Israel struck yesterday at the leadership of the terrorist organization Hamas while it was being hosted in Doha, the capital of Qatar. The strike has implications not only for the negotiations over the release of the hostages and for Hamas’s standing and its ability to function as it has, but also for Qatar, its status, and its playing a similar role in the future.
Until the strike, Qatar, alongside Turkey, was the external player with the closest ties to Hamas, giving it decisive influence over the organization and the negotiations for the release of the hostages. This connection has now ended, at least temporarily. The strike severely harms Qatar, its status, and its prestige—and above all, its ability to serve as a “super-mediator” in the region and to reap the many dividends of this role, especially from the United States.
Egypt may now gain greater weight in the negotiations, but it does not necessarily wield the same influence as Qatar over the remaining members of Hamas’s leadership. Most Arab states are likely to condemn Israel and support Qatar, whose sovereignty was violated. Yet these statements will amount to no more than lip service. Hamas remains a problem, and even a threat, to the pragmatic Arab states. They don’t lament the blow to Qatar either, since many perceive its foreign policy as reckless and as harmful to their interests.
The United States was likely privy to the matter long before the strike, if only because of its militarypresence in Qatar. Israel would not have acted without US approval, despite Washington’s current effortto distance itself from the event. American involvement is significant, as it will help mitigate some of the negative consequences in both the political and media spheres—in which Qatar has strong influence. While it’s true that the United States has considerable leverage over Qatar, the reverse is also true: In recent years, Qatar has become a close partner of Washington, both in the region and beyond.
Although the strike has substantial deterrent value, it could indirectly harm Israel’s ties with other Gulf states. Although some are rivals of Qatar and resent its ties to organizations like Hamas, they are now likely to show solidarity, condemn Israel, and may even take actions against it, such as in international forums—at a time when their relations with Israel are already strained by the war in Gaza.
Israel struck yesterday at the leadership of the terrorist organization Hamas while it was being hosted in Doha, the capital of Qatar. The strike has implications not only for the negotiations over the release of the hostages and for Hamas’s standing and its ability to function as it has, but also for Qatar, its status, and its playing a similar role in the future.
Until the strike, Qatar, alongside Turkey, was the external player with the closest ties to Hamas, giving it decisive influence over the organization and the negotiations for the release of the hostages. This connection has now ended, at least temporarily. The strike severely harms Qatar, its status, and its prestige—and above all, its ability to serve as a “super-mediator” in the region and to reap the many dividends of this role, especially from the United States.
Egypt may now gain greater weight in the negotiations, but it does not necessarily wield the same influence as Qatar over the remaining members of Hamas’s leadership. Most Arab states are likely to condemn Israel and support Qatar, whose sovereignty was violated. Yet these statements will amount to no more than lip service. Hamas remains a problem, and even a threat, to the pragmatic Arab states. They don’t lament the blow to Qatar either, since many perceive its foreign policy as reckless and as harmful to their interests.
The United States was likely privy to the matter long before the strike, if only because of its militarypresence in Qatar. Israel would not have acted without US approval, despite Washington’s current effortto distance itself from the event. American involvement is significant, as it will help mitigate some of the negative consequences in both the political and media spheres—in which Qatar has strong influence. While it’s true that the United States has considerable leverage over Qatar, the reverse is also true: In recent years, Qatar has become a close partner of Washington, both in the region and beyond.
Although the strike has substantial deterrent value, it could indirectly harm Israel’s ties with other Gulf states. Although some are rivals of Qatar and resent its ties to organizations like Hamas, they are now likely to show solidarity, condemn Israel, and may even take actions against it, such as in international forums—at a time when their relations with Israel are already strained by the war in Gaza.