After approximately 13 months of intense fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel’s security cabinet approved the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon. While the full terms of the agreement have not been disclosed, they include the following understandings: a 60-day ceasefire during which Hezbollah will gradually withdraw from the area south of the Litani River, IDF forces will leave southern Lebanon, the Lebanese Army (reinforced with additional troops) will gradually deploy, and UNIFIL forces will be strengthened. These principles do not fundamentally differ from UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted in 2006.
The difference lies in two significant additions that could make this agreement more effective than its predecessor: the establishment of an international oversight mechanism, led by the United States, to report on violations, specifically Hezbollah’s renewed deployment south of the Litani and its military buildup north of the river; and more importantly, an American commitment enshrined in a side letter to the agreement, recognizing the principle of “self-defense,” which grants Israel freedom of action to strike in Lebanon in the event of an immediate threat or unaddressed violations.
Hezbollah, after the severe blows that it sustained, the growing internal criticism, and the need to restore its military and political standing—alongside Iranian support for ending the war—ultimately led it to sever its commitment to Gaza and accept the agreement, despite the significant concessions involved.
The concerns of those opposing the agreement, including some residents of the north, are understandable. Their skepticism regarding its enforceability is also valid. As with any agreement, it involves compromises and does not provide an airtight solution to all the challenges. However, given the current circumstances and Israel’s military achievements against Hezbollah, the advantages of accepting the agreement outweigh the disadvantages. These include severing the link between the two arenas—Lebanon and Gaza—and leaving Hamas without Hezbollah’s support, renewing the focus on Iran, and allowing the IDF to regroup and replenish its exhausted forces and depleted munitions stockpiles. Moreover, halting the war in Lebanon could create new momentum for negotiations of a hostage deal, reduce the economic burden, and mitigate international and regional criticism of Israel.
Still, the dynamics on the ground in the coming period will provide substantive content to the agreement and will determine facts. In this context, it’s crucial that Israel does not, as in the past, overlook immediate threats and unaddressed violations by Hezbollah. Israel must not hesitate to use force against the organization when necessary. Demonstrating Israeli determination through effective military enforcement is crucial for shaping the new rules of engagement between Israel and Lebanon—this time, in a way that enhances Israel’s security and deters its adversaries.
After approximately 13 months of intense fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel’s security cabinet approved the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon. While the full terms of the agreement have not been disclosed, they include the following understandings: a 60-day ceasefire during which Hezbollah will gradually withdraw from the area south of the Litani River, IDF forces will leave southern Lebanon, the Lebanese Army (reinforced with additional troops) will gradually deploy, and UNIFIL forces will be strengthened. These principles do not fundamentally differ from UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted in 2006.
The difference lies in two significant additions that could make this agreement more effective than its predecessor: the establishment of an international oversight mechanism, led by the United States, to report on violations, specifically Hezbollah’s renewed deployment south of the Litani and its military buildup north of the river; and more importantly, an American commitment enshrined in a side letter to the agreement, recognizing the principle of “self-defense,” which grants Israel freedom of action to strike in Lebanon in the event of an immediate threat or unaddressed violations.
Hezbollah, after the severe blows that it sustained, the growing internal criticism, and the need to restore its military and political standing—alongside Iranian support for ending the war—ultimately led it to sever its commitment to Gaza and accept the agreement, despite the significant concessions involved.
The concerns of those opposing the agreement, including some residents of the north, are understandable. Their skepticism regarding its enforceability is also valid. As with any agreement, it involves compromises and does not provide an airtight solution to all the challenges. However, given the current circumstances and Israel’s military achievements against Hezbollah, the advantages of accepting the agreement outweigh the disadvantages. These include severing the link between the two arenas—Lebanon and Gaza—and leaving Hamas without Hezbollah’s support, renewing the focus on Iran, and allowing the IDF to regroup and replenish its exhausted forces and depleted munitions stockpiles. Moreover, halting the war in Lebanon could create new momentum for negotiations of a hostage deal, reduce the economic burden, and mitigate international and regional criticism of Israel.
Still, the dynamics on the ground in the coming period will provide substantive content to the agreement and will determine facts. In this context, it’s crucial that Israel does not, as in the past, overlook immediate threats and unaddressed violations by Hezbollah. Israel must not hesitate to use force against the organization when necessary. Demonstrating Israeli determination through effective military enforcement is crucial for shaping the new rules of engagement between Israel and Lebanon—this time, in a way that enhances Israel’s security and deters its adversaries.