President Trump’s 21-point plan to end the war in the Gaza Strip was formulated based on several understandings between the president and Arab leaders and is assumed also to rest on understandings with Prime Minister Netanyahu while taking into account vital Israeli interests. Since the plan’s principles require the disarmament of Hamas, the release of all hostages, the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, and recognition of the need to ensure that Gaza will not pose a security threat to the State of Israel, as well as recognition of the necessity of an expanded security perimeter, they meet Israel’s security demands and align with its declared war objectives. Therefore, Israel should say yes.
Israel’s “yes” must be clear and convincing; any ambiguity—which is effectively a refusal—should be left to Hamas. A hesitant or vague response from Hamas will further erode any remaining patience toward the organization and its leadership, and it’s reasonable, or at least hopeful, to assume that this will also extend to Qatar, its patron. That shift would thereby expand the basis of Israel’s legitimacy to complete its mission up to a full occupation of the Gaza Strip.
In the public segment of the prime minister’s meeting with the president, it’s important that Prime Minister Netanyahu thank President Trump for his plan, express appreciation for the effort, and convey hope for its swift implementation. In their private meeting prior to the press conference, the prime minister should persuade President Trump to update, clarify, and expand several points to ensure alignment with Israel’s vital and necessary interests. For example, regarding the disarmament of Hamas, the plan should explicitly address the destruction of all tunnel infrastructure. Without eliminating this network, Hamas could rebuild its power, leaving a real security threat to Israel and undermining the ability of any governing authorities established there to neutralize such threats.
Additionally, Israel should ensure that Qatar will not be part of the “day after” mechanism, and if any involvement is considered, it must be conditioned on a fundamental change in its hostile conduct toward Israel in the international arena. As for the Palestinian terrorists to be released as part of Israel’s concession for the return of Israeli hostages, Israel should demand that they all be transferred to the Gaza Strip with a firm Egyptian commitment not to allow them to exit Gaza through Egypt. Furthermore, conditions should be imposed on their release, including strict limitations on their activities in Gaza and their commitment not to return to terrorism. This commitment must be vigorously enforced by the governing mechanism to be established in Gaza; under its overriding security authority and freedom of operational action, Israel must address any breach not effectively handled by that mechanism. These are among the points that require further clarification and expansion regarding the plan.
Finally, concerning Gaza’s reconstruction, it must be ensured that UNRWA will not be part of the process and that there will be no revival or rehabilitation of the refugee camps. UNRWA serves as the ultimate perpetuator of the refugee ethos, with the camps themselves acting as a living symbol of the “right of return.” A necessary precondition for any reconstruction process is an unequivocal and resolute international statement eliminating the refugee ethos and rejecting any attempt to preserve the “right of return.” This is a historically significant and unique opportunity to initiate essential change.
Israel must not appear as the one that refuses the initiative but rather as the one that welcomes it and is ready to join it. It’s difficult to imagine that Hamas will genuinely and explicitly accept the plan; therefore, it’s critical that the prime minister and the president reach understandings, to be reinforced by the relevant Arab leaders, regarding the joint Israeli–Arab–American response should Hamas maintain its refusal. Such conduct by Israel will serve its war objectives, whether within the framework of an updated, agreed-upon plan or through significantly enhanced legitimacy for Israeli actions should Hamas reject it.
President Trump’s 21-point plan to end the war in the Gaza Strip was formulated based on several understandings between the president and Arab leaders and is assumed also to rest on understandings with Prime Minister Netanyahu while taking into account vital Israeli interests. Since the plan’s principles require the disarmament of Hamas, the release of all hostages, the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip, and recognition of the need to ensure that Gaza will not pose a security threat to the State of Israel, as well as recognition of the necessity of an expanded security perimeter, they meet Israel’s security demands and align with its declared war objectives. Therefore, Israel should say yes.
Israel’s “yes” must be clear and convincing; any ambiguity—which is effectively a refusal—should be left to Hamas. A hesitant or vague response from Hamas will further erode any remaining patience toward the organization and its leadership, and it’s reasonable, or at least hopeful, to assume that this will also extend to Qatar, its patron. That shift would thereby expand the basis of Israel’s legitimacy to complete its mission up to a full occupation of the Gaza Strip.
In the public segment of the prime minister’s meeting with the president, it’s important that Prime Minister Netanyahu thank President Trump for his plan, express appreciation for the effort, and convey hope for its swift implementation. In their private meeting prior to the press conference, the prime minister should persuade President Trump to update, clarify, and expand several points to ensure alignment with Israel’s vital and necessary interests. For example, regarding the disarmament of Hamas, the plan should explicitly address the destruction of all tunnel infrastructure. Without eliminating this network, Hamas could rebuild its power, leaving a real security threat to Israel and undermining the ability of any governing authorities established there to neutralize such threats.
Additionally, Israel should ensure that Qatar will not be part of the “day after” mechanism, and if any involvement is considered, it must be conditioned on a fundamental change in its hostile conduct toward Israel in the international arena. As for the Palestinian terrorists to be released as part of Israel’s concession for the return of Israeli hostages, Israel should demand that they all be transferred to the Gaza Strip with a firm Egyptian commitment not to allow them to exit Gaza through Egypt. Furthermore, conditions should be imposed on their release, including strict limitations on their activities in Gaza and their commitment not to return to terrorism. This commitment must be vigorously enforced by the governing mechanism to be established in Gaza; under its overriding security authority and freedom of operational action, Israel must address any breach not effectively handled by that mechanism. These are among the points that require further clarification and expansion regarding the plan.
Finally, concerning Gaza’s reconstruction, it must be ensured that UNRWA will not be part of the process and that there will be no revival or rehabilitation of the refugee camps. UNRWA serves as the ultimate perpetuator of the refugee ethos, with the camps themselves acting as a living symbol of the “right of return.” A necessary precondition for any reconstruction process is an unequivocal and resolute international statement eliminating the refugee ethos and rejecting any attempt to preserve the “right of return.” This is a historically significant and unique opportunity to initiate essential change.
Israel must not appear as the one that refuses the initiative but rather as the one that welcomes it and is ready to join it. It’s difficult to imagine that Hamas will genuinely and explicitly accept the plan; therefore, it’s critical that the prime minister and the president reach understandings, to be reinforced by the relevant Arab leaders, regarding the joint Israeli–Arab–American response should Hamas maintain its refusal. Such conduct by Israel will serve its war objectives, whether within the framework of an updated, agreed-upon plan or through significantly enhanced legitimacy for Israeli actions should Hamas reject it.