmanned vehicles.
An additional layer—occupying an increasingly central place in the relationship—is their shared stance against Israel’s policy in Gaza and the region. In a joint statement issued ahead of the convening of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council they established, the presidents of Egypt and Turkey presented a united front vis-à-vis Israel on several issues. They demanded a full withdrawal from Gaza; the return of a reformed Palestinian Authority to the Strip; the renewal of a political process leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state; the opening of the Rafah crossing in both directions; the rehabilitation of the Strip as soon as possible; respect for UNRWA’s mandate; condemnation of alleged Israeli violations of Syrian and Lebanese sovereignty; and support for Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity in relation to Somaliland.
For Egypt and Turkey, Israel has become a kind of “binding glue,” creating a partnership around goals of high priority for both sides: stabilizing the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza; preventing a renewed escalation of war in Lebanon and Iran; deterring Israel from advancing what they perceive as “plots of expansion and hegemony” in the region; and creating an Arab-Muslim counterweight to Israel in Washington vis-à-vis the Trump administration.
In practice, the Egyptian–Turkish axis is part of a broader Arab-Muslim effort that has emerged against the backdrop of the war to isolate Israel—an effort in which Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Indonesia also participate at times. Whereas in the past Egypt and Israel belonged to the same pragmatic regional camp, which was wary of Turkey and included moderate Arab and Mediterranean states, the alignment may now be shifting. Alongside Egypt’s continued commitment to the peace treaty with Israel, disagreements are beginning to shape their relations.
Ongoing frictions between Israel and Egypt over the future of Gaza, the Palestinian arena, and other regional issues may push Cairo further into Ankara’s embrace and lead the two countries to deepen their partnership. Such a trajectory could result in a further cooling of the cold peace, a sharpening of hostile rhetoric, and a deepening of political estrangement and security suspicion. Conversely, improving Egyptian–Israeli dialogue, increasing mutual attentiveness, and a sincere effort to rebuild trust and bridge gaps are likely to reduce the anti-Israeli component in the Egyptian–Turkish partnership.
The al-Sisi–Erdoğan summit in Cairo on February 4 marked a significant milestone in the rapprochement that has been developing in recent years between Egypt and Turkey—countries that until the past decade were considered regional rivals. The two leaders exchanged gestures of friendship: The Egyptian president welcomed his Turkish counterpart at the airport, accompanied by his wife, and called him “Egypt’s most honored guest.” In return, the Turkish president presented his Egyptian host with a red electric car manufactured in his country, valued at about $50,000.
The accelerated normalization process between the two states is based on a range of shared interests. These include increasing bilateral trade from $9 billion to $15 billion; exporting liquefied gas from Egypt to Turkey; expanding military cooperation around joint naval exercises; signing arms deals for the export of Turkish air defense systems; and establishing a Turkish plant for producing artillery ammunition in Egypt. These steps help reduce the two countries’ dependence on Western weaponry and build on previous agreements for the joint production of drones and unmanned vehicles.
An additional layer—occupying an increasingly central place in the relationship—is their shared stance against Israel’s policy in Gaza and the region. In a joint statement issued ahead of the convening of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council they established, the presidents of Egypt and Turkey presented a united front vis-à-vis Israel on several issues. They demanded a full withdrawal from Gaza; the return of a reformed Palestinian Authority to the Strip; the renewal of a political process leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state; the opening of the Rafah crossing in both directions; the rehabilitation of the Strip as soon as possible; respect for UNRWA’s mandate; condemnation of alleged Israeli violations of Syrian and Lebanese sovereignty; and support for Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity in relation to Somaliland.
For Egypt and Turkey, Israel has become a kind of “binding glue,” creating a partnership around goals of high priority for both sides: stabilizing the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza; preventing a renewed escalation of war in Lebanon and Iran; deterring Israel from advancing what they perceive as “plots of expansion and hegemony” in the region; and creating an Arab-Muslim counterweight to Israel in Washington vis-à-vis the Trump administration.
In practice, the Egyptian–Turkish axis is part of a broader Arab-Muslim effort that has emerged against the backdrop of the war to isolate Israel—an effort in which Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Indonesia also participate at times. Whereas in the past Egypt and Israel belonged to the same pragmatic regional camp, which was wary of Turkey and included moderate Arab and Mediterranean states, the alignment may now be shifting. Alongside Egypt’s continued commitment to the peace treaty with Israel, disagreements are beginning to shape their relations.
Ongoing frictions between Israel and Egypt over the future of Gaza, the Palestinian arena, and other regional issues may push Cairo further into Ankara’s embrace and lead the two countries to deepen their partnership. Such a trajectory could result in a further cooling of the cold peace, a sharpening of hostile rhetoric, and a deepening of political estrangement and security suspicion. Conversely, improving Egyptian–Israeli dialogue, increasing mutual attentiveness, and a sincere effort to rebuild trust and bridge gaps are likely to reduce the anti-Israeli component in the Egyptian–Turkish partnership.