Since the beginning of the war in Gaza, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein-Amir Abdollahian has played a central role in leading Iran’s political campaign in the region. A few days after the outbreak of the war, he visited Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Qatar and met with the senior officials of their governments, with the heads of the Palestinian organizations, and with the Secretary General of Hezbollah. He also participated in an unscheduled meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation on the Palestinian issue and held telephone conversations with his colleagues in the regional and international arena, as well as with the heads of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Abdollahian’s intensive involvement in the political campaign in the Middle East is a continuation of his efforts to advance Iran's regional goals, led by strengthening Tehran’s ties in the Arab world and easing tensions with its neighbors. In doing so, Abdollahian reflects a significant change in relation to the degree of involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in regional affairs, compared to his predecessor in the position, Mohammad-Javad Zarif, who served as Foreign Minister in the government of President Hassan Rouhani.
Abdollahian's extensive involvement in regional affairs can be explained by his professional background, his deep familiarity with the Middle East, his command of Arabic, and his good relations with the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force. Abdollahian, who previously served as deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African affairs, as ambassador to Bahrain, and as a member of the Iranian negotiating team with the United States on the Iraq issue, is considered very close to the former commander of the Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, and a clear supporter of Iran's efforts to establish its regional influence. This is especially noticeable when compared to Zarif, whose relations (similar to President Rouhani's relations) with the Revolutionary Guards were often marked by tensions. Thus, for example, Zarif announced his temporary resignation as Foreign Minister in February 2019, after he was excluded from the visit of Syrian President Bashar Assad to Tehran. In a press interview toward the end of the Rouhani government, Zarif admitted that he had to settle for a limited role regarding his country's regional foreign policy, which was led by the Revolutionary Guards.
The political establishment in Iran is characterized by institutional duplication between different centers of power, including between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Revolutionary Guards. The commander of the Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, continues to coordinate between Iran and its allies in the “resistance front.” Therefore, it is not impossible that there may still be differences of opinion and tensions in the Iranian leadership in the foreign policy decision making process. However, Abdollahian's prominent position and his close relationship with the Revolutionary Guards may help forge a consensus regarding the policies required in the next stages of the war. Furthermore, Abdollahian's positions reflect the strengthening of the hawkish approach at the government echelon since the Iranian presidential elections in 2021. This approach, which currently characterizes both the political echelon led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military-security echelon led by the Revolutionary Guards, may influence decision making as the campaign continues to unfold.
Since the beginning of the war in Gaza, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein-Amir Abdollahian has played a central role in leading Iran’s political campaign in the region. A few days after the outbreak of the war, he visited Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Qatar and met with the senior officials of their governments, with the heads of the Palestinian organizations, and with the Secretary General of Hezbollah. He also participated in an unscheduled meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation on the Palestinian issue and held telephone conversations with his colleagues in the regional and international arena, as well as with the heads of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Abdollahian’s intensive involvement in the political campaign in the Middle East is a continuation of his efforts to advance Iran's regional goals, led by strengthening Tehran’s ties in the Arab world and easing tensions with its neighbors. In doing so, Abdollahian reflects a significant change in relation to the degree of involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in regional affairs, compared to his predecessor in the position, Mohammad-Javad Zarif, who served as Foreign Minister in the government of President Hassan Rouhani.
Abdollahian's extensive involvement in regional affairs can be explained by his professional background, his deep familiarity with the Middle East, his command of Arabic, and his good relations with the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force. Abdollahian, who previously served as deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African affairs, as ambassador to Bahrain, and as a member of the Iranian negotiating team with the United States on the Iraq issue, is considered very close to the former commander of the Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, and a clear supporter of Iran's efforts to establish its regional influence. This is especially noticeable when compared to Zarif, whose relations (similar to President Rouhani's relations) with the Revolutionary Guards were often marked by tensions. Thus, for example, Zarif announced his temporary resignation as Foreign Minister in February 2019, after he was excluded from the visit of Syrian President Bashar Assad to Tehran. In a press interview toward the end of the Rouhani government, Zarif admitted that he had to settle for a limited role regarding his country's regional foreign policy, which was led by the Revolutionary Guards.
The political establishment in Iran is characterized by institutional duplication between different centers of power, including between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Revolutionary Guards. The commander of the Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, continues to coordinate between Iran and its allies in the “resistance front.” Therefore, it is not impossible that there may still be differences of opinion and tensions in the Iranian leadership in the foreign policy decision making process. However, Abdollahian's prominent position and his close relationship with the Revolutionary Guards may help forge a consensus regarding the policies required in the next stages of the war. Furthermore, Abdollahian's positions reflect the strengthening of the hawkish approach at the government echelon since the Iranian presidential elections in 2021. This approach, which currently characterizes both the political echelon led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military-security echelon led by the Revolutionary Guards, may influence decision making as the campaign continues to unfold.