Udi Dekel

A comprehensive comparison between the plan to conquer Gaza and the Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire, the release of hostages, and the establishment of an alternative administration in the Strip

Insights from a simulation conducted at the Institute for National Security Studies, focusing on the conduct of the various actors regarding the second phase of the framework for the release of the hostages

Although the concept of conflict management led to the events of October 7, Israel is still entrenched in the approach of “indefinite conflict management.” Its conduct results in control over all dimensions and aspects of the Palestinian population in the West Bank (and possibly also in the Gaza Strip), which in practice would constitute a “one-state” reality between the Jordan River and the sea. Since the “two states for two peoples” framework, which includes a fully sovereign Palestinian state, is not feasible in the foreseeable future, and in order to prevent the emergence of a “one-state” reality, it is in Israel’s interest that the Palestinian Authority be granted self-governing powers. After all, the PA is currently the lesser evil in terms of Palestinian leadership and the only relevant alternative to Hamas. We suggest a model of expanded Palestinian autonomy/limited Palestinian sovereignty in which Israel would retain control over essential areas, with an emphasis on security and border protection. This model (PELS -Palestinian Entity with Limited Sovereignty) is intended to be implemented for a transitional period; it will address Saudi Arabia’s demand for a political pathway toward the establishment of a Palestinian state as part of normalization with Israel; and it will serve as a test of both sides’ readiness to discuss the details of full Palestinian sovereignty, which in any case will not include military forces or capabilities.

A proposed model for limited Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank, meaning a political-territorial arrangement—that could serve as a solution for Israel in the current geopolitical situation

After 500 days of fighting, Israel has not defeated the terrorist organization Hamas. Given this, how should it proceed now in light of the framework for the hostage return and Trump’s proposal to expel Gaza’s residents?

Did Israel miss the (last) chance for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? With the growing debate among the Israeli public about the viability of a two-state solution, and the lack of public knowledge about the Annapolis process and how close Israel may have been to “two states for two peoples,” INSS recently published a memorandum on the Annapolis process (2007-2008). The Annapolis process saw the convergence of optimum conditions for negotiations, with a golden opportunity to reach a settlement: calm after the years of the second intifada; trust between Prime Minister Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas; an outline for negotiations drawn up in advance with the Palestinians and the United States; the involvement of professional elements on the specific issues; a supportive international system; and more. Nonetheless, the professional and practical talks did not bring about the sought agreement. The Biden administration, which hopes to promote the two-state option, could learn from the lessons of Annapolis, if it seeks to restart the political process.