Raz Zimmt

Although we are currently in the midst of a war and do not yet know how it will end, the US negotiations initiative—which may bring the campaign to an end—requires a clear definition of Israel’s interest regarding the Iranian nuclear project. The conclusion of Operation Roaring Lion will place Israel and the international community before a new strategic reality vis-à-vis Iran. The regime in Tehran, if it survives the war, may—after experiencing systemic trauma and damage to its senior leadership—adopt a national security doctrine that relies on nuclear weapons as its sole existential deterrent capability. Under these circumstances, it is essential to ensure that Iran retains no nuclear capability that could serve as a foundation for a military nuclear program. This paper argues that previous models of “risk management” (such as the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) are no longer relevant. Therefore, Israel must insist on the complete dismantling of Iran’s uranium enrichment infrastructure and relevant technological capabilities as a necessary condition for ending the war, whether by diplomatic or military means.

This interactive map highlights the deployment of U.S. military assets and other relevant actors in the region. The current U.S. posture signals deterrence and readiness for offensive military operations, while reflecting a strong preference to avoid a protracted conflict. Combined with intensified ISR activity and diplomatic signaling, this configuration supports coercive diplomacy but also increases the risk of escalation through miscalculation in an already volatile theater. The map is updated regularly and as accurately as possible, based on open-source intelligence assessments and media reporting.

Are Iran’s reformists the answer for those seeking an alternative to the rule of the ayatollahs?

Even if the regime manages to overcome the current crisis temporarily, roughly half a century after the revolution, the Second Iranian Republic appears to be approaching its historical end. What might the Third Republic look like?

The Data Analytics Center at INSS provides accurate and up-to-date data on the widespread protests in Iran

Since the end of 2024 there has been growing criticism from ultra-conservative and revolutionary factions in the Islamic Republic on issues of domestic and foreign policy. Most of the criticism has focused on Iran’s lack of response to the Israeli attack on October 26, 2024, Iranian failures in Syria in view of the collapse of the Assad regime, and the decision to postpone implementation of the hijab law, which is intended to increase the severity of penalties for breaches of the Islamic dress code. Although disagreements between the main political streams in Iran are a regular feature of the system, the protest by radical groups is a subject of intense public and political interest, mainly because it centers around decisions that are not the sole responsibility of the government and that were taken by political institutions directly subordinate to the supreme leader, particularly the Supreme National Security Council. Therefore, sections of the conservative camp have expressed concern that the challenges to government policy posed by the radicals could not only further undermine social cohesion but also damage the unity of the governing elite. Even if the radical elements’ growing criticism of regime policy does not constitute an immediate and significant threat to the unity of the Iranian political and security elite, it could undermine the basis of the regime’s ideological support and harm its long-term ability to deal with more important threats to its stability.