Even for the Gulf states, the rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria was a strategic surprise. Aside from Qatar, the Gulf states were in the middle of a normalization process with the Assad regime, which began as early as 2019 with the UAE and continued recently with the reopening of the Saudi embassy in Damascus. The Gulf states’ attempt to draw Assad closer, aiming to drive a wedge in the Shiite axis, was based on the assessment that his regime was strong and stable.
Although the regime’s collapse instantly shattered this Gulf strategy, it also achieved a coveted goal: Iran’s Axis of Resistance is losing Syria and suffering a significant blow. Additionally, the flow of Captagon drugs to the Gulf is expected to weaken from now on.
In the short term, the Sunni camp in the region has an opportunity to strengthen itself at the expense of the weakened Iranian axis. However, divisions within this camp will make it difficult to capitalize on this opportunity.
The big winner among the Gulf states may be Qatar, which, along with Turkey, supported the Syrian rebels throughout and declared its opposition to the Assad regime. Now, Qatar is leveraging its role as a communication channel to the world with the leading rebel organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and will likely use this position to establish its influence in post-Assad Syria.
The other Gulf states, for their part, quickly sent their ambassadors in Syria to meet with the organization two days after the regime’s fall, hoping to establish ties with the new Syrian leadership. In this context, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could utilize the reconciliation they achieved in recent years with Turkey and Qatar as intermediaries with the new Syrian regime. This connection could also benefit Israel, which may leverage its ties in the Gulf to engage with the new leadership beyond its northern border.
Another question is the “domino effect”: Even though this was not a popular revolution in the style of the “Arab Spring,” the success of Islamist forces in toppling Assad’s iron-fist regime—alongside the sensational but temporary success of Hamas against Israel in the October 7 attack—raises concerns among the Gulf regimes about a potential Islamist wave sweeping the region, which they see as their main political threat. In particular, the Gulf states will not be pleased to see an Islamist state resembling the Taliban or ISIS emerge in Syria.
Even for the Gulf states, the rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria was a strategic surprise. Aside from Qatar, the Gulf states were in the middle of a normalization process with the Assad regime, which began as early as 2019 with the UAE and continued recently with the reopening of the Saudi embassy in Damascus. The Gulf states’ attempt to draw Assad closer, aiming to drive a wedge in the Shiite axis, was based on the assessment that his regime was strong and stable.
Although the regime’s collapse instantly shattered this Gulf strategy, it also achieved a coveted goal: Iran’s Axis of Resistance is losing Syria and suffering a significant blow. Additionally, the flow of Captagon drugs to the Gulf is expected to weaken from now on.
In the short term, the Sunni camp in the region has an opportunity to strengthen itself at the expense of the weakened Iranian axis. However, divisions within this camp will make it difficult to capitalize on this opportunity.
The big winner among the Gulf states may be Qatar, which, along with Turkey, supported the Syrian rebels throughout and declared its opposition to the Assad regime. Now, Qatar is leveraging its role as a communication channel to the world with the leading rebel organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and will likely use this position to establish its influence in post-Assad Syria.
The other Gulf states, for their part, quickly sent their ambassadors in Syria to meet with the organization two days after the regime’s fall, hoping to establish ties with the new Syrian leadership. In this context, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could utilize the reconciliation they achieved in recent years with Turkey and Qatar as intermediaries with the new Syrian regime. This connection could also benefit Israel, which may leverage its ties in the Gulf to engage with the new leadership beyond its northern border.
Another question is the “domino effect”: Even though this was not a popular revolution in the style of the “Arab Spring,” the success of Islamist forces in toppling Assad’s iron-fist regime—alongside the sensational but temporary success of Hamas against Israel in the October 7 attack—raises concerns among the Gulf regimes about a potential Islamist wave sweeping the region, which they see as their main political threat. In particular, the Gulf states will not be pleased to see an Islamist state resembling the Taliban or ISIS emerge in Syria.