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Home Posts Ramadan 2022: A Shaky Balance

Ramadan 2022: A Shaky Balance
Udi Dekel
24 April, 2022
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It is still too early to summarize, and as such, to grade Israel's political-security conduct in face of the rising tensions in the Israeli-Palestinian arena during the month of Ramadan. The round of violence and terrorism has not yet subsided and volatility is high, with any unusual event able to ignite the area. However, an intermediate balance sheet can be drafted as follows:

Weaknesses, which undermine stability:

  • Hamas, the main perpetrator of the events, has not paid a price for the incitement, and is therefore not motivated to bring the round to an end and impose calm.
  • Hamas strengthens its image as a “defender of Jerusalem,” in the spirit of May 2021. East Jerusalem youth mobilize and riot in accordance with the organization's incitement trumpet and call on Mohammed Deif to intervene, while Hamas flags wave on the Temple Mount.
  • Hamas controls the contours of the campaign, focuses on the Jerusalem front, and tries to ignite the West Bank front at the same time, albeit without success for now. At the same time, the organization manages to prevent escalation in the Gaza arena out of an interest in preventing widespread damage to its achievements of recent months – Israel’s relaxation of the closure of the Gaza Strip, and the reconstruction moves in the region.
  • Early understandings between Jerusalem and Amman have collapsed and Jordan positioned itself as the main indicter and condemner of Israel, while not trying to calm and restrain the militant Palestinian elements.
  • Israel has not organized adequately with a response centered on the cognitive dimension. The methodical campaigns of incitement originating with Hamas have not been exposed as required, emphasizing their false information and the calls for violence and terrorism – not by the organization but by other incited elements.
  • The political crisis in Israel makes it difficult for the government to take decisive action against extremists within Israel, who seek to heighten friction and volatility.

Strengths, which stabilize:

  • Israel has prepared for the events, learning from the events of May 2021. However, it was surprised at the opening of the round by the terrorist attacks in the heart of the country waged by extremist Israeli Arabs and armed infiltrators from the Jenin area.
  • Steps have been taken to reduce friction on the Temple Mount – between Muslim and Jewish worshippers, and between police forces and rioters. It was possible to hold the Ramadan celebrations at the Nablus Gate. Despite the rising violence, so far no rioters have been killed in Jerusalem (no shahids).
  • The differentiation policy is maintained. The Gaza Strip has not flared up, except for a few rockets launched into Israeli territory. In the West Bank as well, Hamas has failed to incite mass violence and terrorism against IDF forces and settlers.
  • Regarding the Gaza Strip, Israel has chosen indirect economic pressure on Hamas to close the Erez crossing and prevent Gazans from entering Israel for work. This move is designed to deter Hamas and halt the dynamics of escalation in the Gaza Strip. Time will tell if this is a stabilizing move.
  • In other sectors, Israel avoids extensive response measures, which are inevitably cast as collective punishment. The routine of life in the West Bank is maintained, including the permits of Palestinian workers in Israel and the entry of Israeli Arabs into Palestinian cities for commercial purposes.
  • The Palestinian Authority is functioning and even adhering to security cooperation with Israel. However, the PA aligns itself with the rebellious elements and takes part in inciting and accusing Israel of tensions and violent incidents.
  • Global attention has not been diverted from the war in Ukraine to the Israeli-Palestinian arena. Condemnations toward Israel are also relatively moderate in the Arab and Muslim world (except for the Jordanian criticism).

Interim summary and recommendations

So far, the balance between the stabilizing and restraining factors and the destabilizing factors is shaky and sensitive, because any unusual event, especially if it spreads and includes casualties, could play to the hands of Hamas, which is trying to intensify the friction and clashes, particularly in the West Bank. It is even possible that the organization’s balance of considerations will change, and it will decide to include the Gaza Strip in the conflict as well. Therefore, Israel must adhere to a stabilizing policy, reduce friction, and increase the cognitive efforts. It should use a drone to photograph the Temple Mount on a 24/7 basis and present the images continuously to the whole world, and especially to the leadership and audiences in the Arab-Muslim world. At the same time, it is essential to expose and present false information and staged images of rioting confrontations with Israel's security forces on social media.

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