Yesterday, the IDF completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon in accordance with the ceasefire agreement of November 27, 2024. However, the IDF continues to hold onto five strategic points in a very limited area along the border. Israel’s decision to maintain its presence at these points—in dominant positions and adjacent to Israeli communities—stems from several considerations, including the assessment that the Lebanese army will struggle, at least in the near term, to fully deploy across the area and act against Hezbollah’s efforts to restore its presence in southern Lebanon, as required by the agreement; the intelligence and operational advantages provided by these strategic positions for defending the border communities; and the need to bolster the sense of security for the evacuated northern residents to encourage them to return to their homes.
Hezbollah is adamantly demanding the immediate withdrawal of the IDF from all of southern Lebanon and has even threatened to take action if it does not occur, although without specifying how (as stated in the latest speech by the organization’s Secretary General, Naim Qassem). For Hezbollah, completing the Israeli withdrawal is of utmost importance, as it would reinforce its claims of victory in the war—claims it will likely declare officially during the grand and widely attended funeral planned for Nasrallah and his successor on February 23.
Lebanon’s new leadership has also publicly opposed the continued Israeli presence at these points, arguing that it constitutes an extension of the occupation, an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty, and a violation of the agreement. However, it appears to have tacitly accepted the situation in light of US backing for Israel. After all, Lebanon’s leadership cannot openly defy Hezbollah’s position, despite its shared interest with Israel in preventing Hezbollah’s reestablishment in southern Lebanon. Furthermore, Lebanon has a long-term interest in dismantling Hezbollah as an independent militia and disarming it, as subtly suggested in the new government’s policy guidelines on February 17. Nonetheless, Lebanon’s president and prime minister have already made it clear that they will continue pursuing full Israeli withdrawal “through diplomatic means.”
Given these circumstances, Israel is likely to face ongoing pressure—both from Lebanon and international actors—to vacate these points as soon as possible. This issue could become a point of contention between Israel and Lebanon’s leadership, which enjoys backing from France, a member of the committee overseeing the agreement’s implementation. Hezbollah might also exploit Israel’s continued presence as proof of the Lebanese army’s weakness against Israel and as justification for maintaining its status as an independent militia, portraying itself as Lebanon’s true protector. Over time, IDF forces at these locations could become targets for attack.
Under these conditions—where Israel has a vested interest in further weakening Hezbollah, potentially leading to its disarmament, while simultaneously strengthening the Lebanese state under its new leadership—Israel should aim to minimize the duration of its hold on these five points and redeploy its forces along the Blue Line as soon as possible. Israel should make it clear now that its presence at these points is temporary and that it will withdraw once the Lebanese army successfully deploys across the area and proves its capability to handle the challenge posed by Hezbollah. A full IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon could also bolster US and other international support for continued Israeli military action against Hezbollah’s violations and threats, as permitted by the agreement should the Lebanese army fail to address them.
Yesterday, the IDF completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon in accordance with the ceasefire agreement of November 27, 2024. However, the IDF continues to hold onto five strategic points in a very limited area along the border. Israel’s decision to maintain its presence at these points—in dominant positions and adjacent to Israeli communities—stems from several considerations, including the assessment that the Lebanese army will struggle, at least in the near term, to fully deploy across the area and act against Hezbollah’s efforts to restore its presence in southern Lebanon, as required by the agreement; the intelligence and operational advantages provided by these strategic positions for defending the border communities; and the need to bolster the sense of security for the evacuated northern residents to encourage them to return to their homes.
Hezbollah is adamantly demanding the immediate withdrawal of the IDF from all of southern Lebanon and has even threatened to take action if it does not occur, although without specifying how (as stated in the latest speech by the organization’s Secretary General, Naim Qassem). For Hezbollah, completing the Israeli withdrawal is of utmost importance, as it would reinforce its claims of victory in the war—claims it will likely declare officially during the grand and widely attended funeral planned for Nasrallah and his successor on February 23.
Lebanon’s new leadership has also publicly opposed the continued Israeli presence at these points, arguing that it constitutes an extension of the occupation, an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty, and a violation of the agreement. However, it appears to have tacitly accepted the situation in light of US backing for Israel. After all, Lebanon’s leadership cannot openly defy Hezbollah’s position, despite its shared interest with Israel in preventing Hezbollah’s reestablishment in southern Lebanon. Furthermore, Lebanon has a long-term interest in dismantling Hezbollah as an independent militia and disarming it, as subtly suggested in the new government’s policy guidelines on February 17. Nonetheless, Lebanon’s president and prime minister have already made it clear that they will continue pursuing full Israeli withdrawal “through diplomatic means.”
Given these circumstances, Israel is likely to face ongoing pressure—both from Lebanon and international actors—to vacate these points as soon as possible. This issue could become a point of contention between Israel and Lebanon’s leadership, which enjoys backing from France, a member of the committee overseeing the agreement’s implementation. Hezbollah might also exploit Israel’s continued presence as proof of the Lebanese army’s weakness against Israel and as justification for maintaining its status as an independent militia, portraying itself as Lebanon’s true protector. Over time, IDF forces at these locations could become targets for attack.
Under these conditions—where Israel has a vested interest in further weakening Hezbollah, potentially leading to its disarmament, while simultaneously strengthening the Lebanese state under its new leadership—Israel should aim to minimize the duration of its hold on these five points and redeploy its forces along the Blue Line as soon as possible. Israel should make it clear now that its presence at these points is temporary and that it will withdraw once the Lebanese army successfully deploys across the area and proves its capability to handle the challenge posed by Hezbollah. A full IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon could also bolster US and other international support for continued Israeli military action against Hezbollah’s violations and threats, as permitted by the agreement should the Lebanese army fail to address them.