A.In a predictable and unsurprising manner, even after Israel’s air force strike, the Houthis’ firing toward Israel hasn’t ceased. The Houthis have continued to launch both missiles and UAVs toward Israeli territory, vowing to persist until Israel ends its campaign in Gaza against Hamas.
B. Despite the frustrating (yet expected) reality in recent weeks, there seem to have been some changes in the campaign against the Houthis, particularly by the US-led coalition. The frequency of operations against the Houthis has significantly increased, and there have been attempts to strike weapons manufacturing and underground command sites using various means to disrupt the organization’s operational capabilities.
C. In the Israeli context, there has also been a profound change in the frequency of strikes (the intervals between strikes have dramatically decreased), but the targets appear to remain unchanged—various infrastructure targets (especially power stations), including in the capital Sanaa during the weekly mass rally for Gaza, sending a message both to the regime and the population.
D. The bottom line is “complex.” Will these strikes force the Houthis to completely stop firing at Israel and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait? It’s highly unlikely. However, this activity, especially by the coalition, does seem to complicate the Houthis’ capabilities, particularly in launching missiles toward Israel (although this capability still exists in principle).
E. As we’ve written, it’s essential to maintain the pace of strikes and improve their quality, especially in targeting production and launch capabilities, as well as significantly impacting the senior Houthi leadership. With President Trump’s entry, it’s crucial to ensure that US Central Command continues (and even intensifies) the pace of strikes, particularly their quality. Naturally, high-quality intelligence is key to achieving these objectives.
F. The campaign against the Houthis will not end soon (assuming the campaign in Gaza continues), but continuous and high-quality strikes will lead to increasing difficulties for the terrorist organization in launching attacks on Israel.
G. In any case, a long-term, integrated solution is required, including a ground campaign by actors in the southern part of the country, supported by the UAE and Saudi Arabia, to bring about an end to Houthi rule in Yemen. This is far from easy, but tolerating a terrorist organization that effectively “chokes” a significant maritime transportation route is unsustainable in the long term, as any concessions to it only bolster its resolve to extort the international community and regional states.
It’s not over yet. It’s another important day in the campaign against the Houthis, but the road ahead remains long.
A.In a predictable and unsurprising manner, even after Israel’s air force strike, the Houthis’ firing toward Israel hasn’t ceased. The Houthis have continued to launch both missiles and UAVs toward Israeli territory, vowing to persist until Israel ends its campaign in Gaza against Hamas.
B. Despite the frustrating (yet expected) reality in recent weeks, there seem to have been some changes in the campaign against the Houthis, particularly by the US-led coalition. The frequency of operations against the Houthis has significantly increased, and there have been attempts to strike weapons manufacturing and underground command sites using various means to disrupt the organization’s operational capabilities.
C. In the Israeli context, there has also been a profound change in the frequency of strikes (the intervals between strikes have dramatically decreased), but the targets appear to remain unchanged—various infrastructure targets (especially power stations), including in the capital Sanaa during the weekly mass rally for Gaza, sending a message both to the regime and the population.
D. The bottom line is “complex.” Will these strikes force the Houthis to completely stop firing at Israel and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait? It’s highly unlikely. However, this activity, especially by the coalition, does seem to complicate the Houthis’ capabilities, particularly in launching missiles toward Israel (although this capability still exists in principle).
E. As we’ve written, it’s essential to maintain the pace of strikes and improve their quality, especially in targeting production and launch capabilities, as well as significantly impacting the senior Houthi leadership. With President Trump’s entry, it’s crucial to ensure that US Central Command continues (and even intensifies) the pace of strikes, particularly their quality. Naturally, high-quality intelligence is key to achieving these objectives.
F. The campaign against the Houthis will not end soon (assuming the campaign in Gaza continues), but continuous and high-quality strikes will lead to increasing difficulties for the terrorist organization in launching attacks on Israel.
G. In any case, a long-term, integrated solution is required, including a ground campaign by actors in the southern part of the country, supported by the UAE and Saudi Arabia, to bring about an end to Houthi rule in Yemen. This is far from easy, but tolerating a terrorist organization that effectively “chokes” a significant maritime transportation route is unsustainable in the long term, as any concessions to it only bolster its resolve to extort the international community and regional states.
It’s not over yet. It’s another important day in the campaign against the Houthis, but the road ahead remains long.