Last night’s attack by Pakistan on Iranian territory – limited as it may be – following Iran's attack on the bases of the Baluchi-Sunni organization Jaish al-Adl in Pakistan, and the sharp political response on the part of Iraq to the Iranian attacks in northern Iraq, which also included an unusual complaint submitted to the Security Council, testify to the limitations of Iran’s power when it is forced to act directly and not through its network of proxies.
It is for good reason that Iran prefers to act through proxy organizations to remove responsibility from itself, preserve "room for denial," and reduce the risk of paying a price for its actions. The use of proxies is part of the concept of asymmetric warfare adopted by the Iranian regime to compensate for its conventional military limitations. However, in cases where Iran wants to respond to a direct attack on its forces or citizens, such as the elimination of senior Iranian commanders in Syria or terrorist attacks on its territory, it is sometimes forced to act directly, initiate offensive operations itself, and not rely on its proxies to conduct its own wars. In such cases, it exposes itself to increasing risks, be they political or military.
Iran's recent attacks in Iraq and Pakistan are apparently not expected to lead to an intolerable price, and it can be assumed that even the temporary tensions with its two neighbors will subside in the near future. However, not only do these attacks not provide a solution to the basic security problems it faces in the internal and regional arenas, but Tehran's decision to respond to the ongoing harm to its security by opening additional fronts – and in the midst of the war in Gaza – intensifies the suspicion toward it on the part of its neighbors, including those that maintain good relations with it, such as Iraq and Pakistan; reduces over time their willingness to cooperate with it in promoting security goals along their shared common borders; and reveals the limitations of Iran’s power in dealing directly with the security challenges and its inferiority compared to some of its regional and international rivals.
Last night’s attack by Pakistan on Iranian territory – limited as it may be – following Iran's attack on the bases of the Baluchi-Sunni organization Jaish al-Adl in Pakistan, and the sharp political response on the part of Iraq to the Iranian attacks in northern Iraq, which also included an unusual complaint submitted to the Security Council, testify to the limitations of Iran’s power when it is forced to act directly and not through its network of proxies.
It is for good reason that Iran prefers to act through proxy organizations to remove responsibility from itself, preserve "room for denial," and reduce the risk of paying a price for its actions. The use of proxies is part of the concept of asymmetric warfare adopted by the Iranian regime to compensate for its conventional military limitations. However, in cases where Iran wants to respond to a direct attack on its forces or citizens, such as the elimination of senior Iranian commanders in Syria or terrorist attacks on its territory, it is sometimes forced to act directly, initiate offensive operations itself, and not rely on its proxies to conduct its own wars. In such cases, it exposes itself to increasing risks, be they political or military.
Iran's recent attacks in Iraq and Pakistan are apparently not expected to lead to an intolerable price, and it can be assumed that even the temporary tensions with its two neighbors will subside in the near future. However, not only do these attacks not provide a solution to the basic security problems it faces in the internal and regional arenas, but Tehran's decision to respond to the ongoing harm to its security by opening additional fronts – and in the midst of the war in Gaza – intensifies the suspicion toward it on the part of its neighbors, including those that maintain good relations with it, such as Iraq and Pakistan; reduces over time their willingness to cooperate with it in promoting security goals along their shared common borders; and reveals the limitations of Iran’s power in dealing directly with the security challenges and its inferiority compared to some of its regional and international rivals.