The deputy foreign ministers of Iran and the E3 countries (Britain, France, and Germany) will meet this coming weekend in Istanbul, as part of the parties’ efforts to return to a “deal-based reality” regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. This is an important meeting, as it is supposed to address the attempt to find a solution to the SNAPBACK issue, namely the reimposition of all sanctions from the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and imposing them again on Iran.
As is known, until October 18, 2025, each of the E3 countries can reinstate all the sanctions that were already lifted from Iran under the nuclear agreement, and they have recently threatened to do so if Iran does not reach a new nuclear agreement that will limit its nuclear program. Although it is highly doubtful that the reimposition of the sanctions will lead to Iran’s economic collapse, the expected Iranian response to such a move (Tehran has previously threatened that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if the SNAPBACK is activated) would minimize the likelihood of a return to a nuclear agreement between Iran and the world powers and would create an unprecedented rift between Iran and the E3 countries.
Even if the parties reach an agreement, there will be no return to a deal-based reality as long as the U.S. and Iran do not reach understandings on the nuclear issue, and therefore the negotiations between Iran and the Europeans are not a substitute for dialogue between Tehran and Washington. Still, without understandings on the SNAPBACK issue, the likelihood of a nuclear agreement will, as stated, be extremely low.
In the background, it is important to note that perhaps as a goodwill gesture ahead of the talks, Iran confirmed that it intends to return to “technical” dialogue with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but still without the return of inspectors to the enrichment facilities. As part of the talks, it is likely that the E3 countries will demand the return of inspectors to Iran as a condition for the possible postponement of the SNAPBACK.
In the Israeli context, the expectation in Jerusalem is that the E3 countries will activate the SNAPBACK, a step that—as stated—will dramatically reduce the likelihood of an agreement. On the other hand, it is important to remember that such a step may increase the likelihood that in Iran they will “duplicate” the North Korean model of withdrawal from the NPT and possible progress toward nuclear weapons while exploiting the absence of IAEA inspectors in Iran.
The deputy foreign ministers of Iran and the E3 countries (Britain, France, and Germany) will meet this coming weekend in Istanbul, as part of the parties’ efforts to return to a “deal-based reality” regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. This is an important meeting, as it is supposed to address the attempt to find a solution to the SNAPBACK issue, namely the reimposition of all sanctions from the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and imposing them again on Iran.
As is known, until October 18, 2025, each of the E3 countries can reinstate all the sanctions that were already lifted from Iran under the nuclear agreement, and they have recently threatened to do so if Iran does not reach a new nuclear agreement that will limit its nuclear program. Although it is highly doubtful that the reimposition of the sanctions will lead to Iran’s economic collapse, the expected Iranian response to such a move (Tehran has previously threatened that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if the SNAPBACK is activated) would minimize the likelihood of a return to a nuclear agreement between Iran and the world powers and would create an unprecedented rift between Iran and the E3 countries.
Even if the parties reach an agreement, there will be no return to a deal-based reality as long as the U.S. and Iran do not reach understandings on the nuclear issue, and therefore the negotiations between Iran and the Europeans are not a substitute for dialogue between Tehran and Washington. Still, without understandings on the SNAPBACK issue, the likelihood of a nuclear agreement will, as stated, be extremely low.
In the background, it is important to note that perhaps as a goodwill gesture ahead of the talks, Iran confirmed that it intends to return to “technical” dialogue with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but still without the return of inspectors to the enrichment facilities. As part of the talks, it is likely that the E3 countries will demand the return of inspectors to Iran as a condition for the possible postponement of the SNAPBACK.
In the Israeli context, the expectation in Jerusalem is that the E3 countries will activate the SNAPBACK, a step that—as stated—will dramatically reduce the likelihood of an agreement. On the other hand, it is important to remember that such a step may increase the likelihood that in Iran they will “duplicate” the North Korean model of withdrawal from the NPT and possible progress toward nuclear weapons while exploiting the absence of IAEA inspectors in Iran.