The Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program Following the War

Operation Rising Lion substantially rolled back Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Iran is no longer considered a threshold state—one capable of enriching uranium to 90% weapons-grade material within two weeks of a political decision to do so. However, the war left Iran with residual capabilities that may be enough to support rebuilding efforts or even a covert breakout. Iran could potentially regain threshold status within one to two years, barring external interference.

The Israeli and American strikes severely damaged the three main facilities associated with Iran’s uranium enrichment program, to the point where their rehabilitation is unlikely.

• Natanz Enrichment Plant: Iran’s main enrichment facility was severely damaged. Around 15,000 centrifuges, including both first-generation and advanced models, were reportedly destroyed.
• Fordow Enrichment Plant: Targeted by six US Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOPs) bombs, the site was used to enrich uranium to 60%, and also suffered major damage.
• Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center: Critical for converting uranium compounds from “yellow cake” to UF6 gas—the material needed for the enrichment process—and later back to uranium metal. This material is then used to create a fission core for a nuclear weapon. This site was severely damaged and is likely inoperable.

Overall, most of Iran’s active centrifuges were likely destroyed, and Iran’s production capabilities were damaged—although its extensive knowledge and expertise in this field remain. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that Iran still possesses at least several hundred centrifuges, including those that were manufactured but were not installed in the two enrichment facilities prior to the war. It should be noted that since February of 2021, Iran has not allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor the production and storage of centrifuges.

Enriched uranium stockpile: It is unclear whether Iran’s 408 kg of uranium enriched to 60% that was in Iran’s possession prior to the war was dispersed and hidden, or if it remained at sites that were damaged in the attacks. Additionally, the extent to which any of this material can still be used is uncertain. Beyond the 60% enriched uranium, it is assumed that there are additional quantities of uranium enriched to lower levels still in Iran’s possession. A senior Israeli official told the New York Times that at least some of the fissile material likely survived, buried under Natanz and Fordow, and that “nothing was moved” prior to the Israeli and US strikes. This official expressed confidence that any Iranian attempt to extract the uranium would likely be detected, which would lead to another military strike.

Heavy water reactor at Arak: The Arak reactor, intended for producing military-grade plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, was heavily damaged, eliminating the potential of returning it to a military track in the future.

Weaponization program: It is not clear if the war affected Iran’s progress in nuclear weaponization. Several facilities related to nuclear weaponization—including Parchin and the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) headquarters in Tehran—were targeted. The extent of the damage is unknown, but any disruption  could delay weaponization.

The elimination of more than ten nuclear scientists: The targeted elimination of Iran’s leading experts in fields relevant to nuclear weapons has significantly affected the country’s expertise in related domains. This may also hinder future recruitment of nuclear scientists for the weapons program—although some  may still be motivated to join out of loyalty to the regime or the state. It is likely that a reserve of personnel exists in relevant fields who could potentially replace the eliminated scientists; however, they may lack comparable experience and expertise. Additionally, the damage inflicted on the nuclear archive in Tehran may represent a major disruption to Iran’s nuclear knowledge base.

The Nuclear Program in Iran’s Strategy

The desire to ensure the regime’s survival in the face of both internal and external threats is a paramount objective of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a central pillar of its security doctrine. This doctrine, shaped by the regime’s threat perception, aims to prevent the emergence of any significant danger to Iran’s borders, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and national security.

As with many other aspects of Iran’s strategic strength, the origins of its nuclear program date back to the era of the Shah. Following the Islamic Revolution, the program was suspended by order of Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, as it conflicted with his view of the spirit of Islam. However, the Iran–Iraq War prompted the Iranian regime to revive the nuclear program in the mid-1980s, driven by the heavy toll suffered in the war and by Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and missiles against Iran.

For years, senior Iranian officials have repeatedly declared that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons and will never attempt to do so, asserting that they see no utility in such weapons and that, according to Iran’s supreme leader, nuclear weapons are religiously forbidden (haram). Nevertheless, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has never abandoned his belief that possessing a military nuclear threshold capability would provide Iran with effective deterrence against its enemies and thus constitutes an essential insurance policy for the regime’s continued survival. Khamenei has also maintained that the nuclear issue is merely a pretext used by the West to pressure, isolate, and weaken Iran in order to pave the way for its ultimate strategic goal: regime change in the Islamic Republic.

Moreover, Khamenei has pointed to the decision by former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi to dismantle his country’s nuclear program in 2003—which ultimately did not prevent his overthrow with Western support—as proof of the strategic imperative in Iran’s refusal to yield to Western demands vis-à-vis the nuclear program. Similarly, Iran views the contrast between the immunity enjoyed by nuclear-armed North Korea and the fate of Saddam Hussein, who did not possess such weapons, as proof of the critical importance of possessing nuclear weapons, alongside other strategic assets—chief among them, its long-range missile arsenal. However, the Iranian leadership has refrained from making a decision to break out and develop nuclear weapons, based on the assessment that such a move could lead Iran into military confrontation with Israel—and more seriously, with the United States. Iran has therefore preferred to progress along the nuclear path in a cautious and calculated manner. The regional developments following the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip have posed increasing security challenges to the Islamic Republic and have raised doubts about the viability of its security doctrine. In particular, the efficacy of two key components of Iran’s deterrence strategy—its proxy network and its strategic military capabilities (ballistic missiles and UAVs)—has come under scrutiny. The collapse of its proxy network and Iran’s failure to deter Israel through its strategic missile arsenal have intensified the skepticism regarding its ability to counter Israel’s military superiority and to effectively deter further Israeli actions against Iran.

In response, voices within Iran have grown louder, calling for improved deterrence capabilities, including a change in its nuclear doctrine and consideration of a breakout to nuclear weapons, which they claim would provide the ultimate “insurance policy” against Israel and the United States. In light of Iran’s continued efforts to consolidate its status as a nuclear threshold state—and possibly even take measures to shorten its breakout time to a nuclear weapon—senior Iranian officials have called for a reassessment of the country’s nuclear strategy, arguing that remaining at the threshold is no longer sufficient.

Such sentiments were evident when, in October 2024, several dozen members of Iran’s parliament submitted an official letter to the Supreme National Security Council, urging a change in the Islamic Republic’s defense doctrine regarding its nuclear program. On October 26, the chairman of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, Kamal Kharazi, stated that Tehran was considering extending the range of its ballistic missiles and that a change in its nuclear doctrine would remain on the table if Iran faced an existential threat. He emphasized that Iran possesses the technical capabilities required to produce a nuclear weapon and that the Supreme Leader Khamenei is the sole obstacle preventing it. Despite the growing presence of these voices, until the outbreak of the war with Israel, there had been no indication that Iran’s leadership, led by Supreme Leader Khamenei, had decided to alter its nuclear strategy or to move decisively toward weaponization. However, the increasingly public discourse within Iran advocating a reassessment of this strategy suggests that such debates are taking place within the corridors of power in Tehran, alongside growing support for a nuclear breakout.

Iran’s Strategic Options

At this stage, it is reasonable to assume that Iran has not yet completed its battle damage assessment (BDA) and is still trying to ascertain what it has lost and what remains of its nuclear capabilities. Consequently, it is unlikely to make hasty decisions regarding its possible courses of action. This is compounded by the fact that decision-making in Iran is a structured process and thus may take considerable time. Nonetheless, it can be assessed that Iran’s motivation to obtain nuclear weapons has increased in light of the lessons learned from this war. This conflict has served to starkly illustrate the failure of Iran’s deterrence doctrine against Israel and the United States. The Iranian leadership faces several central strategic alternatives:

Abandoning the Nuclear Program. This would require a complete dismantling of Iran’s enrichment infrastructure—a decision that would hinge on whether the leadership concludes that the nuclear program has shifted from being a strategic asset to a liability. However, this scenario is highly unlikely, as it contradicts the leadership’s worldview, which sees the nuclear program not only  as a natural right but also as a crucial guarantee for regime survival. This perception existed even before the war and seems to have been strengthened further in its aftermath. In Iran, there is a growing belief that if the country had possessed nuclear weapons, similar to North Korea, it would not have been vulnerable to military attacks by Israel and the United States.

Pursuing a new nuclear agreement. Iran has not clearly signaled a desire to return to negotiations, especially under terms it perceives as capitulating to US demands—chiefly the abandonment of enrichment on Iranian soil. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Iran would accept intrusive monitoring mechanisms by the IAEA, which senior Iranian officials accuse of cooperating with Israel and the United States and of laying the groundwork for attacks on Iran. It is also questionable whether Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei wishes to resume negotiations with the US administration, which he sees as having deceived him and proven once again to be untrustworthy. Nevertheless, Khamenei may be willing to renew negotiations—and even reach a political agreement—if doing so serves key strategic objectives. These include the removal of immediate military threats against Iran, substantial economic benefits achieved through meaningful sanctions relief and the unfreezing of Iranian assets abroad, and the opportunity to buy time—potentially until the end of President Trump’s term. Should Iran choose to go down the diplomatic path, this holds a significant risk that it is doing so simply for the benefits, while in fact pursuing secret weaponization track (the North Korean model).

Gradual and renewed rebuilding of its nuclear threshold status(without an agreement and without a breakout to weapons). This path is possible while maintaining nuclear ambiguity through significant limitations on IAEA supervision or even withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since the end of the war, a public debate has emerged in Iran about the possibility of adopting a policy of nuclear ambiguity while refraining from officially disclosing its nuclear capabilities. As with other controversial issues, this subject has sparked internal disagreements between conservative “hardliner” circles and more pragmatic ones. Conservative and radical factions believe ambiguity could serve a dual purpose both as a bargaining chip and a pressure tool in negotiations, and as a significant deterrent against Iran’s adversaries. In contrast, more moderate voices warn that a policy of nuclear ambiguity could lead to the intensification of economic sanctions and even the resumption of war. They also believe Iran lacks the ability to overcome the intelligence capabilities of its adversaries, which enable them to monitor its nuclear progress.

Clandestine nuclear breakout. As previously stated, Iran’s motivation to acquire nuclear weapons appears to have increased since the war with Israel. A decision to pursue a breakout remains highly risky for Iran due to several factors: the threat of further military strikes by Israel or the United States, and the demonstrated ability of Western intelligence to penetrate Iran’s nuclear program. In addition, Israel—and potentially the United States—has shown a clear willingness to use force again, and even threaten the regime’s survival, to prevent Iran from rebuilding its nuclear infrastructure and from advancing toward weapons capability. However, the Iranian regime has already misjudged the intentions and capabilities of both Israel and the United States—as seen in the April and October 2024 attacks on Israel and in stalling in negotiations with the United States—and it may miscalculate again.

It can be assumed that Iran will not attempt to rebuild the enrichment facilities damaged in the attack. However, it may enrich uranium to 90% weapons-grade level at a secret site. Such enrichment requires no more than one or two cascades of advanced centrifuges (between 100 and 200). If Iran opts for a crash program, it could potentially be carried out within several weeks. This timeline could be accelerated further if Iran has already prepared a hidden facility or several smaller facilities scattered across the country in anticipation of strikes.

Despite the damage to the conversion facility at Isfahan, Iran could also convert the enriched uranium back into metallic form at alternative sites (e.g., chemical labs at universities or chemical plants), and such infrastructure may already be in place. If the process is carried out hastily, covertly, and without safety constraints, it could take several months at most. A key challenge in this approach would be transporting the fissile material to facilities enabling reconversion.

Although Iran may be able to overcome enrichment and conversion obstacles, breaking out to nuclear weapons could prove more complex. It remains unclear how far Iran had advanced in assembling an explosive device prior to the war, but it is evident that it made significant progress in weaponization efforts and Iran is believed to possess the necessary knowledge to do so. There are assessments that Iran could assemble a relatively simple gun-type nuclear device. However, this type of weapon requires a larger quantity of fissile material compared to an implosion-type device, and it is unclear how close Iran is to having the manufacturing capability to produce it. Additionally, such a device is not suitable for ballistic missile delivery and requires a large strategic bomber. Therefore, breaking out with such a device might serve as a deterrent by projecting nuclear power through a test rather than posing a direct operational threat to Israel. Even in this regard, Iran might choose a rapid path (albeit less secure and structured compared to Western standards). In any case, reaching full operational capability (ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads) is not possible in the short term, and the ability to deliver a nuclear bomb without missiles is extremely dangerous and very limited.

While there is a theoretical possibility of North Korea (or Pakistan) transferring a ready-made nuclear weapon system to Iran, our assessment of  the likelihood of such a scenario—which contradicts Iran’s strategic doctrine of self-reliance, especially in strategic capabilities—is extremely low. Iran may also develop nuclear weapons systems intended for electromagnetic pulse attacks. Since this type of weapon is non-lethal, such a move would also be theoretically compatible with the fatwa issued by Iran’s supreme leader, which allegedly prohibits the production of nuclear weapons.

Strategic Purpose 

Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons has been and remains—even after the war—the central goal for preserving and strengthening the national security of the State of Israel. Israel cannot accept a nuclear-armed radical regime that seeks its destruction. In light of the war’s successes, a clear strategic objective is required: to deny Iran the ability to develop nuclear weapons—whether through an agreement that eliminates this capability, or through active enforcement (via military or covert means) that prevents any renewed Iranian efforts to restore its nuclear program, let alone break out to a nuclear weapon. This objective must be achieved while preserving Israel’s ability to continue a comprehensive campaign against Iran to weaken the regime, limit its malign regional activities, and restrict its missile capabilities.

Preparation for a wide range of scenarios, as described above, requires a diversified set of tools and capabilities. In the immediate aftermath of a strike, efforts should focus on developing means that will enable a variety of strategic alternatives, as outlined below.

Operational Tools Required Against Iran’s Nuclear Program

• Intelligence and collection capabilities to detect any Iranian progress along a covert nuclear path;
• Diversification and expansion of covert operational capabilities, enabling infiltration into Iran to sabotage and destroy industrial assets related to the nuclear program;
• Independent Israeli strike capabilities with weapon systems capable of penetrating deep underground to destroy subterranean facilities;
• Enhancing the ability of Israeli weapons systems to breach Iranian air defenses, particularly in anticipation of upgrades Iran may implement following the war. This should be done while maintaining cooperation with the United States and the ability to act with American support;
• Identifying and preventing external assistance for the rehabilitation of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, using Israeli means in coordination with the international community;
• Improving Israel’s capabilities to detect and thwart terrorist efforts, based on the assumption that the non-conventional terrorist threat has increased as part of the Iranian response.

Strategic Alternatives

1. A strong nuclear agreement (its advantages and disadvantages will be detailed below);
2. A broad preemptive strike: A joint Israeli–American campaign to destroy the remaining nuclear assets in Iran and destabilize the regime, potentially including ground operations;
3. No Strike, no deal: A non-agreement-based reality, with increased international pressure on the Islamic Republic aimed at weakening and isolating it.

Recommendations for Israel

Prior to the war, Israel faced a strategic choice: support diplomatic efforts for an agreement between Iran and the United States, or resort to military action. Once the decision is made in favor of a military strike, Israel must pursue a dual policy—seeking a restrictive agreement under close IAEA supervision, while preserving the ability to enforce red lines and intervene to disrupt any Iranian attempt to break out toward nuclear weapons.

With Iran only beginning to assess and internalize the lessons of the recent conflict, assumptions about its leadership’s potential decisions—shaped largely by conservative and radical forces—should be approached with strict caution. Moreover, Iran is expected to internalize lessons from the capabilities demonstrated by Israel during the war and could upgrade its weapons systems, with foreign assistance, particularly from China. Iran may also adopt a new strategy centered on projecting strength for the purpose of deterrence, including in the nuclear field. Therefore, Israel must develop flexible operational capabilities, employing a range of diverse tools adapted to evolving circumstances, decisions made in Tehran, and potential changes in Iran’s strategy.

Option 1: A Political Agreement

• A nuclear agreement—dependent primarily on decisions in Washington and Tehran in the coming weeks—is likely the only way to reinstate and even strengthen IAEA monitoring compared to the 2015 JCPOA deal. IAEA inspectors have the experience and capabilities (although not foolproof) to attempt to determine the fate of Iran’s pre-war fissile material and secure any remaining stockpiles. Without an agreement, intelligence alone would have to suffice. The IAEA inspection mechanism provides political and legal legitimacy for another strike should Iran deny inspectors access to sites under suspicion. A nuclear agreement (assuming it is not exploited by Iran to secretly advance a military track) would solidify the international community’s long-term commitment—and particularly that of the United States—to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. It may also buy time for internal political change in Iran or, at a minimum, until the death of its 86-year-old Supreme Leader, Khamenei.
• The recent attacks in Iran could pave the way for a renegotiated nuclear agreement under more favorable terms for Israel and the United States. Iran is unlikely to relinquish its right to enrich uranium (to a low level of 3.67%) on its territory, even under new conditions. However, the damage to its enrichment facilities might encourage Tehran to accept a creative solution (e.g., a regional nuclear consortium) bridging the American position (against enrichment in Iran) and Iran’s stance.
• Conversely, an agreement on its own does not guarantee Iran’s long-term compliance, let alone prevent covert advancement of its nuclear program using residual capabilities still in its possession. Moreover, an agreement expected to lead to the removal (or significant easing) of economic sanctions would provide the regime with a lifeline and enhance its ability to continue its malign activities across multiple domains. Such an agreement could also restrict Israel’s freedom of action against Iran unless that freedom is preserved through informal understandings with the United States. In addition, military strikes are likely to impair the IAEA’s ability to conduct an effective “material balance” to locate remaining fissile material inside Iran. It is also doubtful that Iran would agree to a highly intrusive monitoring mechanism by the IAEA—even under a political settlement. In this scenario, a non-agreement reality may be preferrable for Israel, provided that strict supervision is maintained despite the absence of a formal deal (under Iran’s obligations to the NPT) and that Israel retains enforcement capabilities.
• From Israel’s perspective, a new nuclear agreement must ensure Iran remains at a breakout time of a minimum one year to allow sufficient time for potential military intervention, if necessary. It must also include intrusive and rigorous monitoring—such as Iran’s reaffirmation of the Additional Protocol under the NPT, the expansion of IAEA authority, and the resolution of ambiguities in the 2015 nuclear deal, particularly those related to monitoring suspected military sites. In addition, the agreement should be free of expiration clauses (“sunset provisions”) or, at the very least, include mechanisms to extend the validity of nuclear restrictions beyond the initially agreed upon period. Furthermore, there is a need to strengthen enforcement and oversight of potential weaponization activities addressed in Section T of the 2015 nuclear agreement. This includes specific activities relevant to the development of a nuclear warhead, such as a ban on uranium metal production; operations involving the development and use of computer models that could be used for nuclear weapons research and design; and prohibitions on experiments involving a “neutron initiator”—a critical component that functions as the detonator in a nuclear bomb.

Option 2: Offensive Initiative Against Iran

A strike in Iran may be justified and necessary as  preventive action. In a scenario where Israel identifies an immediate threat or sees an opportunity, a new military campaign should be planned—drawing on lessons learned by both sides from Operation Rising Lion. At this stage, it would be premature  to publicly discuss the methods of such a campaign. However, it is reasonable to assume that the campaign would rely on several fundamental principles:

• Close coordination with the United States
• Use of technological and intelligence-based surprises
• Initiation through a surprise attack
• Destruction of Iran’s military capabilities, particularly those enabling strikes on Israel’s home front, and the dismantling of Iranian air defenses
• Targeting regime pillars, based on a thorough analysis of the previous Israeli campaign

Option 3: No Strike, No Agreement—Iran Crawls Back to Nuclear Threshold Below Israeli Response Level

• Whether or not an agreement is reached, Israel must develop and maintain enforcement and intervention capabilities to disrupt any breakout toward military nuclear capability. These capabilities—including kinetic strikes and covert sabotage operations, preferably conducted below the threshold of Iranian retaliation—require high-quality intelligence, the continuous deployment of operational capabilities, and ongoing coordination and cooperation with the United States. In any case, an in-depth intelligence investigation is needed regarding the 408 kilograms of 60%-enriched uranium believed to remain in Iran, along with various means of intelligence collection to detect any activity aimed at enriching uranium to 90%, converting it into uranium metal, or advancing toward weaponization. While some of these activities are expected to leave behind indicators or detectable traces, it must be assumed that intelligence capabilities are not foolproof and may not detect everything. It also cannot be assumed with certainty that the impressive intelligence and operational capabilities demonstrated during the war will be maintained in the future—especially given that Iran is expected to learn from the attacks, gain a deeper understanding of Israeli and US strike capabilities, and improve its defensive and concealment strategies against military threats.
• Moreover, enforcement efforts could lead to a resumption of hostilities and potentially drag Israel into a prolonged war of attrition, which would impose significant constraints on daily life within the country. Additionally, it is uncertain whether close coordination with the United States will be sustained over time, or whether the American position regarding Israeli freedom of action will remain unchanged in the face of political shifts in the United States in the coming years or changes in its priorities in the international arena.
• A credible threat to the very survival of the regime must be established in order to deter Iran from actions that could advance its nuclear weapons ambitions. It may be possible to deter Iran from deciding to rebuild its nuclear program—especially from breaking out toward weaponization—by making it clear that such a move would inevitably trigger attacks on infrastructure targets, military assets, and symbols of the regime, thereby endangering the regime’s very stability. Iranian authorities must be made to understand that Israel (and ideally the United States as well) will not allow a nuclear-armed Iranian regime to exist, and that the force employed during the war—focused primarily on the nuclear and missile programs—would be redirected, in the event of a breakout, against the regime’s critical assets and infrastructure. However, Iran’s decision will ultimately depend on a range of considerations, including its assessment of its ability to rebuild its program without detection and resolve of Israel and of the United States to continue military action over the long term.
• International political and economic pressure on Iran must continue to be applied (even in a scenario where a formal agreement exists) in order to weaken the regime, isolate it, and exhaust it economically and diplomatically. This pressure should address all the areas in which Iran poses a challenge to the international community—its missile program, malign regional activities, involvement in international terrorism, influence operations on social media, and human rights violations. In this context, and in the absence of a political agreement in the coming weeks, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany should be encouraged to activate the snapback mechanism prior to its expiration in October 2025. This is especially important given that concerns over a potential Iranian nuclear response (such as enriching uranium to 90%) have become less relevant in light of the outcome of the war, and that Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT could now pose an even greater risk to the regime than it did in the past.

Concluding Recommendations

1. The United States is a key player in every scenario. Accordingly, Israeli strategic planning must account for the US political calendar, including the 2026 midterms and the 2028 presidential elections. In parallel, perception-shaping tools must be employed to challenge Iran’s post-war belief that Israel is merely a Western proxy—an image that strengthens Iranian confidence, based on the perception of Western decline.
2. Pursuing or preserving a restrictive framework that allows strict monitoring and legitimizes action is in Israel’s interest—but Israel must hold firmly to its red lines as previously outlined.
3. Israel should diplomatically engage with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom to urge them to withdraw from the nuclear deal and trigger the snapback mechanism before the authority to do so expires.
4. Developing enforcement capabilities (intelligence and operational tools) should be Israel’s strategic focus, rather than committing to one long-term strategy. The Iranian regime’s strategic system is undergoing a post-war transformation, and thus it is too early for Israel to hone in on a unified strategic doctrine. The key tension in Israel’s strategic design lies between enforcement and diplomacy. As such, decision-makers must preserve flexibility and focus on building the capacity to operate with a diverse set of tools in rapidly changing circumstances.

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[1]  This document is the first policy paper in the framework of an examination of the lessons from Operation Rising Lion, its impacts across various domains, and the resulting policy recommendations for Israel.

[2] This paper is based on the work of a team including Dr. Ephraim Asculai, Dr. Avishay Ben Sasson-Gordis, Hannah Liberman-Alemu, Rafi Meron, Danny Citrinowicz, Dr. Yehoshua Kalisky, Eldad Shavit, Sima Shine, and Ofer Shelah.