The IDF’s successful operation has prevented Hezbollah from launching an even more extensive barrage into northern Israel and targeting specific sites in the center. However, this operation does not change the broader situation, which is edging closer to a regional war, despite the lack of clear benefits for any party involved.
Nasrallah’s concept of “equations” has suffered a blow, but Hezbollah will continue its attacks on Israel as long as the war in Gaza continues. Those advocating for a major Israeli campaign must demonstrate that it will effectively remove the threat to the north over time or improve our position in future negotiations. Past experience casts doubt on this capability.
The real way to return the residents to their homes in the north lies in resolving the conflict, which will require ending the fighting in Gaza. This is the position of the security establishment, which due to reasons of prestige, does not state it explicitly but instead expresses support for an agreement to return the hostages—implying the same outcome. But here lies the paradox: Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu agrees to the flexible positions supported by the establishment, the current situation benefits Yahya Sinwar. The escalation between Israel and Hezbollah brings the region closer to a major war, which is Sinwar’s grand vision. This certainly does not increase Sinwar’s appetite to agreeing to a hostage deal, which in his view would be a “small victory” compared to the strategic goal that motivated the October 7 attack.
And rubbing its hands on the sidelines is the main enemy—Iran. Israel’s actions have led to a situation in which the Iranians hold a strategic dialogue with the United States while bypassing Israel. The Americans primarily want to keep Iran out of the open conflict, as this spares the US administration from the dilemma of what to do. A conflict between Israel and Hezbollah only concerns them if it leads to a flare-up that also includes Iran. Consequently, the Iranians are extracting concessions from the United States over a scenario it initially had no interest in—a direct attack on Israel. Once again, the lack of an overall strategy means that the tactical-operational achievement does not necessarily improve our overall situation.
The IDF’s successful operation has prevented Hezbollah from launching an even more extensive barrage into northern Israel and targeting specific sites in the center. However, this operation does not change the broader situation, which is edging closer to a regional war, despite the lack of clear benefits for any party involved.
Nasrallah’s concept of “equations” has suffered a blow, but Hezbollah will continue its attacks on Israel as long as the war in Gaza continues. Those advocating for a major Israeli campaign must demonstrate that it will effectively remove the threat to the north over time or improve our position in future negotiations. Past experience casts doubt on this capability.
The real way to return the residents to their homes in the north lies in resolving the conflict, which will require ending the fighting in Gaza. This is the position of the security establishment, which due to reasons of prestige, does not state it explicitly but instead expresses support for an agreement to return the hostages—implying the same outcome. But here lies the paradox: Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu agrees to the flexible positions supported by the establishment, the current situation benefits Yahya Sinwar. The escalation between Israel and Hezbollah brings the region closer to a major war, which is Sinwar’s grand vision. This certainly does not increase Sinwar’s appetite to agreeing to a hostage deal, which in his view would be a “small victory” compared to the strategic goal that motivated the October 7 attack.
And rubbing its hands on the sidelines is the main enemy—Iran. Israel’s actions have led to a situation in which the Iranians hold a strategic dialogue with the United States while bypassing Israel. The Americans primarily want to keep Iran out of the open conflict, as this spares the US administration from the dilemma of what to do. A conflict between Israel and Hezbollah only concerns them if it leads to a flare-up that also includes Iran. Consequently, the Iranians are extracting concessions from the United States over a scenario it initially had no interest in—a direct attack on Israel. Once again, the lack of an overall strategy means that the tactical-operational achievement does not necessarily improve our overall situation.