Gaza: In the north of the Gaza Strip, the IDF has resumed its ground maneuver eastward, and is operating against the large pocket of resistance that formed between the perimeter line along the coast in the west and the border of the Gaza Strip in the east. Over 150,000 civilians and Hamas operatives who were taken from the battalions that surround Gaza City remain in this area. This is a more difficult core to vanquish, but once it is broken, the campaign in the north of the Gaza Strip will be decided. Yet it is important to remember that even after the decision in the north, we are still far from dismantling Hamas. We need to eliminate its leaders, and we will likely have to act in the south and neutralize the subterranean infrastructure.
The North: Hezbollah is under pressure, and therefore has intensified its effort to strike Israel. The organization's deterrence equations have collapsed and it has already reported 100 Lebanese dead. We attacked Hezbollah sites deep in the country, including sensitive assets. Activists in Syria have been killed, and there is Israeli initiative. The evacuation of tens of thousands of Lebanese Shiites to the north is a difficult image for Hezbollah, which purports to be the defender of the Shiite community and of Lebanon. Hezbollah is also under time pressure. If the war ends with a surprise, then from Hezbollah's point of view there is a chance that the new deterrence equations (which do not exist) will be preserved, and this means a profound change in Israel’s policy of force application against Lebanon: from a reality of avoiding to initiative and design. Will the situation remain below the threshold of war? If we ask Nasrallah, he would likely answer affirmatively. As for Israel, it is not certain – it is possible that Nasrallah will nonetheless give us the necessary excuse in front of the United States that allows broader action in Lebanon.
Yemen: Thiss is a campaign in the second tier, and it is technically complicated. The hijacking of the ship constitutes piracy and was a strategic mistake by the Houthis and Iran, which sent them but of course were quick to deny involvement. Piracy is considered a problem for all countries of the world and contravenes everyone's interests, and it will have to be addressed accordingly. The lack of response so far is what apparently led to the escalation. The US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have chosen to defend themselves and not respond. Since the target of the attacks was Israel, the responsibility for the response is Israel's. Saudi Arabia and the US are determined to maintain the fragile ceasefire reached between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, and any response could reignite the fighting. An Israeli attack, which could prompt retaliation against Israel and Saudi Arabia, could well complicate the situation for them.
Gaza: In the north of the Gaza Strip, the IDF has resumed its ground maneuver eastward, and is operating against the large pocket of resistance that formed between the perimeter line along the coast in the west and the border of the Gaza Strip in the east. Over 150,000 civilians and Hamas operatives who were taken from the battalions that surround Gaza City remain in this area. This is a more difficult core to vanquish, but once it is broken, the campaign in the north of the Gaza Strip will be decided. Yet it is important to remember that even after the decision in the north, we are still far from dismantling Hamas. We need to eliminate its leaders, and we will likely have to act in the south and neutralize the subterranean infrastructure.
The North: Hezbollah is under pressure, and therefore has intensified its effort to strike Israel. The organization's deterrence equations have collapsed and it has already reported 100 Lebanese dead. We attacked Hezbollah sites deep in the country, including sensitive assets. Activists in Syria have been killed, and there is Israeli initiative. The evacuation of tens of thousands of Lebanese Shiites to the north is a difficult image for Hezbollah, which purports to be the defender of the Shiite community and of Lebanon. Hezbollah is also under time pressure. If the war ends with a surprise, then from Hezbollah's point of view there is a chance that the new deterrence equations (which do not exist) will be preserved, and this means a profound change in Israel’s policy of force application against Lebanon: from a reality of avoiding to initiative and design. Will the situation remain below the threshold of war? If we ask Nasrallah, he would likely answer affirmatively. As for Israel, it is not certain – it is possible that Nasrallah will nonetheless give us the necessary excuse in front of the United States that allows broader action in Lebanon.
Yemen: Thiss is a campaign in the second tier, and it is technically complicated. The hijacking of the ship constitutes piracy and was a strategic mistake by the Houthis and Iran, which sent them but of course were quick to deny involvement. Piracy is considered a problem for all countries of the world and contravenes everyone's interests, and it will have to be addressed accordingly. The lack of response so far is what apparently led to the escalation. The US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have chosen to defend themselves and not respond. Since the target of the attacks was Israel, the responsibility for the response is Israel's. Saudi Arabia and the US are determined to maintain the fragile ceasefire reached between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, and any response could reignite the fighting. An Israeli attack, which could prompt retaliation against Israel and Saudi Arabia, could well complicate the situation for them.