On Tuesday, February 3, Iran successfully launched its first entirely homemade satellite. The satellite, called Omid ("hope"), was launched on a Safir 2 satellite launcher from the space center in Semnan Province, southeast of Tehran. The timing of the launch coincided with the 30^th anniversary celebrations of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

The Satellite

The Omid is a small research satellite. According to Iranian spokesmen, it carries telecommunications and telemetry equipment, as well as what is referred to as remote sensory devices and a geographic information system (GIS). From here it can be concluded that the satellite also carries a small camera. It entered orbit at a height of 252.7-384.5 kilometers, with an inclination of 55 degrees, and orbits the earth once every 90.8 minutes. Iran said that its satellite was scheduled to remain in orbit about three months. Western monitoring stations that measured its orbit estimated that it would return to the atmosphere in June-July 2009. The satellite’s weight is unknown, but probably does not exceed a few dozen kilograms.

The satellite is undoubtedly a great success for Iran. Its launch demonstrates that the Iranian space industry is capable of approaching and achieving extremely impressive technological capabilities, mostly in missile technology. The Safir 2 is a liquid fuel-powered two stage satellite launcher (it may also have a small third stage for putting the satellite into orbit). Its successful launch demonstrates the capability to fire, manage, and separate the stages. It also shows an independent capability to construct, launch, and control satellites.

Iranian spokesmen stressed that the satellite was designed for research purposes and is not a military satellite, and furthermore that the entire Iranian satellite program was for peaceful purposes. They took the opportunity to describe Iran’s plans in outer space for the near and distant future. In the context of these plans, the Omid functions mainly as an experimental satellite for a series of additional satellites of various types scheduled for launch in the coming decade. The most ambitious goal presented was the launch of an Iranian astronaut into space by 2021.

Plans for satellite launches in the short term include the Mesbah satellite built for Iran by an Italian company, which was originally scheduled for launch in 2005. Development of the Besharat, a joint satellite project of Iran and all the member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), was also announced.

Significance

Western commentators quickly voiced great concern about the Iranian satellite launch. A White House spokesman expressed concern that Tehran was threatening the security of Israel by launching the satellite, and stated that the US was not convinced that Iran was acting responsibly to promote stability in the region. Similar sentiments were also voiced in London, Paris, and, needless to say, Israel. The real concern is that satellite launch technology is similar to the technology required in order to launch ballistic missiles. A missile capable of carrying a load of several dozen kilograms is also capable of carrying several hundred kilograms for distances of thousands of kilometers. This means that Iran can threaten West European countries.

Although this assessment is technologically correct, and despite the fact that Iran’s hostile attitude towards Israel means that Israel must prepare for the possibility, however unlikely, that these launchers will be used for military purposes, it is important to also present counter arguments. First, satellite launchers are not military missiles. They are complex, cumbersome, and require lengthy preparation for launching. They are also usually not made in large production series, because there is no need to establish an operational inventory. Second, from the organizational perspective, the satellite project probably belongs to a civilian entity, not a military one. The person most interviewed following the launch was Iran Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) head Reza Taghipour, not Minister of Defense Mostafa Mohammad Najjar. Third, Iran appears genuinely interested in an advanced satellite program. Beyond the benefit derived from satellites – in both civilian spheres such as locating resources, dealing with natural disasters, telecommunications, and so on, and in military applications, such as imagery intelligence gathering – the very existence of the program involves an extremely important element of prestige. It demonstrates Iran’s technological superiority, in comparison with other countries in the region, its ability to compete on equal terms with developed Western countries (Europe and the US), and its consequent ability to challenge Israel’s technological superiority.

Finally, Iran has had a military missile program for a long time, and the range of its Shehab-3 missile has covered Israel for at least the past decade. From this standpoint, the inherent threat of the solid-fuel Sejil missile, whose first trial took place last November and that was probably designed for military purposes, is much more serious than the direct threat stemming from the Iranian space program.