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Turkey’s September 26, 2013 announcementthat the Chinese company CPMIEC had won the tender for the purchase of a longrange air defense system came as a surprise to Turkey’s NATO partners – eventhough prior rumors had indicated this would be the decision – and was met withmuch disapproval. The Chinese manufacturer outbid American companies (themakers of the Patriot system), a Russian company (the maker of the S-300 andS-400), and an Italian-French consortium (the maker of the SAMP/T Aster-30). WhileTurkish President Abdullah Gul said that the decision was not final and thedeal had yet to be finalized and signed, the terms of the tender obligateTurkey to move ahead with China. Thus, it seems that it will take more than thecurrent level of condemnation by NATO members to persuade Turkey to change itsmind. Moreover, the decision was made at the Defense Industry Executive Committee,chaired by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and this indicates hisfull support for the decision.

{According to Turkey, three main reasons ledit to opt for the Chinese bid. First of all, finances: the price quoted by the Chinesecompany was some $1 billion less than the others (the Turks stipulated amaximum of $4 billion for the deal; the Chinese bid came in at $3.4 billion).Second, China is willing to include the transfer of technology and some of theproduction to Turkey as part of the deal, something Turkey has been very keenon in recent years, given its desire to strengthen its self-reliance in thedefense realm. Finally, expected delivery: Turkey estimates that China willsupply the systems in a relatively short period.

Criticsof the Turkish decision are concerned about several issues. Buying the systemfrom China means that Turkey will be limited in its interoperability with the defensesystems of other NATO members, which is liable to affect Turkey’s defensivecapabilities; it also raises the concern about friendly fire due to the lack ofsynchronization with the alliance’s friend-or-foe identification systems.Second, the Chinese system has reportedly not been tested under real conditionsand is inferior to the Russian S-400 proposed to the Turks. Third, NATOofficials are worried not only that the systems, once in place, could serve forintelligence gathering by the Chinese espionage, but that even at the stage ofjoint development the Chinese would have access to information and data NATOmembers would rather not reveal. Furthermore, CPMIEC is subject to Americansanctions for violations of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria NonproliferationAct. In response to some of these reservations, Turkey claims it is planning todevelop an independent friend-or-foe identification system, and that there isno comprehensive requirement that NATO members purchase defensive systemscompatible with those of other alliance members. In fact, the proponents of thedeal point to Greece, also a NATO member, which bought the S-300 from Russia (note,however, that this was a compromise purchase after Turkey vetoed the intentionof the Republic of Cyprus to buy the system, which instead was placed on Greeksoil).

At thebroader political level, Ankara is criticized for its willingness to cooperatein a sensitive strategic field with one of the biggest competitors of Turkey’slongstanding close ally, the United States. In practice, the possibility ofTurkey working with China in the military realm as a counterweight to orsubstitute for the United States is not new. In the late 1990s Turkey boughtrockets and imported rocket technology from China (known in Turkey as the T-300Kasirga and J-600T Yildirim) after talks with the United States on purchasing anadvanced rocket launcher system fell through. In 2010, Turkey held joint aerialmaneuvers with China after Washington canceled its participation in an exercisewith Turkey in response to Ankara’s rejection of Israel’s participation. Theupgrading of the Turkish army’s armored vehicles (FNSS ACV) was also a jointTurkish-Chinese project.

At thesame time these moves, including the newest deal, should not be viewed as proofthat Turkey and China are establishing strategic relations, as they havefundamental political and strategic differences of opinion preventing any realpartnership. Among these are China’s efforts to subvert international stepsagainst the Assad regime; Turkey’s enormous trade deficit with China (currentlyabout $18 billion annually); and Turkey’s critique vis-à-vis China’s policy withregard to its Uyghur minority (a population of some 10 million, according toChinese official statistics), which shares ethnic, cultural, and historicalties with the Turkish people. In the background are also the complex historicalrelations between the nations that for decades cast China’s image in Turkey ina negative light. In addition, recent developments, especially the escalatingtension between Turkey and Syria, have highlighted Turkey’s dependence on NATO.Despite some cooling in the relationship with the United States, partly due toTurkey’s disappointment with America’s decision not to intervene militarily inSyria and a chill between Erdogan and President Obama, NATO nations hurried todeploy Patriot missile batteries near the Turkish-Syrian border after it seemedthat relations were deteriorating. It is also clear to Turkey that until itmakes progress in the long process of developing independent anti-missiledefenses it will remain highly dependent on NATO members on this issue.

Thereforethe explanation for the deal must be found in the particular currentcircumstances and complementary interests of Turkey and China. First, there isTurkey’s desire to develop an independent technologically-advanced defenseindustry, which is probably Ankara’s main reason for choosing China as itsdefense system supplier. This goal is entirely comprehensible to Beijing, whichhas been driven by similar considerations since the founding of the modernChinese state. Both nations view the American and European refusal to transferto Turkey manufacturing technology connected to anti-missile defense systems asa way to perpetuate the superiority of the developed nations over thedeveloping nations and leave the latter’s dependence on the former firmly inplace. Second, given Turkey’s complicated relationship with the United Statesand the West – for example, Turkey’s anger over the US refusal to act in Syria,the hurdles the European Union has set for Turkey’s acceptance into the EU, andthe suspicion that NATO members are exploiting Turkey’s dependence on them inthe realm of air defense – it is convenient for Ankara to show that it has analternative of sorts to its alliance with the West. As for China, even if it isaware of the limits to its relations with Turkey, the current deal serves itsinterests well by creating an opportunity to gain a foothold in the Middle Eastweapons market, widen the split between Turkey and the United States, andstrengthen its ties with an important regional power.

Thisdevelopment has some implications for Israel. Despite the difficulties Turkey hasraised in recent years regarding the relationship between NATO and Israel,Israel would like to see Turkey continue being a loyal NATO member. Thus, thecurrent development will likely arouse concern in Jerusalem. Additional evidenceof the difficult state of Turkish-Israeli relations is that Turkey hascurrently chosen to pursue procurement independence via a partnership with problematicactors such as China instead of cooperation with Israel. Finally, the Turkishchoice of the Chinese defense system shows that even if the system’s qualityand performance are inferior to those of its competitors, it is still goodenough so that a nation that sees itself as threatened would choose it. This impliesimprovements in the Chinese defense industry and the possibility of it enteringthe Middle East military arena as an important player.

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Dr. Gallia Lindenstrauss is a researchfellow at INSS. Dr. Yoram Evron is a researchfellow at INSS and a lecturer in the Department of Asian Studies at theUniversity of Haifa. This paper was written within the framework of theINSS-Israel Institute China Program.