Operation Breaking Dawn began with a very successful opening move. This is an unusual achievement – eliminating senior officials during a tense reality, "surprise within tension." This achievement required misrepresentation and the illusion of passivity, which in turn aroused much criticism.
The first leading figure who was eliminated, Tayseer Jabari, was one of the most important and senior Islamic Jihad commanders in the Gaza Strip. He has no immediate replacement with clear authority. In addition, the fact that Akram Ajouri, the Islamic Jihad “Minister of Defense,” and organization head Ziad Nakhala are in Iran constitutes an unprecedented event. Consequently, there is a crisis in the chain of command and control of the organization.
The advantage for Israel is the embarrassment, delay, and lack of coordination of the Islamic Jihad’s operational effort. The downside is the need for a more complex exit mechanism and an environment surrounding the organization’s leadership that strongly encourages escalation.
The main questions that arise now: Will Hamas join? How will Hezbollah respond and what will it allow from the north? How does Israel finish on a high note and not get dragged into a long and exhausting campaign? And what will happen in the mixed cities?
Operational events do not repeat themselves – there are always changes. Therefore, one should be careful about trying to recreate previous operations. Hamas did not participate in Operation Black Belt. It will have a hard time repeating this restraint. Furthermore, in Guardian of the Walls the cities with mixed Jewish and Arab populations were ignited, but this time there is no Jerusalem component that acts as an inciting factor to accelerate the opening stages of the event.
Operation Breaking Dawn began with a very successful opening move. This is an unusual achievement – eliminating senior officials during a tense reality, "surprise within tension." This achievement required misrepresentation and the illusion of passivity, which in turn aroused much criticism.
The first leading figure who was eliminated, Tayseer Jabari, was one of the most important and senior Islamic Jihad commanders in the Gaza Strip. He has no immediate replacement with clear authority. In addition, the fact that Akram Ajouri, the Islamic Jihad “Minister of Defense,” and organization head Ziad Nakhala are in Iran constitutes an unprecedented event. Consequently, there is a crisis in the chain of command and control of the organization.
The advantage for Israel is the embarrassment, delay, and lack of coordination of the Islamic Jihad’s operational effort. The downside is the need for a more complex exit mechanism and an environment surrounding the organization’s leadership that strongly encourages escalation.
The main questions that arise now: Will Hamas join? How will Hezbollah respond and what will it allow from the north? How does Israel finish on a high note and not get dragged into a long and exhausting campaign? And what will happen in the mixed cities?
Operational events do not repeat themselves – there are always changes. Therefore, one should be careful about trying to recreate previous operations. Hamas did not participate in Operation Black Belt. It will have a hard time repeating this restraint. Furthermore, in Guardian of the Walls the cities with mixed Jewish and Arab populations were ignited, but this time there is no Jerusalem component that acts as an inciting factor to accelerate the opening stages of the event.