During the 12-day confrontation between Israel and Iran, Russia emerged as an almost irrelevant player. Despite the strategic partnership agreement signed between Moscow and Tehran in January and the joint anti-Western rhetoric the two countries have cultivated, one could have expected Russia to assist its ally. Indeed, such expectations existed in Tehran—but they were not met. While the Kremlin did pursue diplomatic activity, including proactive mediation initiatives, these efforts bore no fruit. Moreover, there is no indication that Moscow provided any meaningful military support to Iran—not drones, not air-defense systems, nor any significant technology, even indirectly.
As part of its diplomatic efforts, President Putin proposed that Donald Trump serve as a mediator. Trump publicly rejected the suggestion, advising his Russian counterpart to “help himself” instead—an implicit reference to the deadlock in negotiations over Ukraine and to Russia’s declining relevance as a credible intermediary.
Several factors contributed to Russia’s lack of influence: a shortage of available resources due to its heavy commitments on the Ukrainian front; a desire to avoid provoking tensions with Trump, who is perceived as a key enabler of the continued campaign against Kyiv; and an acknowledgment of the clear military superiority of Israel and the United States, which reduced Russia’s incentive to support a side likely to lose.
Nevertheless, Russia has not given up on efforts to reinsert itself into the process of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. In a rare phone call between Putin and French President Emmanuel Macron—initiated by the latter—the two leaders discussed the Iranian file and Russia’s role in it. Similarly, at the recent BRICS+ summit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, and reiterated an earlier proposal: that Russia could store and even dilute Iranian uranium to levels suitable for civilian use. This mechanism—exclusively available through Russia—could potentially meet both Western demands and Iranian concerns, echoing similar provisions once offered under the JCPOA framework.
In addition, Putin encouraged the Iranians to accept the Western demand to cease all enrichment activities on Iranian soil—a recommendation that Moscow had previously avoided out of concern it would be seen as siding with the West against Tehran.
Having demonstrated irrelevance and a lack of dominance during the confrontation itself, Moscow is now attempting to reclaim what it perceives as its traditional role: a vital stakeholder at the negotiating table. In its bid to restore influence, Russia is even willing to align with some of the demands directed at Iran. However, the success of this effort largely hinges on the cooperation—or at least the acquiescence—of the other key players, including the United States, Europe, and Israel.
During the 12-day confrontation between Israel and Iran, Russia emerged as an almost irrelevant player. Despite the strategic partnership agreement signed between Moscow and Tehran in January and the joint anti-Western rhetoric the two countries have cultivated, one could have expected Russia to assist its ally. Indeed, such expectations existed in Tehran—but they were not met. While the Kremlin did pursue diplomatic activity, including proactive mediation initiatives, these efforts bore no fruit. Moreover, there is no indication that Moscow provided any meaningful military support to Iran—not drones, not air-defense systems, nor any significant technology, even indirectly.
As part of its diplomatic efforts, President Putin proposed that Donald Trump serve as a mediator. Trump publicly rejected the suggestion, advising his Russian counterpart to “help himself” instead—an implicit reference to the deadlock in negotiations over Ukraine and to Russia’s declining relevance as a credible intermediary.
Several factors contributed to Russia’s lack of influence: a shortage of available resources due to its heavy commitments on the Ukrainian front; a desire to avoid provoking tensions with Trump, who is perceived as a key enabler of the continued campaign against Kyiv; and an acknowledgment of the clear military superiority of Israel and the United States, which reduced Russia’s incentive to support a side likely to lose.
Nevertheless, Russia has not given up on efforts to reinsert itself into the process of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. In a rare phone call between Putin and French President Emmanuel Macron—initiated by the latter—the two leaders discussed the Iranian file and Russia’s role in it. Similarly, at the recent BRICS+ summit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, and reiterated an earlier proposal: that Russia could store and even dilute Iranian uranium to levels suitable for civilian use. This mechanism—exclusively available through Russia—could potentially meet both Western demands and Iranian concerns, echoing similar provisions once offered under the JCPOA framework.
In addition, Putin encouraged the Iranians to accept the Western demand to cease all enrichment activities on Iranian soil—a recommendation that Moscow had previously avoided out of concern it would be seen as siding with the West against Tehran.
Having demonstrated irrelevance and a lack of dominance during the confrontation itself, Moscow is now attempting to reclaim what it perceives as its traditional role: a vital stakeholder at the negotiating table. In its bid to restore influence, Russia is even willing to align with some of the demands directed at Iran. However, the success of this effort largely hinges on the cooperation—or at least the acquiescence—of the other key players, including the United States, Europe, and Israel.