The quarterly meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded this week amid continued confrontation between Iran and the West over Tehran’s compliance with its obligations under the inspection agreements. To prevent a decision against it, Iran invited the agency’s director general for a visit, allowing him to tour two uranium enrichment sites in Natanz and Fordow. Iran even expressed an implicit willingness not to increase the amount of uranium enriched to 60% (a negligible gesture) and considered granting visas to inspectors it had previously disqualified. These measures, aimed at showing goodwill to prevent a decision against it, did not benefit Iran.
The Board of Governors adopted a draft resolution condemning Iran’s non-cooperation and demanding that the IAEA director general prepare a comprehensive report on Iran’s nuclear program, detailing Tehran’s level of cooperation with the IAEA. This report, due by spring 2025, could highlight Iran’s lack of cooperation and failure to address long-standing questions. It could potentially lead to a referral to the UN Security Council, paving the way to declare Iran’s non-compliance and trigger the snap-back mechanism—the reinstatement of UN Security Council sanctions set to expire in October 2025.
In response to the Board of Governors’ condemnation, and as Tehran had made clear in advance, the spokesperson for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announced that Iran would take steps to significantly increase its enrichment capacity, while operating thousands of new advanced centrifuges. This decision took place despite continued signals from the Iranian regime about its willingness to reach a new agreement with the US and Europe on the nuclear issue. On this matter, Ali Larijani, an advisor to the supreme leader and former speaker of the Iranian parliament for many years, stated that “Iran is ready to agree to avoid nuclear weapons if Washington accepts its conditions, including the payment of compensation,” stands out.
It appears that the regime in Tehran is raising the stakes in anticipation of the Trump administration’s entry into office, hoping to get to an agreement for a commitment not to advance toward nuclear weapons without having to roll back its achievements in the nuclear program. This new position is gaining particular validity in light of the increasing voices in Tehran calling for a change in the nuclear policy pursued until now, which has been content with the status of a nuclear threshold state. The discussion on the subject has intensified in the wake of Israel’s severe attacks on Iran’s regional proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as the attack on Iran itself, and the need to achieve stronger deterrence.
At this point, before the Trump administration enters the White House, the parties’ opening positions don’t reflect a shared common denominator for progress toward a deal. However, these are starting positions that may be flexible, given both parties’ declared interest in reaching an agreement.
The quarterly meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded this week amid continued confrontation between Iran and the West over Tehran’s compliance with its obligations under the inspection agreements. To prevent a decision against it, Iran invited the agency’s director general for a visit, allowing him to tour two uranium enrichment sites in Natanz and Fordow. Iran even expressed an implicit willingness not to increase the amount of uranium enriched to 60% (a negligible gesture) and considered granting visas to inspectors it had previously disqualified. These measures, aimed at showing goodwill to prevent a decision against it, did not benefit Iran.
The Board of Governors adopted a draft resolution condemning Iran’s non-cooperation and demanding that the IAEA director general prepare a comprehensive report on Iran’s nuclear program, detailing Tehran’s level of cooperation with the IAEA. This report, due by spring 2025, could highlight Iran’s lack of cooperation and failure to address long-standing questions. It could potentially lead to a referral to the UN Security Council, paving the way to declare Iran’s non-compliance and trigger the snap-back mechanism—the reinstatement of UN Security Council sanctions set to expire in October 2025.
In response to the Board of Governors’ condemnation, and as Tehran had made clear in advance, the spokesperson for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announced that Iran would take steps to significantly increase its enrichment capacity, while operating thousands of new advanced centrifuges. This decision took place despite continued signals from the Iranian regime about its willingness to reach a new agreement with the US and Europe on the nuclear issue. On this matter, Ali Larijani, an advisor to the supreme leader and former speaker of the Iranian parliament for many years, stated that “Iran is ready to agree to avoid nuclear weapons if Washington accepts its conditions, including the payment of compensation,” stands out.
It appears that the regime in Tehran is raising the stakes in anticipation of the Trump administration’s entry into office, hoping to get to an agreement for a commitment not to advance toward nuclear weapons without having to roll back its achievements in the nuclear program. This new position is gaining particular validity in light of the increasing voices in Tehran calling for a change in the nuclear policy pursued until now, which has been content with the status of a nuclear threshold state. The discussion on the subject has intensified in the wake of Israel’s severe attacks on Iran’s regional proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as the attack on Iran itself, and the need to achieve stronger deterrence.
At this point, before the Trump administration enters the White House, the parties’ opening positions don’t reflect a shared common denominator for progress toward a deal. However, these are starting positions that may be flexible, given both parties’ declared interest in reaching an agreement.