Swords of Iron War

The main foreign policy issue that has preoccupied Egypt recently has been the war in the Gaza Strip. Egypt’s policy toward the war in particular, and toward Israel in general, should be assessed in light of two central factors: first, the prolonged war and its severe consequences in the Gaza Strip—an area that directly borders Egypt; and second, the war’s contribution to the growing prominence of the Palestinian issue on Egypt’s national agenda, which resonates deeply within Egyptian public opinion. In this sense, this current situation is unprecedented in the 45 years of peace between Egypt and Israel. The war has posed a significant test for Egyptian–Israeli relations. At the same time, Egypt’s leadership has had to consider its domestic political and economic agenda—already burdened with challenges—as it formulated its policy toward both the war and Israel. Understanding these two dimensions—Egypt’s position on the Palestinian issue and its internal challenges—helps explain Egypt’s policy toward Israel and the likely implications for relations between the two countries. The analysis and insights presented in this article are based on official statements, as well as commentary and reporting by Egyptian analysts and journalists during the period under review.

How can victory and decisive defeat be defined – and has Israel achieved them after two years of war in Gaza?

Israeli policymakers have relied on cumulative deterrence strategies to combat terrorism. However, Israel has consistently failed to deter Hamas’ attacks, not only on October 7 but also in 2008-09, 2012, 2014, and 2021. A critical yet often overlooked observation is that cumulative deterrence strategies coupled with robust denial capabilities can lead to an attrition trap, which serves as a victory strategy for weaker actors, ultimately resulting in deterrence failure rather than success. This article employs lessons from cases of both successful and failed deterrence in a longitudinal study of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It argues, firstly, that in challenging contests of resolve, actors can escape the attrition trap when they move beyond cumulative deterrence strategies and employ land maneuvers that systematically target the strategies of terrorist organizations, thus addressing the credibility problem. Secondly, such wars can potentially lead to overextension and further wars of attrition, which means defenders must know when to stop and disengage, ensuring the balance of legitimacy and resolve remains favorable to them. This paper asserts that Hamas remained undeterred throughout the conflict because Israel viewed reliance on cumulative deterrence strategies and its robust denial capability, the Iron Dome, as less costly than engaging in a war of maneuver, which was essential to resolving Israel’s credibility issue regarding its willingness to act.