The elimination on November 23 of Hezbollah’s acting Chief of Staff, Haytham Ali Tabatabai, in the heart of Beirut’s Dahiyeh neighborhood, represents a high point in the campaign Israel has waged since the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon was signed a year ago. Tabatabai, a commander in the Radwan Force, was responsible for the organization’s special operations and also served as Hezbollah’s representative for the development of Iran’s proxies abroad: in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Due to his involvement in promoting terrorist activity outside Lebanon, he has been included on the US administration’s wanted list since 2018, with a five-million-dollar reward on his head. Tabatabai was promoted to his senior position in Hezbollah after the elimination of almost the entire veteran military leadership of the organization. Over the past year, with Iran’s assistance, he worked to advance Hezbollah’s rehabilitation efforts following the heavy blows it suffered during the war.
Tabatabai’s assassination aligns with the IDF’s efforts over the past year to continue weakening the organization and prevent its rearmament. The IDF strikes in Lebanon daily, and over the past year has eliminated some 350 Hezbollah operatives and destroyed the organization’s weapons and infrastructure in southern Lebanon, the Beqaa, and Beirut. Nevertheless, Hezbollah continues to advance its rehabilitation efforts and to smuggle funds and weapons, albeit to a more limited extent.
Given the severity of the elimination, Hezbollah now faces a dilemma regarding its response: whether to abandon its “containment” policy and retaliate, and if so, when and in what form.
The organization still possesses weapons and operatives—remnants from the war alongside new capabilities it has developed or smuggled—enabling it to act against Israel if it decides to do so. Its options include attacking IDF forces within Lebanon, firing toward northern Israeli communities, infiltrating Israeli territory, launching missiles toward Israel’s home front, or carrying out terrorist attacks against Israeli targets abroad. At this stage, the organization refrains from specifying the nature of its expected response and limits itself to implied threats.
At the same time, several restraining factors weigh on Hezbollah: the harsh Israeli response it can expect, with the IDF signaling that it will not hesitate to escalate the fighting; the organization’s internal difficulties and its confrontation with the Lebanese government seeking to disarm it; international and regional pressure on Lebanon to advance this effort; and concern over further damage to Lebanon that could erode domestic support, particularly among the Shiite population. Therefore, even if Hezbollah chooses to respond, it is likely to opt for a low-level response to avoid triggering an expanded Israeli military campaign.
In conclusion, Tabatabai’s assassination is a significant achievement in Israel’s effort to maintain Hezbollah’s weakness. Israel must continue its military pressure while preparing for a possible escalation, but simultaneously pursue a complementary political process with the Lebanese government, with US support.
The elimination on November 23 of Hezbollah’s acting Chief of Staff, Haytham Ali Tabatabai, in the heart of Beirut’s Dahiyeh neighborhood, represents a high point in the campaign Israel has waged since the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon was signed a year ago. Tabatabai, a commander in the Radwan Force, was responsible for the organization’s special operations and also served as Hezbollah’s representative for the development of Iran’s proxies abroad: in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Due to his involvement in promoting terrorist activity outside Lebanon, he has been included on the US administration’s wanted list since 2018, with a five-million-dollar reward on his head. Tabatabai was promoted to his senior position in Hezbollah after the elimination of almost the entire veteran military leadership of the organization. Over the past year, with Iran’s assistance, he worked to advance Hezbollah’s rehabilitation efforts following the heavy blows it suffered during the war.
Tabatabai’s assassination aligns with the IDF’s efforts over the past year to continue weakening the organization and prevent its rearmament. The IDF strikes in Lebanon daily, and over the past year has eliminated some 350 Hezbollah operatives and destroyed the organization’s weapons and infrastructure in southern Lebanon, the Beqaa, and Beirut. Nevertheless, Hezbollah continues to advance its rehabilitation efforts and to smuggle funds and weapons, albeit to a more limited extent.
Given the severity of the elimination, Hezbollah now faces a dilemma regarding its response: whether to abandon its “containment” policy and retaliate, and if so, when and in what form.
The organization still possesses weapons and operatives—remnants from the war alongside new capabilities it has developed or smuggled—enabling it to act against Israel if it decides to do so. Its options include attacking IDF forces within Lebanon, firing toward northern Israeli communities, infiltrating Israeli territory, launching missiles toward Israel’s home front, or carrying out terrorist attacks against Israeli targets abroad. At this stage, the organization refrains from specifying the nature of its expected response and limits itself to implied threats.
At the same time, several restraining factors weigh on Hezbollah: the harsh Israeli response it can expect, with the IDF signaling that it will not hesitate to escalate the fighting; the organization’s internal difficulties and its confrontation with the Lebanese government seeking to disarm it; international and regional pressure on Lebanon to advance this effort; and concern over further damage to Lebanon that could erode domestic support, particularly among the Shiite population. Therefore, even if Hezbollah chooses to respond, it is likely to opt for a low-level response to avoid triggering an expanded Israeli military campaign.
In conclusion, Tabatabai’s assassination is a significant achievement in Israel’s effort to maintain Hezbollah’s weakness. Israel must continue its military pressure while preparing for a possible escalation, but simultaneously pursue a complementary political process with the Lebanese government, with US support.