It is not clear how much truth there is in the reports that a proposal was put on the table in Qatar whereby all the hostages, including soldiers and the bodies of Israelis held by Hamas, would be returned to Israel in exchange for a heavy price in Palestinian prisoners and the cessation of fighting in the Strip. The reaction attributed to Mossad head David Barnea, Israel's representative at the talks, that “we will not discuss another deal before the release of all the women and children,” indicates that ideas for a significant expansion of the current framework are indeed being floated.
The current deal is a significant achievement for Israel. Even the security establishment, which initially opposed it, recognizes this. It has something to do with the payment of the moral debt to the people who were abandoned in the most disgraceful way in our history. On the other hand, it is doubtful if there is anyone in Israel who would agree to a complete cessation of the fighting , which means that Hamas has achieved its goal in the kidnapping itself – building itself a protective wall in the form of a human shield against its military defeat.
And if this is the case, what should be done? Expand as much as possible the current framework in exchange for additional days of the military lull, which do not in any way harm the readiness for the continued military effort. Use the time to plan the continuation of the fighting precisely, which will be especially complicated in the presence of two million people in the southern Gaza Strip and in view of the danger to the other hostages, who this time may be in the combat zone itself.
Above all, a required achievement for the continuation of the military operation must be defined, more precise and practical than the “collapse of Hamas,” and formulated in light of thinking about the third goal of the war, as stated by the Prime Minister – guaranteeing that the removal of the security threat from the Gaza Strip is sustained.
In order to achieve this, it is necessary to discuss, together with the US and partners in the region, what the political echelon has avoided discussing until now but should have been the first clause of any decision taken immediately after October 7: a true vision for the “day after.” This is what should define how the military move is executed – and not the other way around.
It is not clear how much truth there is in the reports that a proposal was put on the table in Qatar whereby all the hostages, including soldiers and the bodies of Israelis held by Hamas, would be returned to Israel in exchange for a heavy price in Palestinian prisoners and the cessation of fighting in the Strip. The reaction attributed to Mossad head David Barnea, Israel's representative at the talks, that “we will not discuss another deal before the release of all the women and children,” indicates that ideas for a significant expansion of the current framework are indeed being floated.
The current deal is a significant achievement for Israel. Even the security establishment, which initially opposed it, recognizes this. It has something to do with the payment of the moral debt to the people who were abandoned in the most disgraceful way in our history. On the other hand, it is doubtful if there is anyone in Israel who would agree to a complete cessation of the fighting , which means that Hamas has achieved its goal in the kidnapping itself – building itself a protective wall in the form of a human shield against its military defeat.
And if this is the case, what should be done? Expand as much as possible the current framework in exchange for additional days of the military lull, which do not in any way harm the readiness for the continued military effort. Use the time to plan the continuation of the fighting precisely, which will be especially complicated in the presence of two million people in the southern Gaza Strip and in view of the danger to the other hostages, who this time may be in the combat zone itself.
Above all, a required achievement for the continuation of the military operation must be defined, more precise and practical than the “collapse of Hamas,” and formulated in light of thinking about the third goal of the war, as stated by the Prime Minister – guaranteeing that the removal of the security threat from the Gaza Strip is sustained.
In order to achieve this, it is necessary to discuss, together with the US and partners in the region, what the political echelon has avoided discussing until now but should have been the first clause of any decision taken immediately after October 7: a true vision for the “day after.” This is what should define how the military move is executed – and not the other way around.