Azar Gat

Why have all attempts at a settlement failed since the Oslo Accords, and what can be learned from this about the chances of resolving the conflict?

A response article to political theorist Michael Walzer, who claimed in the New York Times that Israel’s pager attack was an act of terror

From the perspective of one year, the article re-examines the strategic and policy alternatives available to Israel during the war and the key debates that took place surrounding them

The researcher Azar Gat writes: The experience of the 20th century shows that surprise was achieved in every case in which it was attempted, without exception. What are the reasons for this—and what can be inferred from these findings?

Prof. Azar Gat presents the contradictions and the failures in what he calls “the concept of distress,” which he claims has replaced the “concept of overconfidence” that prevailed among many in the Israeli public and was shattered on October 7

Since Hamas’s attack and the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip, the public discourse has been impressed by the view, which Major General (res.) Itzhak Brik in particular voiced even before the war, that the IDF is too small given the threats; that reliance on technology has led to dangerous neglect and reduction of the ground forces; that the air force is disproportionately funded at the expense of the ground forces; and that there is a need to increase the defense budget significantly and permanently, beyond covering the expenses of the war. This article argues that these claims are misleading and even damaging, both militarily and economically. It contends that the current size of the IDF and that of the main fighting ground formations have proven adequate for future challenges. Despite known failures—particularly in the field of intelligence—the article asserts that elite technology, combined with the quality and determination of its combat troops, has given the IDF its most significant advantages in the war. Therefore, the article advocates to continue prioritizing the investment in technology, in addition to significantly expanding and reforming the inexpensive low-tech local and community ground defense forces, which have been neglected, with disastrous consequences.