There have been recent reports of attempts by senior Israeli officials, most noticeably the head of the Mossad, to influence the American position and prevent the signing of the nuclear agreement with Iran that is taking shape. But it is important to stop and remember that we are not debating between excellent and ideal alternatives, but between alternatives that are currently on the table – which are a situation with an agreement versus a situation without an agreement. In this reality, there is room to return to the fundamental question: how can Iran be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons? And as such, which of the situations, with or without agreement, distances Iran further from a nuclear weapon or moves it closer to its goal?
It is clear to all those involved in the issue that at the present time it is not possible to formulate an excellent agreement that meets Israel's interests, because the common interest of the powers is significantly different from the Israeli interest, as is the perceptions of Iran's long-term intentions. Since 2015, there have been significant global changes that make inter-power cooperation more difficult, including the global polarization between East and West, the war in Europe, the economic crisis in the US, and the effects of the climate crisis. These join the knowledge that there is no chance of Iranian willingness to sign an agreement that would further limit its freedom of action. Iran has made it clear on many occasions that it will not agree to any further concessions beyond the ones it agreed to in 2015, certainly not before a deal is reached on returning to the original agreement of 2015. This position has not changed despite the severe economic sanctions it has faced in recent years.
We should compare our situation today, in the absence of an agreement, to our situation in the future with an agreement, even if the agreement is less good for us than the agreement reached in 2015. As much as we at INSS have analyzed the scenario of a lack of an agreement, we have consistently come to the same result – significant progress by Iran in its nuclear program, which will bring it to a nuclear threshold that allows it to break out to a nuclear weapon in a short period of time. Meanwhile, it is important to remember the Iranian regime considers the nuclear military option an "insurance policy" for its survival. Therefore, economic and operational pressure, which in the view of the regime might endanger its stability, may bring the Supreme Leader to increase his determination to change his nuclear strategy, which until now was designed to achieve nuclear threshold capability, and to break out to a nuclear weapon.
Therefore, the only possible way to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons is with an agreement, and at the end of it another agreement.
The paradigm should be changed and switched from sweeping opposition to the agreement, to changing small and technical details in order to improve it, and ensuring that we return, as much as possible, to the terms of the previous agreement. That is, a minimum level, of 300 kg, of enriched material on Iranian soil, at a low level of enrichment; the dismantlement of the infrastructure of the advanced centrifuges operating and enriching today; and close and full supervision while providing information on the entire period when no supervision took place and the IAEA cameras were removed. This joins preparations for the future and building a plan of action together with the United States.
There have been recent reports of attempts by senior Israeli officials, most noticeably the head of the Mossad, to influence the American position and prevent the signing of the nuclear agreement with Iran that is taking shape. But it is important to stop and remember that we are not debating between excellent and ideal alternatives, but between alternatives that are currently on the table – which are a situation with an agreement versus a situation without an agreement. In this reality, there is room to return to the fundamental question: how can Iran be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons? And as such, which of the situations, with or without agreement, distances Iran further from a nuclear weapon or moves it closer to its goal?
It is clear to all those involved in the issue that at the present time it is not possible to formulate an excellent agreement that meets Israel's interests, because the common interest of the powers is significantly different from the Israeli interest, as is the perceptions of Iran's long-term intentions. Since 2015, there have been significant global changes that make inter-power cooperation more difficult, including the global polarization between East and West, the war in Europe, the economic crisis in the US, and the effects of the climate crisis. These join the knowledge that there is no chance of Iranian willingness to sign an agreement that would further limit its freedom of action. Iran has made it clear on many occasions that it will not agree to any further concessions beyond the ones it agreed to in 2015, certainly not before a deal is reached on returning to the original agreement of 2015. This position has not changed despite the severe economic sanctions it has faced in recent years.
We should compare our situation today, in the absence of an agreement, to our situation in the future with an agreement, even if the agreement is less good for us than the agreement reached in 2015. As much as we at INSS have analyzed the scenario of a lack of an agreement, we have consistently come to the same result – significant progress by Iran in its nuclear program, which will bring it to a nuclear threshold that allows it to break out to a nuclear weapon in a short period of time. Meanwhile, it is important to remember the Iranian regime considers the nuclear military option an "insurance policy" for its survival. Therefore, economic and operational pressure, which in the view of the regime might endanger its stability, may bring the Supreme Leader to increase his determination to change his nuclear strategy, which until now was designed to achieve nuclear threshold capability, and to break out to a nuclear weapon.
Therefore, the only possible way to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons is with an agreement, and at the end of it another agreement.
The paradigm should be changed and switched from sweeping opposition to the agreement, to changing small and technical details in order to improve it, and ensuring that we return, as much as possible, to the terms of the previous agreement. That is, a minimum level, of 300 kg, of enriched material on Iranian soil, at a low level of enrichment; the dismantlement of the infrastructure of the advanced centrifuges operating and enriching today; and close and full supervision while providing information on the entire period when no supervision took place and the IAEA cameras were removed. This joins preparations for the future and building a plan of action together with the United States.