What was clear even before the ground operation in the Gaza Strip began must be stated explicitly once again: by itself, the maneuver will not achieve the war's goals. Moreover, in the time frame that for various reasons has been designated – a few weeks at most – it is doubtful if the operation will yield even the sense of significant achievement, both in terms of defeating Hamas and in relation to the release of the hostages, whose tangible danger to their lives increases with each passing day.
The right thing to do, starting today, is to direct the military operations to draw the IDF lines in “Phase III” of the fighting. This involves control of the northern part of the Strip, action in the southern part in the form of raids and airstrikes while withdrawing the ground forces from that area, blocking the Philadelphi axis, and designing “the day after” through the introduction of regional coalition elements into the humanitarian process in the northern Gaza Strip. At the same time, Israel must present a proposal that stipulates where the fighting will stop – with the IDF deployed along these lines – in exchange for the return of all the hostages and the departure of Sinwar and the Hamas leadership from Gaza.
The continuation of the fighting in the current framework will not bring about a significant change in the situation in the coming weeks. The cost in human lives of soldiers and hostages will be accompanied by a feeling of aimlessness and treading water, which will probably only strengthen the tendency to continue in the same direction with more force, but without changing the results. The hope for a “victory image” in the form of Sinwar's elimination is sincere, but a strategy cannot be built on hopes. At the same time, the political process must be started immediately, without which Israel will not have the legitimacy to continue fighting in the next phase, which will take many months.
This should be the sole preoccupation of the political echelon. So far, for reasons of personal politics, it is busy with everything else. The campaign commanders must present the issues to the decision makers in the clearest way possible and tell them and themselves the truth. Otherwise, a phase of marking time will surely await us, followed by even worse.
What was clear even before the ground operation in the Gaza Strip began must be stated explicitly once again: by itself, the maneuver will not achieve the war's goals. Moreover, in the time frame that for various reasons has been designated – a few weeks at most – it is doubtful if the operation will yield even the sense of significant achievement, both in terms of defeating Hamas and in relation to the release of the hostages, whose tangible danger to their lives increases with each passing day.
The right thing to do, starting today, is to direct the military operations to draw the IDF lines in “Phase III” of the fighting. This involves control of the northern part of the Strip, action in the southern part in the form of raids and airstrikes while withdrawing the ground forces from that area, blocking the Philadelphi axis, and designing “the day after” through the introduction of regional coalition elements into the humanitarian process in the northern Gaza Strip. At the same time, Israel must present a proposal that stipulates where the fighting will stop – with the IDF deployed along these lines – in exchange for the return of all the hostages and the departure of Sinwar and the Hamas leadership from Gaza.
The continuation of the fighting in the current framework will not bring about a significant change in the situation in the coming weeks. The cost in human lives of soldiers and hostages will be accompanied by a feeling of aimlessness and treading water, which will probably only strengthen the tendency to continue in the same direction with more force, but without changing the results. The hope for a “victory image” in the form of Sinwar's elimination is sincere, but a strategy cannot be built on hopes. At the same time, the political process must be started immediately, without which Israel will not have the legitimacy to continue fighting in the next phase, which will take many months.
This should be the sole preoccupation of the political echelon. So far, for reasons of personal politics, it is busy with everything else. The campaign commanders must present the issues to the decision makers in the clearest way possible and tell them and themselves the truth. Otherwise, a phase of marking time will surely await us, followed by even worse.