According to various reports, Iran, Hezbollah, and possibly other members of the axis of resistance intend to attack Israel in the coming days, as revenge for the assassinations of Ismail Haniyeh and Fuad Shukr. In the Iranian view, Tehran should choose a response that will rebalance the “deterrence equation” vis-à-vis Israel but that will not lead to an unwanted war with Israel and especially with the United States. Iran is willing to risk escalation in order to draw a “red line” for Israel’s actions, but it’s likely that Iran hopes that by aiming its missiles at military areas, possibly in the Tel Aviv or Haifa regions, it will be possible to avoid a wider campaign. In Iran’s view, the damage to its sovereignty and especially the humiliation it suffered by the elimination of Haniyeh in Tehran obliges it to respond.
Either way, Iran states that the upcoming attack will be more significant than the one on April 14. This warning, along with the possibility that members of the axis, led by Hezbollah, could actively join the attack, could significantly increase the likelihood of escalation. Behind the scenes, the active involvement of the United States, both in building a significant force in the region and in trying to rebuild the regional coalition that worked so well on April 14, means that even if Iran attacks, the containment of the attack by the United States, Israel, and regional countries will be a key component in containing the escalation, enabling Israel to take a measured response against Iran and/or the axis countries, if it decides to respond.
At the same time, the countries of the region are also very afraid of the escalation, which will affect them directly. The relatively rare visit of Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi to Tehran shows how much these countries fear their fate in the event of a regional war, especially Jordan, as most of the Iranian weapons fired on April 14 passed over its territory. It’s likely that al-Safadi sought to moderate the Iranian response and perhaps conveyed messages from the American administration to the leadership in Tehran. It’s also likely that Iran is seeking to create fissures in that coalition to prevent the Sunni countries from standing at Israel’s side, and it’s quite possible that al-Safadi heard these kinds of messages.
In the wake of all this, it’s important to note another significant development—an article published in the Jomhouri-e Eslami newspaper (the voice of the moderate camp in Iran) warns of recklessness in the Iranian response and “falling into Israel’s trap” that aims to prevent the Iranian president from reducing tensions between Iran and the West. This article, and the fact that Iran’s current president, Pezeshkian, comes from the reformist camp that is interested in promoting a nuclear agreement with the West, indicate differences of opinion in Iran regarding the possible response.
Indeed, the fact that the leader of Iran has publicly committed to an attack requires the Iranian system to react, and the threshold set on April 14 requires Tehran to react significantly, but if the situation between Iran and Israel deteriorates, these differences of opinion may have an impact on the decision-making process in Iran.
The bottom line is that the coming days will be decisive for the question of where we are headed—“contained escalation” or escalation that leads to war.
According to various reports, Iran, Hezbollah, and possibly other members of the axis of resistance intend to attack Israel in the coming days, as revenge for the assassinations of Ismail Haniyeh and Fuad Shukr. In the Iranian view, Tehran should choose a response that will rebalance the “deterrence equation” vis-à-vis Israel but that will not lead to an unwanted war with Israel and especially with the United States. Iran is willing to risk escalation in order to draw a “red line” for Israel’s actions, but it’s likely that Iran hopes that by aiming its missiles at military areas, possibly in the Tel Aviv or Haifa regions, it will be possible to avoid a wider campaign. In Iran’s view, the damage to its sovereignty and especially the humiliation it suffered by the elimination of Haniyeh in Tehran obliges it to respond.
Either way, Iran states that the upcoming attack will be more significant than the one on April 14. This warning, along with the possibility that members of the axis, led by Hezbollah, could actively join the attack, could significantly increase the likelihood of escalation. Behind the scenes, the active involvement of the United States, both in building a significant force in the region and in trying to rebuild the regional coalition that worked so well on April 14, means that even if Iran attacks, the containment of the attack by the United States, Israel, and regional countries will be a key component in containing the escalation, enabling Israel to take a measured response against Iran and/or the axis countries, if it decides to respond.
At the same time, the countries of the region are also very afraid of the escalation, which will affect them directly. The relatively rare visit of Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi to Tehran shows how much these countries fear their fate in the event of a regional war, especially Jordan, as most of the Iranian weapons fired on April 14 passed over its territory. It’s likely that al-Safadi sought to moderate the Iranian response and perhaps conveyed messages from the American administration to the leadership in Tehran. It’s also likely that Iran is seeking to create fissures in that coalition to prevent the Sunni countries from standing at Israel’s side, and it’s quite possible that al-Safadi heard these kinds of messages.
In the wake of all this, it’s important to note another significant development—an article published in the Jomhouri-e Eslami newspaper (the voice of the moderate camp in Iran) warns of recklessness in the Iranian response and “falling into Israel’s trap” that aims to prevent the Iranian president from reducing tensions between Iran and the West. This article, and the fact that Iran’s current president, Pezeshkian, comes from the reformist camp that is interested in promoting a nuclear agreement with the West, indicate differences of opinion in Iran regarding the possible response.
Indeed, the fact that the leader of Iran has publicly committed to an attack requires the Iranian system to react, and the threshold set on April 14 requires Tehran to react significantly, but if the situation between Iran and Israel deteriorates, these differences of opinion may have an impact on the decision-making process in Iran.
The bottom line is that the coming days will be decisive for the question of where we are headed—“contained escalation” or escalation that leads to war.