Operation “Arnon” (originally called “Summer Seeds”) to free the four hostages from a location in Nuseirat on the morning of June 8, 2024, has posed a serious dilemma for Hamas, exposing all its vulnerabilities in terms of intelligence penetration, operational capability, the ability to protect its most important assets, and especially the cynical and cruel use it makes of its people as human shields.
Public criticism against Hamas is increasing and likely to continue as the extent of the war’s destruction and the damage caused to all residents of the Gaza Strip becomes clear. In the days before the war when the organization had full strength and operational and intelligence control over the Gaza Strip, Hamas was known to benefit from drawing lessons from operational mishaps and Israeli successes. But with most of its military and intelligence capabilities dismantled, and as it’s busy preserving and protecting its organizational remnants in the wake of a severe war as the IDF continues to besiege it and as the chain of command no longer functions regularly, the organization will find it difficult to conduct processes of drawing fundamental lessons as it did in the past. This means that the organization will be left vulnerable and exposed, and it’s likely that this insight is permeating the consciousness of its leaders who are hiding from the long arm of the IDF.
Without the ability to investigate, draw lessons, and reorganize organizational systems, and considering the value of the hostages as the ultimate insurance certificate for the survival of Hamas and its leadership, it must be assumed that the leaders, who still effectively control the majority of the hostages, will choose to tighten the conditions of captivity for those who are still alive and who are not in the immediate vicinity of Yahya Sinwar in his hiding place. They will likely prefer to transfer some of the hostages to the active tunnels that remain under Hamas’s control. Those who cannot be moved to the tunnels will probably be transferred to new hiding places, while the conditions of their captivity, security, and their guarding will become more severe.
Due to the conditions in most areas of the Gaza Strip, including the disuse of many tunnels (even if they weren’t destroyed, the supply lines to them from the important strategic tunnels that were destroyed no longer exist), the Israeli military presence, and an active war in some areas, Hamas will have difficulty moving the hostages. The hostages are Hamas’s most significant asset in dealing with Israel and the mediators, and Hamas understands the great sensitivity in Israel regarding the hostages’ fate as well as the public and political pressure for their release. We must be prepared for Hamas to use psychological and emotional blackmail to pressure Israel and the mediators, particularly the United States, to reach a deal quickly and that is closest to Hamas’s terms, which Israel refuses to accept.
Israeli society and leadership are expected to face difficult days of manipulation and emotional blackmail along with great uncertainty regarding Hamas’s conduct vis-à-vis the hostages. This will be a challenging time for the nation, a test for its leadership and society, social cohesion, social and national resilience, as well as for Israel’s degree of determination and political prudence. But, besides these difficulties before us, it’s important to remember that Hamas’s leadership is also facing significant difficulties. This is also the hour of truth for the entire organization, as well as for Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip. And under the existing conditions, the price of Palestinian failure will be high and severe to the point of being existential, and it’s doubtful if Hamas’s leadership understands the magnitude of the hour before it.
Operation “Arnon” (originally called “Summer Seeds”) to free the four hostages from a location in Nuseirat on the morning of June 8, 2024, has posed a serious dilemma for Hamas, exposing all its vulnerabilities in terms of intelligence penetration, operational capability, the ability to protect its most important assets, and especially the cynical and cruel use it makes of its people as human shields.
Public criticism against Hamas is increasing and likely to continue as the extent of the war’s destruction and the damage caused to all residents of the Gaza Strip becomes clear. In the days before the war when the organization had full strength and operational and intelligence control over the Gaza Strip, Hamas was known to benefit from drawing lessons from operational mishaps and Israeli successes. But with most of its military and intelligence capabilities dismantled, and as it’s busy preserving and protecting its organizational remnants in the wake of a severe war as the IDF continues to besiege it and as the chain of command no longer functions regularly, the organization will find it difficult to conduct processes of drawing fundamental lessons as it did in the past. This means that the organization will be left vulnerable and exposed, and it’s likely that this insight is permeating the consciousness of its leaders who are hiding from the long arm of the IDF.
Without the ability to investigate, draw lessons, and reorganize organizational systems, and considering the value of the hostages as the ultimate insurance certificate for the survival of Hamas and its leadership, it must be assumed that the leaders, who still effectively control the majority of the hostages, will choose to tighten the conditions of captivity for those who are still alive and who are not in the immediate vicinity of Yahya Sinwar in his hiding place. They will likely prefer to transfer some of the hostages to the active tunnels that remain under Hamas’s control. Those who cannot be moved to the tunnels will probably be transferred to new hiding places, while the conditions of their captivity, security, and their guarding will become more severe.
Due to the conditions in most areas of the Gaza Strip, including the disuse of many tunnels (even if they weren’t destroyed, the supply lines to them from the important strategic tunnels that were destroyed no longer exist), the Israeli military presence, and an active war in some areas, Hamas will have difficulty moving the hostages. The hostages are Hamas’s most significant asset in dealing with Israel and the mediators, and Hamas understands the great sensitivity in Israel regarding the hostages’ fate as well as the public and political pressure for their release. We must be prepared for Hamas to use psychological and emotional blackmail to pressure Israel and the mediators, particularly the United States, to reach a deal quickly and that is closest to Hamas’s terms, which Israel refuses to accept.
Israeli society and leadership are expected to face difficult days of manipulation and emotional blackmail along with great uncertainty regarding Hamas’s conduct vis-à-vis the hostages. This will be a challenging time for the nation, a test for its leadership and society, social cohesion, social and national resilience, as well as for Israel’s degree of determination and political prudence. But, besides these difficulties before us, it’s important to remember that Hamas’s leadership is also facing significant difficulties. This is also the hour of truth for the entire organization, as well as for Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip. And under the existing conditions, the price of Palestinian failure will be high and severe to the point of being existential, and it’s doubtful if Hamas’s leadership understands the magnitude of the hour before it.