Yaron Schneider

More than 100 missile and UAV launches toward Israeli targets: How has the activity of Iraqi Shiite militias changed since October 2023, and how should Israel respond?

The head of the Iraqi government is charting his country’s course very carefully. On the one hand, he is eager for US forces to remain in Iraq, and he wants to retain American support for his government. On the other hand, he hopes to tighten the connection with the pro-Iranian militias and with Iran. What challenges and obstacles does he face, and how might this situation affect Israel?

After a year of internal conflict and power struggles, the political paralysis in Iraq has ended for the moment, with the establishment of a government – much to Tehran’s satisfaction – led by the pro-Iranian camp. Nonetheless, the chaos in the divided Shiite state is far from over. What lies at the center of the conflict that divides the Shiites in Iraq, and will it be decided by the achievement by Iran and its supporters in the formation of the government?

While weathering a political crisis, Iraq is now at a crossroads regarding the future of the state. In tandem, neighboring Sunni states, led by Saudi Arabia, are moving closer to Baghdad. What are the reasons for this development, and how is it likely to affect the Middle East, Iran’s expansion in the area, and Israel?

The main trend in the Middle East arena is regional detente. Following the competition for hegemony between the various camps (Shiite, Sunni pragmatic, the Muslim Brotherhood, and jihadist) that dominated events in recent years, the patterns in the Middle East shifted in 2021. Especially prominent was a tendency absent in the region for many years in favor of cooperation, departing from the reigning divisiveness. Saudi Arabia and Iran are engaged in dialogue, in part through the mediation of Iraq; the United Arab Emirates terminated its involvement in the wars in Yemen and Libya, and improved its relations with Iran, Syria, and Turkey; after three years of boycott, the dispute between Qatar on one side and the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt on the other has ended; Jordan is engaged in dialogue with Iran and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; and Turkey has shown interest in improving its relations with the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Furthermore, the UAE and Bahrain cultivated their public ties with Israel in the framework of the Abraham Accords, while Egypt seemed intent on strengthening its economic relations with Israel, and is working with Jordan to solve the energy crisis in Lebanon. Israel should give thorough consideration to the significance of the new regional dynamics, and take advantage of the emerging regional openness to expand relations that began in the framework of the Abraham Accords and forge relations with additional countries.

This essay presents an alternative to political negotiations over a permanent status agreement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and argues that this alternative can improve cooperation between the parties and maintain the viability of a two-state solution. Analyzing regional processes, ideas, and Israeli and Palestinian stances, the essay drafts the outline of a political plan based on unilateral moves to shift civilian authority in Area C to the Palestinian Authority, and limited, issue-specific agreements designed to enhance the PA’s governance capability. In addition to their potential to improve PA-Israel relations, such gradual, moderate steps may also bolster Israel’s position in the international arena while skirting the debate dividing the Israeli public. Moreover, in the long term, this outline can help prevent the inadvertent arrival at a one-state reality.