Tuesday evening brought with it very difficult moments, when Israel’s blood boiled, and justifiably so. But precisely at a time like this, decisions should be made with level-headed thinking and not out of a critical approach that shoots from the hip.
There is much talk now about a broad operation, and the term "Defensive Shield" is sounded time and time again. Israel accomplished two principal goals in Operation Defensive Shield (2002): it regained the freedom of operational action on the ground and destroyed the terror infrastructure of the terrorist organizations. Both of these achievements continue to exist. Israel has full freedom of action on the ground; we operate wherever we want and the terrorist infrastructure we face today is much less developed.
Therefore, despite the blood that boils during this difficult week and despite the fact that difficult days are expected in the future, as there were in the past, we must maintain our cool and act with level-headed determination. In the heat of the moment, we must not freely propose tactics and methods: adding roadblocks, using combat helicopters, and launching a large, medium, or small operation are all examples of methods. There are enough talented people in the security establishment who can propose better methods than these at this time.
Rather, what must be discussed is what the goal is, what Israel wants to achieve. If the objective is to change the current security situation, this might require different action, but it must be remembered that there is no military action without a political envelope and without a broader purpose. What is the other situation we want? What will happen with the Palestinian Authority? We must not deal only with what is convenient for us, namely, the local tactical theater.
One of the big risks of a very broad operation is accelerating the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Such a collapse counters Israel’s national security interest, because it will lead to much more serious phenomena, such as unbridled armed groups, Israel's increasing responsibility for the daily lives of millions of Palestinians, and significant criticism in the international arena. In other words, even if we opt for a broad operation – in advance of “the day after” Abu Mazen and the major upheaval that will ensue – the strengthening of the Palestinian Authority and certainly its non-collapse is in line with Israel’s security interest.
And finally: some proportion is in order. We are over a year into an intensive IDF operation in the West Bank, in which over 130 Palestinians were killed, most of them terrorists. The enemy is in distress, and it responds to its fatalities. Had it not been for this activity by the IDF, we would have seen a completely different and much more difficult reality. Regarding Jenin as well, maintain proportion. A locally produced bomb was activated, unfortunately soldiers were injured, but a successful rescue was carried out and the terrorists were killed.
Tuesday evening brought with it very difficult moments, when Israel’s blood boiled, and justifiably so. But precisely at a time like this, decisions should be made with level-headed thinking and not out of a critical approach that shoots from the hip.
There is much talk now about a broad operation, and the term "Defensive Shield" is sounded time and time again. Israel accomplished two principal goals in Operation Defensive Shield (2002): it regained the freedom of operational action on the ground and destroyed the terror infrastructure of the terrorist organizations. Both of these achievements continue to exist. Israel has full freedom of action on the ground; we operate wherever we want and the terrorist infrastructure we face today is much less developed.
Therefore, despite the blood that boils during this difficult week and despite the fact that difficult days are expected in the future, as there were in the past, we must maintain our cool and act with level-headed determination. In the heat of the moment, we must not freely propose tactics and methods: adding roadblocks, using combat helicopters, and launching a large, medium, or small operation are all examples of methods. There are enough talented people in the security establishment who can propose better methods than these at this time.
Rather, what must be discussed is what the goal is, what Israel wants to achieve. If the objective is to change the current security situation, this might require different action, but it must be remembered that there is no military action without a political envelope and without a broader purpose. What is the other situation we want? What will happen with the Palestinian Authority? We must not deal only with what is convenient for us, namely, the local tactical theater.
One of the big risks of a very broad operation is accelerating the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Such a collapse counters Israel’s national security interest, because it will lead to much more serious phenomena, such as unbridled armed groups, Israel's increasing responsibility for the daily lives of millions of Palestinians, and significant criticism in the international arena. In other words, even if we opt for a broad operation – in advance of “the day after” Abu Mazen and the major upheaval that will ensue – the strengthening of the Palestinian Authority and certainly its non-collapse is in line with Israel’s security interest.
And finally: some proportion is in order. We are over a year into an intensive IDF operation in the West Bank, in which over 130 Palestinians were killed, most of them terrorists. The enemy is in distress, and it responds to its fatalities. Had it not been for this activity by the IDF, we would have seen a completely different and much more difficult reality. Regarding Jenin as well, maintain proportion. A locally produced bomb was activated, unfortunately soldiers were injured, but a successful rescue was carried out and the terrorists were killed.