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March 2022 marked 11 years since the start of the civil war in Syria, which ended with a bitter defeat for the opposition and a “hollow victory” for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad – i.e., without effective control of all parts of the country. The war changed the face of Syria: it is now split into four regions, each under the influence of foreign forces; an economic crisis is ongoing, with no signs of a solution; the humanitarian situation is grave; many refugees have fled the country and many displaced persons remain in its territory; there is a long-term presence of foreign players; and the country is torn by the tension between the efforts of the Assad regime to normalize relations with Arab countries and its close ties to Iran. All these factors will affect the future stabilization of the Syrian state.

Syria as a divided country: The war ended with the survival of the Assad regime and victory for the pro-Assad coalition with help from both Russia and Iran, but Assad has regained control of only 60 percent of Syrian territory and about half the population. In areas outside the regime’s control, semi-independent political entities have become established, and in effect Syria remains divided into four regions: regime-controlled territory, the autonomous Kurdish area, Turkish areas in the north, and the rebel-controlled Idlib region. It appears that this division will continue as long as there is no force or political solution that can reunite the country, and Assad’s rule over all Syrian territory will remain “hollow,” with little overall governance.

From war to a socio-economic crisis: More than a decade of war has led to a severe and unprecedented economic crisis. The damage is estimated at $300 billion, with a drop of about 40 percent in GDP and a dramatic rise in inflation, which erodes the people’s purchasing power. During the war, economic policy was focused on defending the regime and maintaining the fighting fitness of the army. Income from oil and taxes became marginal, and failed economic management caused an almost total collapse of the economy. The absence of a political solution and agreement between the various ethnic groups regarding the future of Syria, and the Caesar Act passed by the US administration – the basis for sanctions on Syria and its allies, including Russia and Iran – are significant barriers to trade, investment, and reconstruction.

A humanitarian crisis: The war has caused an enormous humanitarian crisis. Ninety percent of the population live below the poverty line, and 11 million Syrians need humanitarian aid due to a severe lack of food and water. The health system has collapsed, and the UN aid plan meets only 46 percent of humanitarian needs. The deteriorating situation presents the United States and Western countries that oppose the regime with a dilemma – on the one hand, they wish to improve the situation of Syrian citizens, and on the other hand, they wish to boycott the regime, by continuing the economic sanctions.

Refugees: The 6.8 million Syrians who have found refuge in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, and Europe are evidence of the effects of the Syrian crisis beyond its borders. While only about 300,000 refugees have returned to Syria, the assimilation of Syrian refugees in host countries, particularly Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, has affected these countries’ demographic balance, and in turn, their economic, political, social, and security situations. Now that the fighting has died down, there is a visible transition from the flight of refugees to negative migration – Syrians wait in long lines for a passport to leave the country.

Renewed public unrest: The war has been decided in Assad’s favor, but there are still protests all over the country, particularly in the south, due to the harsh living conditions. Last February severe poverty, which has worsened over the years, sparked renewed protests in the Daraa region, compounded by the regime’s failure to reduce the cost of living. Demonstrators included members of the Druze ethnic group, who are also worried by Iranian entrenchment in the country and call on Israel to help drive the Iranians out. At present it seems that the frequent protests will remain at the local level, but they are evidence of a sense of instability and public frustration.

Reconstruction of the Syrian army and the chemical arsenal: Before the war, Israel was the declared threat of the Syrian army and most of its resources were devoted to plans to combat Israel, including with chemical capabilities. When the civil war broke out, the internal struggle and the danger to regime stability became the benchmark threat. Chemical weapons were diverted to attacks on the civilian population, which peaked with a chemical attack in the outskirts of Damascus in 2013. In recent years, the Syrian army has turned to processes of rebuilding, with Russian and Iranian support, while the main weaponry with respect to Israel is based on air defense systems from Russia and Iran, designed to limit Israel’s offensive aerial capabilities. In addition, there have been recent reports of renewed building of chemical capabilities. Presumably the Syrian army will strive to improve its military capabilities as a deterrent to Israeli attacks.

Syria’s regional status: When the war broke out, most countries, including Arab countries, broke off diplomatic relations with Syria, but recent winds of change are evident. In 2018 the United Arab Emirates became the first Arab state to renew its ties with Damascus, and relations between Damascus and Cairo resumed shortly afterwards. In July 2021 Jordan’s King Abdullah visited Damascus; Bahrain subsequently opened an embassy in the city, and President Assad visited the UAE. Underlying the efforts to bring Syria back into the Arab world is the desire to combat Iranian influence over the Damascus regime and build an axis against Iran, as well as Turkey.

Iranian entrenchment in Syria: On the one hand, the Iranian presence harms the aims of the Assad regime to regain full sovereignty over the country, deny Israel an excuse to continue its aerial attacks, and win the support of the Gulf states. On the other hand, Assad owes the Iranians a great deal for the help and support he received during the years of war, and is unable to repay the $17 billion owed to Iran. In recent years, the Iranians have lowered their military profile and still rely on local Syrian militias under their authority, while expanding their activity in the Aleppo region, east of Damascus and east of the border with Iraq.

The Kurdish autonomous region: Over the years, the Kurds have operated in a complex environment – waging blood-soaked warfare against ISIS and dealing with attacks from the Turkish front, while attempting to obtain international recognition. The Kurdish autonomy is relatively stable and has the support and aid of the United States. During the same period the Kurds have improved their status, and they have evolved from a minority that suffered discrimination and oppression under the Syrian regime to a dominant group with an independent regime responsible for 3 million people. However, even this autonomy is not immune to the severe economic crisis, or free of public criticism for its corruption and poor management.

Competition between Iran and Russia over influence: Although it is too early to fully assess the consequences of the war in Ukraine for Syria, it appears that these will include a reduction in the resources that Russia invests in maintaining stability in Syria. Moreover, Russia’s isolation in the independent arena, and its expulsion from the UN Human Rights Council could erode its legitimacy as the promoter of a political settlement and reforms in Syria. On the other hand, Iran’s international and regional status is growing stronger. Iran has gained international legitimacy from the talks on returning to the nuclear deal, and signing an agreement would strengthen it both economically and diplomatically – which could broaden its influence in Syria, at the expense of Russian influence.

United States policy: Over the years, the United States has focused more on the fight against ISIS and the international coalition to bring down the Islamic State, and less on the civil war, although it imposed sanctions on the Assad regime and does not recognize it. The Biden administration condemns the process of normalization between Arab countries and the Damascus regime, but is not working to prevent it. This is a continuation of the weakness that has characterized the response by the United States and the West to the war, and the limp efforts to bring it to an end, which some attribute to a change in American priorities.

Significance for Israel

After 11 years of civil war, Syria is divided, subject to the influence of foreign forces, and suffering from a severe economic and humanitarian crisis. This transitional period is an opportunity for Israel to influence the future shape and stability of its northern neighbor. To be sure, the Assad regime remains obligated to Iran and does not intend to break off relations with it, even in order to return to the Arab world and obtain essential economic aid. Moreover, Iran is expected to increase its influence in Syria as Russia’s involvement is cut back due to the war in Ukraine. However, Assad will try to limit the presence and military visibility of Iran in his country in order to avoid paying the price of Israeli attacks. Israel must therefore continue working to block Iranian entrenchment in Syria and the military threat that it poses – and in order to provide Assad with grounds and leverage to remove Iran from Syrian territory. This means a continuation of the aerial attacks, while retaining the mechanism of coordination with Russia, and improving the efforts to achieve more meaningful and long-term influence. In this framework, Syria should be seen as a divided nation, and Israel should work on building special ties with potential local allies, in particular the Kurds in the northeast of the country and the Druze in the south.