Raz Zimmt

The 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June 2025 marked the sharpest escalation to date in the ongoing confrontation between the two states. Despite its relatively short duration, the war had a destabilizing effect on the Islamic Republic due to the success of Israel’s opening strike, the decision of the United States to join the campaign, and the damage sustained by Iran’s critical strategic systems—notably its nuclear program and long-range missile arsenal. Since the end of the war, Iran has engaged in an ongoing process of drawing lessons from the serious gaps revealed in the Islamic Republic’s deterrence and defense capabilities. The Iranian leadership is certainly aware of the need for improvements and adjustments to its national security doctrine; yet for now, this does not appear sufficient to produce a fundamental shift in Iranian strategy. It seems that Iran prefers to make adjustments within the existing framework by finding acceptable solutions to the gaps exposed rather than introducing major changes to its overall strategy. In any event, the new reality in Iran created by the war is characterized by instability, and it is doubtful whether the current status quo can endure for long. This is exacerbated by the growing possibility of a miscalculation between Iran and Israel that would lead to renewed clashes, or high-risk decisions by Iran on both the nuclear issue and on the regional front. This memorandum seeks to examine the lessons that Iran is drawing from the war and its implications in four main areas: the nuclear program, strategic military systems, the regional arena, and the domestic arena—and to assess how the war has influenced Iran’s national security concept. In addition, it includes a set of policy recommendations intended to block, or at least delay, Iran’s efforts to rebuild its strategic capabilities, foremost among them the nuclear program, and the pro-Iranian axis in the region, and to reduce as much as possible the risk of renewed fighting.

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Since the end of 2024 there has been growing criticism from ultra-conservative and revolutionary factions in the Islamic Republic on issues of domestic and foreign policy. Most of the criticism has focused on Iran’s lack of response to the Israeli attack on October 26, 2024, Iranian failures in Syria in view of the collapse of the Assad regime, and the decision to postpone implementation of the hijab law, which is intended to increase the severity of penalties for breaches of the Islamic dress code. Although disagreements between the main political streams in Iran are a regular feature of the system, the protest by radical groups is a subject of intense public and political interest, mainly because it centers around decisions that are not the sole responsibility of the government and that were taken by political institutions directly subordinate to the supreme leader, particularly the Supreme National Security Council. Therefore, sections of the conservative camp have expressed concern that the challenges to government policy posed by the radicals could not only further undermine social cohesion but also damage the unity of the governing elite. Even if the radical elements’ growing criticism of regime policy does not constitute an immediate and significant threat to the unity of the Iranian political and security elite, it could undermine the basis of the regime’s ideological support and harm its long-term ability to deal with more important threats to its stability.