Strategic Assessment

• Book: The Rise of the Infrastructure State
• By: Jessica DiCarlo, Seth Schindler
• Publisher: Jessica DiCarlo, Seth Schindler
• Year: 2022
• pp: 334

One of the most important discussions on Israel’s national security that has occurred in recent years did not take place in IDF headquarters or at the Knesset; it took place at the Globes newspaper’s Infrastructure Conference, which was held in Tel Aviv in March 2024 (Infrastructure Conference, 2024). Under the guise of civilian and technocratic topics such as “How Will Israel’s Rail System Look in 2040” and “When Innovation Meets Public Transportation,” economic leaders and representatives of government ministries discussed how Israel should act in order to achieve economic prosperity and security. Despite the opposing interests and diverse approaches, as a rule, the speakers agreed that Israel is suffering from an ongoing infrastructure deficit and that governmental and private investment is required to generate national renewal in the coming years. Israel Railways’ roadmap for the country’s southern and northern periphery, as an example of an issue that apparently has no connection to national security, was revealed to be of crucial importance given its close connection with issues such as employment, housing, urban development, social gaps, and, of course, security.

The close relationship between infrastructure and national security is not obvious and the best source for a first dive into this topic is the book discussed here: The Rise of the Infrastructure State: How US–China Rivalry Shapes Politics and Place Worldwide. The book’s editors, geographers Dr. Jessica DiCarlo and Prof. Seth Schindler, established the Second Cold War Observatory[1]—a unique collective of researchers from around the world who study the Second Cold War, between China and the United States, and its impact on world order, places, and people.

An understanding of the struggle between the United States and China is crucial for any appreciation of the current moment in world history, because the relationship between them has, to a large extent, shaped the world order since the end of the (first) Cold War. The “Pax Americana” and the liberal international order of the last three decades would not have been possible without the cheap money, cheap labor, and cheap products that resulted from the integration of Asia, and particularly China, into the global economy (Ferguson & Schularick, 2007). In other words, if the United States was the beating heart of the world, it was Chinese blood that flowed through its arteries. While their mutual dependence endures, both countries have made great efforts to reduce it over the last decade. And along the way, they are changing the world in almost every possible aspect of international relations.

Our lives today depend on a complex, global, cross-border system of communication networks, oil and gas pipelines, financial channels, supply chains, production lines, trade routes, server farms, and transportation infrastructure. Both China and the United States have a central role in this global system, which they see as critical for ensuring their political, economic, and security interests. Their efforts to maintain and expand their influence in these contested arenas are expressed in attempts to shape the rules of the game (for example, who can take part or how to act within them) or to decide what the structure of the networks, channels, chains, etc. will be (for example, certain supply chains will be established in or pass through the territory of certain countries, but not others) (Schindler et al., 2023).

For this reason, the struggle between the superpowers and its consequences for the world order have a direct and real impact on the foundations of Israel’s national security. Several basic components of Israel’s national security, its military superiority over its enemies, its technological capabilities, and its economic resilience are tied to the changing world order and, in particular, depend on open markets and the free trade of goods, knowledge, and raw materials, which have characterized the world in recent decades.

This groundbreaking book provides readers with a comprehensive, panoramic overview of the central and surprising role of infrastructure in the current geopolitical struggle between the United States and China. By focusing on infrastructure, the book succeeds in illustrating how the struggle between the superpowers has a direct, long-term impact on the character of many countries around the world and on the lives of millions. The book’s readers are exposed to the fact that the geopolitical struggle is expressed not only in diplomatic talks or high-profile military conflicts, but also in the very tangible, day-to-day experience of many people worldwide, resulting from the character of important projects such as transportation, communication, commercial, and energy infrastructure. These kinds of material projects have a major impact on people’s lives with respect to employment, the environment, health, and the family, and in addition to the national implications, they also affect the prestige and the national power of the countries where they take place.

The book contains more than twenty chapters on a variety of infrastructure projects (in the fields of nuclear energy, space, transportation, energy, commerce, and more) in Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and South America. In moving away from exclusively looking at the geopolitical relationship between the United States and China and toward many countries in the Global South or the Third World, the book implicitly answers researchers Jean and John Comaroff’s 2022 call for a “theory from the South” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012). According to the Comaroffs, any understanding of the state of the world, must move beyond the Global North. In today’s world, the countries of the Global South are ahead of the countries of the Global North; the most significant global processes are taking place in them and only later reaching the North. Trends and events that we are now experiencing in the Global North have already taken place many times in the Global South, in a way that allows thinkers and researchers from these countries to develop relevant theoretical and practical knowledge about them. For example, instead of confusion when faced with the recurring economic, social, or geopolitical crises we have been experiencing in recent years, it might be beneficial to look at countries in Africa or Latin America, for example, where scholars have developed theories or political ideas that may also be relevant for Israel.

The book’s main deficiency seems to be with respect to conceptual analysis. For example, surprisingly, the book does not discuss at length the question of what infrastructure is or how the concept’s meaning has changed throughout history. One way to understand the concept is a “set of systems that enable a society’s functioning” (Coyle, 2024). In other words, infrastructure is not just the complex engineering systems of pipelines or transportation routes, but also “social infrastructure,” that is, physical infrastructure in the areas of education, health, or welfare, and even digital infrastructure such as data centers that are accessible to the public.

It is beyond the scope of this review to survey all of the case studies presented in the book. The case studies of Laos (chapter 12) and Nepal (chapter 13), which we will focus on, exemplify the new architecture of opportunities that the Second Cold War offers small and medium-sized countries like Israel. They are not the obvious choice because they are perceived as poor, weak, and isolated. But for exactly this reason, the change in their image, standing, and political and economic power should demonstrate the tremendous potential of leveraging the infrastructure struggle between the superpowers. Moreover, these case studies represent central components of a successful process of political change toward adopting a “modern infrastructure state” model that we can and should learn from. Laos and Nepal have exploited the struggle between the superpowers to launch and promote unprecedented physical infrastructure projects that would not have been possible beforehand or under different geopolitical circumstances. While the case studies present countries that have chosen to tie their fate to China’s global infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative (sometimes called the New Silk Road), there are of course other case studies of countries that have joined forces with the United States for similar needs and using similar means.

The Case Studies of Laos and Nepal

In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping held a high-profile visit to Laos, during which the countries signed a long series of agreements related to transportation, energy, agriculture, tourism, trade, banking, and industry. While the agreements strengthened Laos’ dependence on China, more significantly, they were an important milestone in a decades-long process in which Laos succeeded in transforming its geography from a burden into an advantage. Projects such as railways, roads, and logistical warehouses aim to improve Laos’ situation and provide its residents with greater employment opportunities. They have provided Laos with loans worth tens of billions of dollars for the development of infrastructure since the beginning of the previous decade. These projects, and especially the participation in various infrastructure projects of the Belt and Road Initiative, have also led to changes in the state’s mechanisms. New governmental research, consulting, and management agencies have been established to achieve Laos’ national development goals. New bodies have been established to improve cooperation between Laos and China, with an emphasis on optimizing shared decision-making processes. These bodies are in charge of formulating recommendations regarding what types of projects to establish and how to finance and implement them. In addition to changes in the government, projects in Laos within the Belt and Road Initiative affect a large variety of areas—from tax laws to the status of private property and the bureaucratic burden on private businesses.

Two years after his visit to Laos, Xi Jinping visited Nepal, for the first time in 23 years. During the visit, he reaffirmed China’s commitment to building a regional railway, cross-border roads, economic corridors, dry ports, and even a university. As with Laos, large-scale national infrastructure projects were part of a strategy of developing and achieving Nepal’s national goals. After years of economic liberalization and reduced government involvement in the local economy, participation in infrastructure projects in the Belt and Road Initiative forced the Nepalese government to play a more active role, take the initiative, grow, and improve its capabilities. As with the case study of Laos, these projects and others in the Belt and Road Initiative aim to more closely connect Nepal with the regional economy and world markets in order to contribute to the local economy. In addition to the direct contribution to the country’s economy, the Belt and Road Initiative has also had a positive impact on Nepal’s geopolitical positioning, as can be seen, for example, in its impact on Nepal’s relations with India. Chinese interest in Nepal and the economic opportunities that were available to Nepal as part of the Belt and Road Initiative gave Nepal new and greater leeway vis-à-vis India, after many years of dependence on the Indian economy. In this context, it is worth examining, for example, the agreement in which India agreed to invest in the establishment of a 70-km oil pipeline between India and Nepal, as well as investments in dry ports, a railway, and more.

In conclusion, the leaders of Laos and Nepal saw the infrastructure projects within their territories as key to long-term national development plans that will address the totality of the countries’ needs and wants. The nature of the projects also entailed broader changes within Laos and Nepal as well as to their immediate geographical environment. Physical infrastructure projects that aimed to address specific national needs became engines for economic growth, technological modernization, regional development (urban, rural, and agricultural), and social advancement. Broad national change was not just a desirable byproduct of these projects; it was an expression of the local leadership’s recognition that such projects will not achieve their aims if they are not accompanied by necessary reforms in a variety of fields, including the operation and structure of the state’s mechanisms.

From High-Tech Nation to Modern Infrastructure State

Does the book contain insights or lessons that are relevant to Israel’s national security? Certainly! At the very least, the book allows us to reimagine ourselves as a modern infrastructure state. This would entail the State of Israel promoting national projects that shape the physical realm by creating and managing public infrastructure—from building bridges and public libraries to national research and development labs—in order to strengthen its integration in the world economy (including regionally) and to achieve ambitious national development goals in the socioeconomic, environmental, and security spheres. The extensive damage caused to communities in northern and southern Israel since the beginning of the war and the evacuation of their residents created an urgent need, but also an opportunity, to rebuild these areas and communities as part of broader national infrastructure change. In a modern infrastructure state, various types of infrastructure would serve and benefit the entire public—both individuals and communities. This is a model for national socioeconomic development that is different from the start-up nation model that has characterized Israel in recent decades. That model had many advantages, but it did not succeed in serving as a source of inclusive and sustainable national growth (Maggor, 2022, 2024). Moreover, in the coming years it could become untenable, given the Second Cold War and its harmful effect on global supply chains, particularly in technological spheres (Special Conference, 2023).

Israeli recognition of the great potential inherent in infrastructure is expressed in recent Israeli governments’ ambitious moves to make Israel part of the United States’ global supply chains. This would be in the form of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was meant to pass through Israel. The ambitious initiative, which was intended to be a response and an alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative, has encountered geopolitical difficulties in recent years due to the regional war in the Middle East. The fighting itself, as well as the significant changes in the balance of power in the region as well as in the identity of the actors and their interests, raise questions over its feasibility. Nevertheless, the actors involved have not yet publicly abandoned it, and in my estimation, it will be implemented eventually, perhaps after certain changes to the current plan. The initiative is planned as a transportation corridor (sea and land) that proceeds by sea from the coast of India through the Strait of Hormuz to Dubai, continues via Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Haifa, from there by sea to Piraeus in Greece, and from there by land to Northern Europe. The economic corridor initiative, if implemented, could have far-reaching consequences for Israel and the entire region. Israel would benefit not only from new transportation infrastructure that would pass through its territory but also from a variety of implications of being part of a super-national American-sponsored trade system—from strengthening its relations with the other countries participating in the initiative to possible direct economic dividends from tax income and from strengthening the ties between the Israeli and regional economies. The project might also advance urban development in the area that the corridors pass through. It is also conceivable that after the establishment of the corridor, along with other American-sponsored infrastructure initiatives, that the American interest in maintaining a military presence and involvement in the region, which has proven vital to Israel’s security, would increase.

The economic corridor initiative should be examined in relation to other sporadic externally financed infrastructure projects that have been or are planned to be established in Israel. In this context, we note the American company Nvidia’s decision to build digital and communication infrastructure in Israel (development and data centers), the Chinese involvement in transportation initiatives such as Haifa’s Bayport, the Carmel Tunnels, the energy companies investing in developing gas fields in Israel’s territorial waters, and more. While each of these examples can be explained separately, it is better to understand them in context and to see them as milestones in the process of Israel’s technological modernization, its economic development, and its regional and global political positioning. In other words, national infrastructure projects should be a conscious and institutionalized part of a new, overarching Israeli strategy as a modern infrastructure state.

Sources

Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J.L. )2012(. Theory from the South: Or, how Europe is evolving toward Africa. Anthropological Forum 22(2), 113-131. https://doi.org/10.1080/00664677.2012.694169

Coyle, D. (2024, April 19). The West’s new infrastructure imperative. Project Syndicate. https://tinyurl.com/2u7f2r93

Ferguson, N., & Schularick, M. (2007). ‘Chimerica’ and the global asset market boom. International Finance, 10(3), 215-239. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2362.2007.00210.x

Infrastructure Conference (2024, March 20). Globes. https://tinyurl.com/2s3bfz49

Maggor, E. (2002). High-tech for the people. Telem 08. https://tinyurl.com/bdzhn6uc

Maggor, E. (2024, June 27). The return of the policy that shall not be named: What can Israel learn from global developments regarding the new industrial policy? Yesodot Institute. https://tinyurl.com/5af4379p

Schindler, S., Alami, I., DiCarlo, J., Jepson, N., Rolf, S., Bayırbağ, M.K., Cyuzuzu, L., DeBoom, M.J., Farahani, A.F., Liu, I.T. McNicol, H., Miao, J.T., Nock. P., Trei, G., Vila Seoane, M., Ward, K., Zajontz, T., & Zhao, Y. (2023). The Second Cold War: US-China competition for centrality in infrastructure, digital, production, and finance networks. Geopolitics, 29(4), 1038-1120. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2023.2253432

Special Conference: The implications of the superpower competition and the chip market in Israel. (2023. January 10). Institute for National Security Studies. https://tinyurl.com/38abz89w

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* The text represents the opinion of the author alone and does not represent the position of the IDF or the position of the Israeli security establishment.

[1] Second Cold War https://tinyurl.com/2p8naz4x