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Operation Swords of Iron—the official Israeli name for the war that erupted on the Southern and Northern fronts on October 7— brought the government to order the evacuation of communities adjacent to the front lines and their integration in various frameworks around the country. In parallel, other residents and communities independently evacuated themselves. According to figures released by Israel’s National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA) and presented by the Knesset’s Research and Information Center, as of November 1, 2023 around 253,000 Israelis had been evacuated from their homes. Of them, around 94,000 were evacuated or voluntarily moved to another community; some 88,000 were relocated to hotels; and around 70,000 evacuated themselves and made their own arrangements. This is the largest civilian evacuation in Israel’s history. The process has caused immense hardship for the displaced citizens and has created a burden on the Israeli economy and society as a whole. In this article, we will analyze the criteria and the plans for evacuating and integrating residents that were drawn up before the outbreak of the war and the way they were implemented once hostilities broke out. We will also propose alternative criteria for the emergency evacuation of residents in the future, considering the lessons learned in the aftermath of October 7. The starting point for this discussion is that the State of Israel will decide to evacuate residents only in cases where their lives are in danger or if their homes are damaged and uninhabitable. Evacuation should not happen under any other circumstances, including, for example, for the welfare of residents.

The government should only order the evacuation of residents following a recommendation from the military, in the case of a security threat, or from the police, in the case of a civilian disaster. The decision to evacuate (or not) should be based solely on relevant considerations in order to optimize resource allocation during national emergencies and help the state to deal with evacuation requests from communities that do not meet the criteria.

The IDF’s Home Front Command and/or the local authorities are tasked with conducting the orderly evacuation of residents, in accordance with the nature of the incident and the decisions made by the political echelon. The second stage of the evacuation is the integration of the displaced citizens, which is the task of the Interior Ministry’s Emergency Services Authority. Its role is to ensure that the facilities to which evacuees are relocated are prepared well in advance and that they are made operational in emergency situations. Various other government ministries are also involved in the process, including the Education Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Welfare Ministry. Overseeing the entire process is NEMA, which operates under the auspices of the Defense Ministry and is authorized to coordinate between the various bodies and provide a national framework for the process of evacuation and integration.

As the above illustrates, the State of Israel does not have one single body that is responsible for and authorized to plan in advance and to manage in practice the evacuation of residents; instead, the mission is managed by several bodies—forming a complex framework that makes planning for such eventualities difficult—and even more so executing them.

The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that that the IDF—which is the operational entity calling for the evacuation of citizens and communities during wartime—should also be responsible for drawing up the contingency plans, while all the other bodies and government ministries should adapt themselves to the army’s plan and support it on a national level. In many cases, however, the situation in reality is the reverse of this.

The Evacuation Plans Drawn Up Prior to October 7

Over the past eight years, the IDF and the Israeli government have drawn up a number of plans for the evacuation of the civilian population during war or if a natural disaster strikes. In general, residents are supposed to be evacuated to public integration centers (mainly schools) or private facilities (hotels, hostels, and guest houses) across the country.

“Assistance for communities along the Gaza border between 2004–2006”: Two government decisions from July 4, 2004, and August 1, 2004, defined for the first time the “Gaza Strip Envelope” area for purposes of economic and social support during peace times. The definition included the city of Sderot and 44 communities in the Sha’ar HaNegev, Hof Ashkelon, Sdot Negev, and Eshkol Regional Councils—all of which are located within 7 kilometers of the Gaza border. This definition of the Gaza border communities would be used later on as part of the regional evacuation plan for security emergencies. The rationale behind the criterion of 7 kilometers from the border was crafted in line with the estimated range of rockets and missiles in Hamas’s possession at that time.

“Guest Hotel”: A government decision of July 6, 2012, was designed to provide a solution to the mass evacuation of up to 300,000 people in the event of a security emergency or natural disaster, irrespective of distance from the border. The IDF or the local authority, depending on the nature of the incident, is supposed to conduct the evacuation. As part of preparations for an emergency situation, the Interior Ministry was tasked with locating integration centers across the country which meet the Home Front Command’s requirements for protection from missiles. According to the guidelines set in “Guest Hotel,” evacuees should be evacuated to schools and other public buildings and, if necessary, also to boarding schools and hostels—perhaps even hotels. The local authorities were instructed to prepare for the integration of a displaced population at the scale of up to 4 percent of their own populations.

The Hotel Plan (2015–2018) was formulated by the IDF and the Interior Ministry and was designed to provide a solution to the evacuation of up to 75 percent of the population in towns and villages located within 4 kilometers of borders with the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Syria (a total of 60,000 people) for a limited period of time due to a security emergency. This plan was never brought to the government for approval and does not provide a solution for cities located in the 4 kilometers range.

The Safe Distance Plan (2015) was designed to facilitate the evacuation of residents from communities adjacent to Israel’s northern and southern borders in response to a security emergency. This included 25 communities located within 4 kilometers of the Gaza border and 50 communities in the Galilee that are located within 5 kilometers of the Lebanon border. This plan was designed to address the threat of an attack on border communities with high-trajectory or anti-tank missiles, snipers or a ground or subterranean invasion by terrorists.

The Mashav Ruach (Breeze) program (currently in draft form) was drawn up by the Defense Ministry in 2022 with the aim of providing funding to local authorities in the Gaza border communities and the city of Sderot that would allow residents to leave their homes for a period of rest during wartime. The decision on the implementation of this plan should be taken when the IDF decides not to implement the Safe Distance plan. Mashav Ruach was implemented during operation “Guardian of the Walls” in May 2021 and operation “Breaking Dawn” in August 2022.

Operation “Swords of Iron”—The Evacuation in Practice

Since the outbreak of hostilities on October 7, the defense establishment and the Israeli government have mainly implemented the Safe Distance Plan. The Guest Hotel Plan has not been implemented at all, meaning that local authorities have not been called upon to deal with evacuees. At the same time, certain authorities—such as Tel Aviv, Herzliya, and Eilat—took responsibility and provided care for displaced citizens who were relocated to hotels in their jurisdiction. In other cases—like that of the Tamar Regional Council, a tiny local authority—there was an objective difficulty in providing resources for the large number of people evacuated to the Dead Sea hotels.

A government resolution from October 12, 2023, retroactively approved the evacuation of people residing within 4 kilometers of the Gaza border (some 15,800 people), in accordance with the Safe Distance Plan, which was effectively implemented on October 7. In addition, the government approved a one-time grant to people living up to 7 kilometers from the border who had decided to relocate on their own initiative.

A government resolution from October 18, 2023, retroactively approved the defense establishment’s decision to evacuate communities located within 2 kilometers of the northern border (affecting around 27,000 people), in accordance with the IDF’s Safe Distance Plan in the North. In addition, the defense minister was given the authority to decide on the evacuation of residents living within 5 kilometers of the border. On October 20, the defense minister, using that authority and based on the recommendation of the IDF, ordered the evacuation of Kiryat Shmona (23,000 residents) and anyone living between 2–3 kilometers near the border (October 22, 11,000 residents). Currently, most residents in communities located between 3.5–5 kilometers from the border evacuated themselves after the government decided not to order them to relocate. However, around 3,000 people decided to remain in their homes.

A government resolution from October 19, 2023, was aimed at facilitating the evacuation of two specific groups from within the population of Ashkelon: people living in homes without a protected space in their home or their apartment building (around 24,000 people) and elderly people with no stable family support (around 3,000 people). This assistance, which was provided in the form of accommodation and hospitality, was decided upon in light of the massive quantity of rockets that were fired at the city in the first weeks of the war.

A government resolution from October 23, 2023, retroactively approved the evacuation of residents of Sderot (around 31,000 people) and communities within 3–4 kilometers of the Gaza border (around 17,500 people) as part of the Mashav Ruach Plan.

The duration of the evacuation order has been extended several times and, as of the time of this publication, the government has told displaced Israelis living in hotels that they can remain there until July 7, 2024 (apart from Ashkelon residents, who were told they could return to their homes in November 2023). At the same time, the state has allowed residents to return to the Gaza border communities and a growing number of them are deciding to do so.

In summary, at the time of publication of this article, around 253,000 Israelis have been told to evacuate their homes or have done so on their own initiative. The process of allowing residents of the Gaza border communities to return home has recently begun. There are disagreements between evacuees over the issue of returning home, as well as between residents and the heads of their local authorities. Some residents wish to return, while others object, citing security, financial, or emotional reasons. It is also objectively difficult for the local authorities to provide their residents with all the usual services, making it harder for them to return to their homes.

Recommended Criteria for Evacuation 

It is vital to reiterate: The only criterion for ordering the wartime evacuation of the civilian population is saving lives.

The following are the four proposed criteria by which the defense establishment should make the decision to evacuate civilians during wartime. They are designed to prevent pressure that could lead to more evacuations than objectively and absolutely necessary:

1. The threat of a ground incursion and the possible capture of an Israeli town;
2. The threat of anti-tank fire, including the more sophisticated version with optical homing capabilities;
3. The threat of direct sniper fire;
4. Intelligence information about specific hostile activity that poses an immediate and severe threat to residents.

This list of criteria does not include the use of indirect missile fire, since Hezbollah’s missile capabilities cover the territory of the entire State of Israel, making distance from the border irrelevant. When deliberating over this issue, decision makers should consider those border communities that are threatened by missile attacks and do not have enough time to run to their protected spaces and, in some cases, do not have access to such spaces. The effectiveness air defense and alert systems at Israel’s disposal is an important factor in assessing these risks.

The criterion of distance in itself is not one that should guide decisions on evacuation; rather, specific communities targeted for evacuation should be identified, as was the case in the government decisions mentioned in this paper. Nonetheless, examining the proposed criteria indicates that there is a high probability that border communities will be evacuated. Therefore, the distance from the border should be used as part a common language for army, the government, and the public, and nothing more.

In conclusion, the government of Israel and the Defense Ministry’s NEMA should formally adopt the criteria specified herein. As is currently the case, the decision to evacuate should be made by the political echelon, while the evacuation itself should be conducted by the IDF (the Home Front Command) and/or the local authorities, depending on the nature of the emergency.