The surprising assassination of Fuad Shukr (Hajj Mohsin), Nasrallah’s right-hand man, after the disaster in Majdal Shams, is a very hard and painful blow to Hezbollah. It once again proves Israel’s intelligence and operational capabilities, as they attacked in a targeted manner in the heart of the Dahiyeh neighborhood, Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut. This assassination is significant not only because of Shukr’s status and importance within the organization, serving as a sort of chief of staff at Nasrallah’s side, but also due to his direct responsibility as the head of Hezbollah’s strategic array for attacks on Israel’s northern communities since October 8, and specifically for the killing of the 12 Druze children in Majdal Shams.
A few hours later, the assassination of a senior Hamas official, Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Political Bureau, during his visit to Tehran (for which Israel has not taken responsibility), further strengthens Israel’s sense of capability and courage, but also contributes to the confusion and embarrassment among the leaders of the “axis of resistance,” led by Nasrallah and the Iranians, who are now required to react against Israel.
From our experience so far, the elimination of senior officials has not produced a change at the strategic level, and their main benefit comes from the cognitive value associated with it and the short-term consequences on the developments on the ground. The elimination in Lebanon will not stop the “war of attrition” that Hezbollah is waging against Israel in the north, but it seems that under the current circumstances, after almost 10 months of fighting, it is an appropriate response that allows both sides to avoid a wide war, which neither is interested in at this stage.
Consultations are now being held in Beirut and Tehran on how to respond. Before the assassination of Shukr, Hezbollah, which hesitates to admit his death, had already committed to carrying out an equivalent response to the results of the Israeli operation and had warned against an attack in Beirut. Therefore, it is possible to estimate with certainty that an unusual reaction is expected, but it seems that due to the relatively limited nature of the Israeli action, the attack by Hezbollah will be such that allows Israel to “contain” the event. A lot depends on what Israel will do, especially in circumstances where at the same time a move by Iran is also possible, since the elimination of Haniyeh happened under the noses of its security forces, as well as the desire of the Houthis to retaliate against Israel for the attack on the Hodeida Port.
The surprising assassination of Fuad Shukr (Hajj Mohsin), Nasrallah’s right-hand man, after the disaster in Majdal Shams, is a very hard and painful blow to Hezbollah. It once again proves Israel’s intelligence and operational capabilities, as they attacked in a targeted manner in the heart of the Dahiyeh neighborhood, Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut. This assassination is significant not only because of Shukr’s status and importance within the organization, serving as a sort of chief of staff at Nasrallah’s side, but also due to his direct responsibility as the head of Hezbollah’s strategic array for attacks on Israel’s northern communities since October 8, and specifically for the killing of the 12 Druze children in Majdal Shams.
A few hours later, the assassination of a senior Hamas official, Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Political Bureau, during his visit to Tehran (for which Israel has not taken responsibility), further strengthens Israel’s sense of capability and courage, but also contributes to the confusion and embarrassment among the leaders of the “axis of resistance,” led by Nasrallah and the Iranians, who are now required to react against Israel.
From our experience so far, the elimination of senior officials has not produced a change at the strategic level, and their main benefit comes from the cognitive value associated with it and the short-term consequences on the developments on the ground. The elimination in Lebanon will not stop the “war of attrition” that Hezbollah is waging against Israel in the north, but it seems that under the current circumstances, after almost 10 months of fighting, it is an appropriate response that allows both sides to avoid a wide war, which neither is interested in at this stage.
Consultations are now being held in Beirut and Tehran on how to respond. Before the assassination of Shukr, Hezbollah, which hesitates to admit his death, had already committed to carrying out an equivalent response to the results of the Israeli operation and had warned against an attack in Beirut. Therefore, it is possible to estimate with certainty that an unusual reaction is expected, but it seems that due to the relatively limited nature of the Israeli action, the attack by Hezbollah will be such that allows Israel to “contain” the event. A lot depends on what Israel will do, especially in circumstances where at the same time a move by Iran is also possible, since the elimination of Haniyeh happened under the noses of its security forces, as well as the desire of the Houthis to retaliate against Israel for the attack on the Hodeida Port.