The operation to thwart Mohammed Deif is not a miracle. It is a result of high-quality intelligence work which begins with organizational partnership: The formal responsibility for thwarting senior members of Hamas' military wing rests with the Shin Bet, but in order to contribute to the success of its important task, all the capabilities of the intelligence community are at its disposal, with an emphasis on 8200. Since the beginning of the war a multi-organizational campaign, focusing on this goal, has been underway. In fact, the security establishment created a sequence of intelligence ambushes, and with the patience of an seasoned hunter they waited for the first opportunity.
Although Deif was fully functional, he is not completely healthy. It is difficult for him to be underground for long, and he must sometimes go outside to breathe fresh air. Israel needed to identify when and where he would go up for air, in order to catch him in the ambush network of the defense establishment, to be implemented through the lightening connection to the impressive operational activity of the Air Force.
Deif is no old pensioner or mere symbol: he is a cruel commander, an active and vile terrorist, who was tasked with reestablishing the military power of Hamas after the war. He is the one who built the military wing of Hamas and he is the man who came up with the plan to raid Israel that came to fruition on October 7. It is very good if he is not around for the day after the war ends.
Will the countermeasures affect the hostage deal? In my opinion, even if there a bump in the road now, it is not a strategic one. The reasons that Hamas decided to compromise its demands in the deal stem from the operational pressure it is under, the fear that the pressure exerted by the IDF will increase and its understanding that Phase III is a powerful one, which includes significant raids into Gaza and elimination of key figures.
One final word on decision-making: Deif is mortal. The decision to eliminate him is essentially a simple decision for the political echelon, even more so when Deif does not have hostages at his side. These are not the difficult decisions facing the Israeli government. The political echelon must leverage the operation to reach the really difficult decision, which is the hostage deal that is still on the agenda.
The operation to thwart Mohammed Deif is not a miracle. It is a result of high-quality intelligence work which begins with organizational partnership: The formal responsibility for thwarting senior members of Hamas' military wing rests with the Shin Bet, but in order to contribute to the success of its important task, all the capabilities of the intelligence community are at its disposal, with an emphasis on 8200. Since the beginning of the war a multi-organizational campaign, focusing on this goal, has been underway. In fact, the security establishment created a sequence of intelligence ambushes, and with the patience of an seasoned hunter they waited for the first opportunity.
Although Deif was fully functional, he is not completely healthy. It is difficult for him to be underground for long, and he must sometimes go outside to breathe fresh air. Israel needed to identify when and where he would go up for air, in order to catch him in the ambush network of the defense establishment, to be implemented through the lightening connection to the impressive operational activity of the Air Force.
Deif is no old pensioner or mere symbol: he is a cruel commander, an active and vile terrorist, who was tasked with reestablishing the military power of Hamas after the war. He is the one who built the military wing of Hamas and he is the man who came up with the plan to raid Israel that came to fruition on October 7. It is very good if he is not around for the day after the war ends.
Will the countermeasures affect the hostage deal? In my opinion, even if there a bump in the road now, it is not a strategic one. The reasons that Hamas decided to compromise its demands in the deal stem from the operational pressure it is under, the fear that the pressure exerted by the IDF will increase and its understanding that Phase III is a powerful one, which includes significant raids into Gaza and elimination of key figures.
One final word on decision-making: Deif is mortal. The decision to eliminate him is essentially a simple decision for the political echelon, even more so when Deif does not have hostages at his side. These are not the difficult decisions facing the Israeli government. The political echelon must leverage the operation to reach the really difficult decision, which is the hostage deal that is still on the agenda.